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ABSTRACT

While the Commerce Clause neither mentions federal courts nor
expresslyprohibits the exercise of state regulatorypowers that might
operate concurrently with Congressional commerce powers, the
Supreme Court has long used the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to limit the power of states to regulate across a diverse
array of subject areas in the absence of federal legislation.
Commentatorshave criticizedthe Courtless for creatingthe doctrine
than for applying it in a seemingly inconsistent,or even haphazard
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way. Past commentators have recognized that a game theoretical
model, the prisoners'dilemma, can explain the role of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine in promoting cooperationamong states
by inhibiting a regime of mutual defection. This model, however,
provides at best a partial account of existing dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, and sometimes seems to run directly counter to
actual case results. The difficulty is not the power of game theory to
provide a positive account of the cases or to provide the dormant
Commerce Clausedoctrinewith a meaningful normativefoundation.
Rather, the problem has been the limited choice of models drawn
from game theory to explain the conditions in which states rationally
elect to avoid mutually beneficial cooperative strategieswith other
states.ProfessorStearnsshows how a state might avoid cooperation
in a situation not captured in the prisoners'dilemma account to
disrupt a multiple Nash equilibrium game, thus producing an
undesirable mixed-strategy equilibrium in place of two or more
available pro-commerce, pure Nash equilibrium outcomes. At the
same time, the defecting state secures a rent that only becomes
available as a consequence of the pro-commerce, pure Nash
equilibrium strategies of surrounding states and that is closely
analogous to quasi-rents described in the literature on relational
contracting.The combinedgame theoreticalanalysis,drawingupon
the prisoners'dilemma and multiple Nash equilibrium games, not
only explains several of the most criticizedfeatures of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine and several related doctrines, but also
underscoresthe propernormative relationshipbetween the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine and various forms of state law rent
seeking.
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I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declarean Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declarationas to the laws of
the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how
often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was
meant to end.1
[I]n the 114 years since the doctrine of the negative Commerce
Clause was formally adopted as [a] holding of this Court ... and in

the 50 yearspriorto that in which it was alluded to in various dicta
of the Court ... our applicationsof the doctrine have, not to put too

fine a point on the matter, made no sense.2
INTRODUCTION

Describing the pivotal scene in A Beautiful Mind,3 the 2002
Academy Award winner for Best Picture, is perhaps more
problematic for its mathematical than for its political incorrectness.
The disturbed but brilliant John Nash, a mathematics graduate
student at Princeton, is in a bar with four male classmates. The
men spot a group of women that includes an extremely attractive
blonde woman. One of Nash's classmates offers the following
assessment: According to the teachings of Adam Smith, if all
members of the group pursue the blonde woman, competition, or the
invisible hand, will increase the likelihood that each man will
achieve his desired goal of "scoring" with one of the women.4 In a
burst of mathematical, if not hormonal, inspiration (Nash leaves
the bar without pursuing any of the women), Nash suddenly
realizes that this two century-old conventional economic wisdomsuggesting that competition produces the socially optimal result-is
misplaced in this context. Nash then articulates what the movie
presents as his core insight, justifying his receipt, some fifty years
later, of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics.

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
2. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. A BEAUTIFUL MIND (Universal Studios 2001).
4. For the original (and admittedly less intriguing) illustrations of the invisible hand
proposition, see ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 291-92 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., 1993).
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Nash counters his classmate by explaining that unlimited
competition would prevent the five men from achieving their
desired objectives. If all five men pursue the blonde woman, in their
simultaneous pursuit they will block each other from succeeding
with her. By pursuing that strategy, Nash continues, the men will
offend the remaining women, none of whom would respond
favorably to being considered a consolation prize. In this context,
Nash suggests, competition threatens to produce an inferior result
to that which the men could achieve if they instead coordinated
their pursuits. According to Nash, if the men eschewed the blonde
woman in favor of a coordinated effort in which each pursued one
of the remaining women, each man's prospect for success would
significantly increase.
The purpose here, of course, is not to analyze boorish male
behavior. Nor is it to defend the accuracy of this particular
historical account, one that, at least for this viewer, seems
implausible even for an earlier generation of Princeton mathematics
graduate students. 5 Rather, my objective is to compare the game
theoretical insight presented in this now famous bar scene with the
actual insight that gave rise to John Nash's eventual receipt of the
Nobel prize.
The bar scene reveals a coordination difficulty that the men
appeared to confront in their efforts to secure their individual
objectives. Absent coordination, given their first choice strategies,
the prospect for success by each individual actor was substantially
lower than with coordination.' The problem of coordinated
strategies is not uncommon to game theory; indeed it lies at the
base of what is likely the most well known game-the prisoners'
dilemma.
In the standard prisoners' dilemma game, the inability of two
prisoners to coordinate their behavior or to enforce any prior
agreements, yields an outcome for each that is inferior to that
which would have been available had the prisoners followed a
strategy of mutual cooperation. In this familiar game, each prisoner
is informed that she will receive a modest sentence if neither
prisoner rats out the other; that she will be let free if she alone rats
out the other prisoner, while the other prisoner will get a maximum
5. It is noteworthy that this scene is not recounted in Sylvia Nasar's 1998 book, A
BEAUTIFUL MIND, which provided the basis for the movie.
6. As explained below, not only does this fail to capture Nash's true insight, but also,
it might not accurately characterize the incentives in the bar scene game. See discussion
infra Parts II.B.1, III.B.l.c.
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sentence; and that both will receive a significant sentence short of
the maximum if both rat out the other. Behaving rationally, each
prisoner has an incentive to defect because, regardless of what the
other prisoner does, she can reduce her sentence by being an
informant.7 The problem that the prisoners' dilemma reveals is that
with the given payments,8 the players cannot achieve the potential
superior outcome in which both remain silent and thus both receive
modest sentences because they are unable to. coordinate their
behavior.
The bar scene itself does not necessarily depict a prisoners'
dilemma. Without any coordinated effort, any one (or more) of the
mathematics graduate students could increase his prospect of
succeeding with a woman other than the blonde woman by pursuing
that strategy individually. His payoff from following that strategy
is therefore independent ofwhether the other men pursue the same
strategy.9 For our immediate purpose, however, it is sufficient to
note that participants in cooperation/defection games of this sort
confront incentives that threaten to produce payoffs inferior to
those otherwise available if the participants are unmotivated (as
might have been the case in the Princeton bar), or unable (as in the
prisoners' dilemma), to coordinate their behavior.
At least one prominent game theorist has observed that the bar
scene in A Beautiful Mind fails to accurately capture the true
mathematical insight that resulted in Nash's receipt of the Nobel
Prize.' Nash's foundational insight was not in recognizing that
individuals can improve their positions by adopting cooperative
strategies. Rather, it was in finding a solution that works in every
possible game precisely because it does not require any coordination
7. For a more formal presentation of the prisoners' dilemma game, see discussion infra
Part II.B.1.
8. It is, of course, the relationship between the payments, rather than the nominal
payments, that produces the prisoners' dilemma.
9. This assumes that if two or more men pursue a woman other than the blonde woman,
they will not pursue the same woman. If they did pursue the same woman, they would
confront anew the same coordination difficulty with regard to her that confronted them in
their efforts to pursue the blonde woman.
10. See How Bad Things Can Happen,NEWSWEEKINT'L, Mar. 25,2002, at 74 (presenting
critical interview with Stanford game theorist Paul Milgrom). Because the bar scene was
intended to convey the circumstances under which John Nash developed his first
mathematical breakthrough as a student at Princeton, I do not consider the implications of
this scene for his later axiomatic bargaining theory. For a general discussion describing the
relationship between the two theories, see GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 1-2
(Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985).
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between or among the players. To illustrate, it will be helpful to
introduce another familiar, but contrasting, game involving driving.
In the driving game, two drivers are trying to devise a rule or
custom that optimizes their payoffs, and in doing so recognize the
need to anticipate or otherwise account for the other driver's
behavior. If we assume that the drivers are generally indifferent to
left or right driving, but are concerned about personal safety, then
the second driver will optimize her payoffs by mimicking the first
driver's behavior, whether the initial regime is left or right. Unlike
the prisoners' dilemma game, in which the payoffs produce a single
dominant outcome-mutual defection-in the driving game, the
payoffs produce two possible stable outcomes: right-right or left-left.
The alternative mixed strategies-right-left or left-right-produce
payoffs that either of the two drivers can improve by changing to
the other's chosen regime." Most importantly, the higher payoffs
are achieved without the players formally coordinating their
behavior. Nash's core insight was that there is a unique solution (as
in the prisoners' dilemma), or a set of available solutions (as in the
driving game), that is a stable equilibrium because it produces
maximum payoffs for each player given the likely strategies of the
other players in the absence of any coordination with the other
players.
This brief introduction to cooperative and non-cooperative games
provides an apt prelude to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
and to the game theoretical analysis of that doctrine offered in this
Article. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has long been the
subject of two lines of judicial and academic criticism. First, while
Article I, section 8 grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes," 2 it says nothing of the power of federal
courts to strike down state laws found to undermine some
13
conception of political or economic union when Congress is silent.
11. This is not to suggest that whenever players confront a multiple Nash equilibrium
game, the result of their uncoordinated efforts is invariably a pure Nash equilibrium. A
mixed-strategy equilibrium can arise if the parties incorrectly guess at each other's behavior,
and lack an opportunity to correct their chosen regime after the fact. For a more detailed
discussion and an explanation of why this problem is unlikely in the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine context, see infra note 2266.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Scholars are divided as to whether the Commerce Clause is intended to facilitate
political union, and thus to prevent intentional discrimination that might foment retaliatory
measures by disadvantaged states, or whether the clause is intended to facilitate economic
union and the notion of specialization and exchange (also referred to as comparative
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Indeed, the Commerce Clause neither mentions federal courts nor
expressly prohibits the exercise of state regulatory powers that
might operate concurrently with federal Commerce Clause powers.
Second, critics have questioned the doctrine's effectiveness. One
need not be a law and economics enthusiast to appreciate the
inherent normative appeal of an open national market,1 one that
is unhindered by costly and obstructive state-imposed barriers to
trade. 5 But assuming that to be the goal, then a doctrine that is

advantage). See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 6-6, at 417 (2d ed.
1988) (asserting that "the negative implications of the commerce clause derive principally
from apolitical theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade. The function of
the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not economic efficiency"); Brannon P. Denning &
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral,77 B.U. L. REV. 1089,1109 (1997) (positing
that "the Court has linked much of its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its
assertion that one of the animating principles of the Constitution is economic union, which
would be frustrated if states could enact discriminatory or protectionist legislation aimed at
out-of-state commerce"). In this Article, I argue that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
furthers political rather than economic union.
14. Economists characterize this in terms of promoting "comparative advantage." The
critical insight is that one can have an absolute advantage in two endeavors and still benefit
from specializing in one, and trading with another who, although less skilled in the other in
absolute terms, possesses a comparative advantage in it. Comparative advantage is, of
course, the flip side of the economic concept of"opportunity cost." IfI am an outstanding rock
musician and typist, the opportunity cost of typing is simply too high for me to forgo being
a rock musician. Even ifI have to hire someone who is slower at typing and who makes more
mistakes, the typist and I will both be better offifwe each pursue our respective comparative
advantages.
15. Indeed, Justice Thomas, who ranks among the conservative detractors on the present
Court with respect to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, has conceded its normative
merit, observing that despite its absence of a textual basis, the rulings are both "intuitively
... desirable" and "constitutionally correct." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,618 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Of course the
normative merit of an analysis like that associated with the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is by no means limited to interstate trade. For two articles on GATT that
complement the game theoretical analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine set out
in this Article, see John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARv. L. REV. 511, 526-27 (2000) (offering Madisonian vision of GATT); Warren F.
Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, Towarda Positive Theory of the Most FavoredNation Obligation
and Its Exceptions in the WTOIGATT System, 16 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 27, 39-42 (1996)
(using free rider analysis to explore incentives under most favored nation treaties).

10
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pervasively viewed as "incoherent" 6 and "hopelessly confused" 7
seems unlikely to achieve it.
Despite these general criticisms of the doctrine, in the name of
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has significantly limited
the power of states to regulate across a wide range of subject areas,
including train" and truck 9 safety, imports2 ° and exports 2 ' of
myriad goods and services, the conditions for the intake22 and
outflow2 3 of solid and liquid waste, and insurance 4 and corporate 2 5
16. See, e.g., Brian C. Newberry, Taking the DormantCommerce ClauseToo Far?- West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994), 69 TEMP. L. REV. 547, 556 (1996)
("Whether the issue is state taxation, state environmental regulation, truck safety, or
something else, the cases have continually been decided on an ad hoc basis with the result
being that there is no coherent theory for the Court to follow."); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr.,
Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discriminationin Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REV.
381, 383 (1995) (describing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as incoherent).
17. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
18. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (striking
down state statute that limited train lengths to fourteen passenger cars or seventy freight
cars).

19. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665, 669 (striking down Iowa statute that prohibited,
with exceptions, the use of sixty-five foot twin trailers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520, 523, 530 (1959) (striking down Illinois statute requiring the use of curved
mudflaps when surrounding states required or permitted straight mudflaps).
20. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (sustaining Maine statute that
prohibited the import of live baitfish normative to Maine against dormant Commerce Clause
challenge).
21. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (sustaining
export restrictions on groundwater from Nebraska linked to conservation, but striking
provisions that allowed exports to states that granted reciprocal rights to import
groundwater).
22. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,628 (1978) (striking down
New Jersey statute prohibiting the import of solid and liquid waste originating or collected
out of state).
23. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994)
(striking down municipal flow control ordinance that required waste generated in
municipality to be processed in subsidized private waste transfer station).
24. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,883 (1985) (sustaining Alabama's
differential tax scheme on insurance against dormant Commerce Clause challenge in light
ofMcCarren-Ferguson Act, then striking it down based upon equal protection); United States
v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 562 (1944) (holding that insurance contracts are
within interstate commerce).
25. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (sustaining Indiana
antitakeover statute that permitted control shares in Indiana corporation to be voted only
if other shareholders passed approving resolution); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,646
(1982) (striking down Illinois statute which allowed secretary of state to block tender offer
upon finding failure to provide full and fair disclosure of material information or inequity,

2003]

A BEAUTIFUL MEND

law. In virtually every case, the defending state claimed that the
challenged law was a valid exercise of traditional police powers, and
is thus protected by the Tenth Amendment. The Court's seeming
inconsistency in evaluating this defense has confounded both jurists
and legal scholars.
This Article's thesis is that viewed through the lens of game
theory, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine proves neither
"incoherent" nor "hopelessly confused." Quite the contrary, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, properly understood, furthers
a vital set of objectives associated with political-as distinguished
from economic-union between and among the states. This Article
will reveal that the dormant Commerce Clause cases can be cast
along two analytical dimensions, both sharing a common end point.
While the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine does not target
ordinary in-state wealth transfers from diffuse to organized groups,
it does target two specific types of rent-seeking laws that have the
significant potential, if sustained, to compromise the political
relationships between and among states.
The first dimension of dormant Commerce Clause cases involves
state laws-most prominently tariffs and subsidies-that because
they are obviously economically motivated would, if sustained,
encourage adversely affected out-of-state interests to attempt to
secure reciprocal protections in their own states. In the absence of
benign dormant Commerce Clause intervention, the result of this
state-based prisoners' dilemma game would be one of mutual
defection. And this is so even though it can be demonstrated that
all states would be better off in the absence of such obvious
protectionist measures. Indeed, as the Oliver Wendell Holmes
quote makes plain,2" this familiar account is often presented as
the paradigmatic justification of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. This Article will show that while significant to the overall
objectives of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, this category
represents but a slice of the most significant modern cases.
The second dimension involves laws through which individual
states undermine other states in their efforts to adopt common procommerce strategies that represent one of two or more stable,
pure Nash equilibrium outcomes. While the rents pursued in these
cases are not always apparent, for our immediate purposes it is
sufficient to observe that a phenomenon much like efforts to secure
after fraud or deceit if ten percent or more of the shareholders were located in Illinois).
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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appropriable quasi-rents in relational contracting 27 can arise when
the relationship between two or more states creates an opportunity
for another state to undermine the resulting gains from the
common regime simply by adopting a contrary law. When this
occurs, the motivation is not to secure the benefits flowing from the
particular contrary regime (had the other states started with the
contrary regime, the state whose law is challenged would still have
an incentive to defect), but rather it is to appropriate the gains that
other states have made available through the adoption of a common
pro-commerce strategy. Thus, when several states permit combined
trucks of a particular length, a certain type of mudflap, or trains
that meet particular specifications, a state that seeks to minimize
its own contribution to facilitating a regime of interstate commerce
can upset the resulting gains simply by adopting a contrary regime,
even if the contrary regime has nothing more to commend it than
that adopted more generally by other states. In these cases, when
the Supreme Court strikes down the challenged law on grounds
that it "burdens" commerce, in effect the Court facilitates a benign
multiple Nash equilibrium game, one that presumptively takes
strategies inducing a mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome off the
table,2 but that also effectively ratifies the choice of the early
movants followed by other states. It does so not because the chosen
regime is superior to the alternative, but rather because the
commonality of the regime is more important than the particular
choice of regime. In effect the Court tells the state whose law is
under review that while the states are free to choose any of two or
more available pure Nash equilibrium outcomes, individual states
are not free, after a common regime is in place, to supplant other
states' pure Nash equilibrium outcome with a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, at least absent a sufficient demonstration that the
nonconforming state's motivation is other than to disrupt a pure
Nash equilibrium strategy.
27. See infra notes 234, 236-38, 271-73 and accompanying text.
28. The rule is presumptive because it applies when the state inducing a mixed-strategy
equilibrium cannot justify the nonconforming rule on grounds of that rule's superiority, but
rather has selected it based solely or primarily for its nonconformity with the laws or
dominant practices of other affected states. The Supreme Court is less likely to apply the

presumptive prohibition provided that the state whose law is challenged can demonstrate
that its nonconforming rule is superior for reasons other than the benefits flowing from the
simple act of defecting from a pure Nash equilibrium outcome with respect to other states.
Cf Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,530 (1958) (asserting that a new safety
device-out of line with the requirements of the other States-may be so compelling that the
innovating State need not be the one to give way"); see also infra note 359.
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Perhaps the most significant insight of this Article is that while
the Supreme Court has employed the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to target those narrow forms of rent seeking through which
individual states encourage other states to adopt comparable anticommerce, protectionist measures, or through which individual
states undermine other states' common pro-commerce strategies,
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not targeted against
rent seeking as such. The common end point for each of these
two prohibited dimensions of rent seeking under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine involves the successful efforts of
organized in-state interests to secure rents at the expense of diffuse
constituents, when the resulting laws, although costly and inefficient, are not likely to motivate other states to confer reciprocal
protections, and when the result does not undermine the common
pro-commerce strategies of other states. Simply put, the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is not a subterfuge for economic
substantive due process. Rather, it aims to further interstate
commerce. As a result, the Supreme Court has employed the
doctrine to target those state rent-seeking laws that, if sustained,
would compromise commerce respecting other states either by
encouraging them to enact comparably undesirable laws or by
undermining a desirable common pro-commerce regime that is
already in place.
Jurists and legal scholars have long condemned the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine because of its dubious textual basis and
because of the apparent haphazard manner in which it is applied.2 9
In this Article, I show that the latter claim does not withstand
careful scrutiny. A game theoretical analysis of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine shows that while the Court could
improve its application of the doctrine in discrete areas, it has
applied the doctrine in a manner that is generally coherent and
that furthers credible and important objectives associated with
interstate commerce. As for the claim of textual illegitimacy, the
answer rests on one's willingness to afford the Court power when
the Constitution itself is either ambiguous or broadly worded. The
primary mission of this Article is to offer a positive account of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, one that explains even the
most controversial cases. In so doing, the Article offers a sound,
normative basis for this extremely important doctrine. In short,
while it might have been preferable for the Framers to have
29. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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expressly afforded the federal judiciary dormant Commerce
Clause power, this Article explains why, in the absence of such an
expression, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as currently
applied represents "A Beautiful Mend" that helps to further the
Constitution's overriding commitment to a strong political union
between and among the states.
While the game theoretical model of the dormant Commerce
Clause will not eliminate all of the doctrinal anomalies, the
anomalies that it does explain are of central importance to existing
debates over the doctrine's proper scope, its normative underpinnings, and its coherence. Most notably, the model provides a
foundation for the exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine as well as the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine itself.
In addition to explaining the two dominant dimensions of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence described above, I will provide a
positive explanation of such related doctrines as: (1) state as market
participant, a much contested exception to dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny; ° (2) Article IV Privileges and Immunities, a clause
that has been used as a limited de facto exception to the market
participant doctrine with the effect of restoring the functional
equivalent of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny;3 1 and (3) export
taxation, a dQctrine that appears to allow states to impose
significant burdens on commerce with minimal judicial scrutiny. 2
While it is commonplace in the dormant Commerce Clause
literature to cordon off these separate doctrines, and to limit the
analysis that has been offered only to the dormant Commerce
Clause cases, 3 or to a subset of those cases, 4 this Article
deliberately takes the opposite approach. Rather than dismissing
these doctrines summarily at the end, the game theoretical model
30. See infra Parts I.C.3, III.A.
31. See infra Parts I.C.4, III.A. The doctrine is limited because it does not apply to
corporations and because it only applies to fundamental rights. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
32. See infra Parts I.C.5, III.A
33. See, e.g., Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent DormantCommerceClause:
A Proposed UnitaryFramework,21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 395, 462 (1998) (noting that the
author's proposed "Unitary Framework [offered to explain the dormant Commerce Clause

doctrine] does not apply ... to two sorts of state regulations impacting interstate commerce:
(1) state regulations involving taxation; and (2) state regulations where the State is a 'market

participant'").
34. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092-93 (1986) (focusing on
the movement of goods cases).
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takes them head-on. After all, the analysis that I offer cannot
be described as robust if it loses its explanatory force simply
because the Court has invoked an alternative doctrinal label in
characterizing the operative case facts. In fact, the game theoretical
model is strengthened when the scope of inquiry is broadened to
include these doctrinal exceptions.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I sketch the
existing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and the related
doctrines involving market participation, export taxation, and
Article IV Privileges and Immunities. This Part exposes several of
the most significant anomalies that have proven problematic for
traditional doctrinal analysis, even when that analysis is primarily
motivated by a desire to reconcile existing doctrine.3 Part II, which
also draws upon tools from price theory, public choice theory, and
the study of transactions costs, will set out the game theoretical
model of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Part III applies
the game theoretical model developed in Part II to the cases and
doctrines described in Part I, and offers some modest suggestions
for improving existing doctrine.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE: ANOMALIES AND
INCONSISTENCIES

As suggested in Justice Scalia's opening quote,"6 the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine has among the longest histories of any
active constitutional law doctrine, and especially of any body of
law widely viewed as an illegitimate judicial innovation. Although
some context will be helpful, it is not necessary to provide a
comprehensive historical account of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine for the game theoretical analysis to follow.37 Instead, this
Part sketches the contours of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and related doctrines as they presently exist. In setting out
the relevant cases and doctrines, I remain true to the Court's own
articulation of the governing tests and standards. I deliberately
seek to avoid presenting characterizations that could be viewed as
tendentious or as an effort to cleverly fit the cases into a neat
35. For an informative article along these lines, see Lawrence, supra note 33. For an
article that seeks to reconcile the movement of goods cases, see Regan, supra note 34.
36. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
37. For an excellent and detailed history of the dormant commerce clause cases, see 2
RONALD D. ROTUNDA&JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 11.1 to .11 (3d ed. 1999).
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doctrinal or theoretical framework. Instead, my objective is to
describe the doctrine in the Court's own terms, and in doing so, to
expose the various inconsistencies that have long been the focus of
judicial and academic commentary.
In this Part, I follow a conventional presentation, one that places
the doctrine's exceptions at the end, as apparent inconsistencies to
be explained. In Part III, I use the model developed in Part II to
show that reversing much of the conventional presentation allows
us to synthesize the game theoretical analysis with existing case
law and to show that the dormant Commerce Clause and associated
doctrines can be defended on credible normative grounds.
The dormant Commerce Clause cases are divided in numerous
ways in the literature, and I do not intend to suggest that my
method of presentation is the only one that is correct. The purpose
of this presentation is to identify the principal case categories, and
then to reveal within each of those categories the most prominent
doctrinal anomalies that have been identified in the literature to
criticize the dormant Commerce Clause and its related doctrines. 9
The purpose of the division and classification, in any event, is not
to reconcile the existing cases or doctrines. That comes later.
Instead, the purpose is to highlight the conflicts that have motivated much academic and judicial commentary in a manner that
remains true to the doctrines as the Court itself has expressed
them. Because some of the anomalies relate to foundational aspects
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, including its default
status and the doctrine's relationship to the Court's affirmative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the next two subparts provide a
background of the early history of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and an overview of the modern Commerce Clause cases.40
The Part that follows provides the framework for evaluating the
modern dormant Commerce Clause cases, which are the principal
focus of this Article.

38. For other informative approaches, see supra notes 33-34.
39. The four principal categories are summarized in Table 3, infra Part I.C.2.b, and the
anomalies that are associated with each category are set out in Table 4, infra Part I.C.5.
40. Readers familiar with these aspects of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
are invited to skip ahead to Part I.C.
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in the Marshall,
Taney, and Fuller Courts
An analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine necessarily begins with Gibbons v. Ogden.4 The dispute between Chief
Justice Marshall and Justice Johnson in the landmark Commerce
Clause case centered on the basis for striking down the challenged
New York license granted to Fulton and Livingston, who in turn
granted it to Ogden. Gibbons claimed a competing right to operate
a "vessel[in] the coasting trade" in the same waters pursuant to a
federal statute enacted in 1793. Chief Justice Marshall spent most
of his famous opinion answering the question whether commerce
comprehends navigation, and if so, whether Congress has the power
to regulate navigation that occurs within the boundaries of a single
state against that state's contrary regulation. Marshall's affirmative answer to both questions rested upon his understanding
that "[commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:
it is intercourse."42 Marshall observed that the "power over
commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for
which the people of America adopted their overnment, and must
have been contemplated in forming it."S Marshall cautioned,
however, that the delegated powers under the Commerce Clause
presuppose some powers not delegated, and then set about defining
the scope of Congress' delegated-and conversely the scope of the
states' reserved-powers. Thus, Marshall stated:
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and
that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be,
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the
States generally; but not to those which are completely within

a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of
executing some of the general powers of the government. The
completely internal commerce of a State,
then, may be
44
considered as reserved for the State itself.
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

42. Id. at 189.
43. Id. at 190.
44. Id. at 195.
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Marshall's analysis was in large part motivated by the thendominant conception of federal and state powers residing in
discrete-and thus mutually exclusive-spheres.4 5 The central
theoretical problem that such a supposition posed was that there
were numerous state laws-typified, for example, by inspection
laws-that limited the flow of goods in commerce, but that were
widely understood to operate as valid exercises of state police
powers. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Johnson, who wrote
separately, agreed on two points: first, that the New York license
should be struck down,' and second, that striking down the New
York license should not threaten traditional exercises of state police
powers in general, 7 and inspection laws in particular. 8
Marshall's analysis and language focusing on intercourse
suggested that commerce did not take place at the boundaries of
the states, but necessarily pierced the border of the states, and
sometimes passed entirely through states. This notion, when
combined with the late eighteenth century understanding of powers
residing in discrete and isolated spheres, might have further
suggested that Congress' Commerce Clause power-which in this
case had already been exercised-threatened to diminish or even to
eliminate traditional state police powers that touched upon goods
destined for commerce. Marshall avoided this problem through an
analytical ploy that can rightly be characterized as formalistic. His
analytical technique continues to influence debates over the scope
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. For Marshall, inspection
laws were carved out of the scope of commerce powers because
45. This thinking was motivated in large part by the issue of slavery. In Mayor of New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) and in the PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283
(1849), the Court addressed the permissible extent of state powers in regulating the slave
trade. In Miln, the Court treated the subject matter as one of state police powers, thus
allowing a state to require shipmasters to report the names and residences of passengers.
In the PassengerCases, a divided Court struck down, among other things, a state statutory
provision that imposed a per-passenger tax used to defray the cost of health inspections and
treatment of incoming passengers on a slave ship. Provided the regulatory power resided in
the states, southern states had an incentive to support the mutually exclusive powers model.
But once the Court determined the subject area to be national, the same states were
motivated to argue for the abandonment of the exclusive powers model in favor of one that
allowed concurrent regulation.
46. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 211; id. at 234 (Johnson, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 211; id. at 235 (Johnson, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 211-14; id. at 235-36 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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"[tihey act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign
9
commerce."n
Justice Johnson, in contrast, rested his analysis on the nature of
the underlying state law, rather than on a timing-based conception
of when goods are or are not in commerce. Thus, Johnson asserted
that while inspection laws touch on goods in a noncommercial
capacity, by ensuring that goods destined for commerce are safe and
that noxious goods are stopped in their tracks and quarantined, the
same could not be said about the New York license.50 The license
ultimately prohibited all others who sought to navigate waters
between New York and New Jersey. The nature of the New York
license was therefore commercial, and thus off limits without
regard to whether Congress had acted in the first instance. The
positions of the two justices are summarized in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Marshall and Johnson Frameworks
in Gibbons v. Ogden
Pre-Commerce
Commercial
Regulation
Non-Commercial
Regulation

In Commerce
New York License

Inspection Laws

In the Marshall framework, inspection laws operated precommerce, and thus fell within the valid bounds of state powers
represented in the left-hand side of the four box matrix. In contrast,
in the Johnson framework, such laws were valid because they
operated in the lower half of the same four box matrix. Because the
lower left box overlaps in these two conceptions, we can place the
hypothetical inspection laws in that box, consistent with the
competing analyses of both jurists. In addition, both Marshall and
Johnson voted to strike down the New York license, again for
competing reasons that allow us to identify an overlapping box in
49. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 232-33 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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Table 1. For Marshall, the New York license operated in an area in
commerce, and since Congress chose to regulate it, the contrary
state law had to yield. This analysis places the actual case in the
right two boxes. For Johnson, however, because the state law was
commercial in nature, it was invalid without regard to whether
Congress had acted, thus placing it in the top two boxes. Because
these categorizations again overlap--this time in the upper right
box-we can place the actual case facts there in a manner
consistent with both opinions. In short, because the debate between
Johnson and Marshall allowed both to maintain their preferred
positions with respect to the immediate case and the most significant hypothetical that they envisioned, it was unnecessary to
the outcome of Gibbons for the Court to resolve these two competing
visions of the Commerce Clause. The next time that Marshall was
presented with an opportunity to strike down a state law on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, he declined, holding that the
state law in question was a valid exercise of state police powers."1
The Taney Court further considered the question of whether
the Commerce Clause imposed a judicially enforceable negative
prohibition on states. As with the Marshall Court, the Taney Court
initially expressed its affirmative answer in the form of dictum.52
51. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244, 250-52 (1829), a
federally licensed sloop broke and injured a dam, erected under the authority of Delaware
law, on a creek that flowed into the Delaware River. In defending against a suit for the
resulting damages, Wilson claimed that the state law authorizing the dam violated the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 250. In this case, Chief'Justice Marshall found no clear preemption,
and thus was forced to consider the question raised in Johnson's Gibbons analysis, namely
whether in the absence of a federal statute, a state statute that interfered in some sense with
interstate commerce was void under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 251. In his short opinion
for the Court, Marshall appeared to follow Johnson's lead in asking whether the regulation
in question was commercial in nature. Id. at 252. Marshall conceded that had Congress
chosen to regulate access through small navigable creeks, "we should feel not much difficulty
in saying, that a state law coming to conflict with such act would be void." Id. at 250. He also
recognized, however, the Delaware statute as an exercise of state police powers that had the
effect of enhancing property values and of promoting the health of local inhabitants. Id. at
251. In essence, Marshall appeared to recognize, perhaps in some tension with his earlier
Gibbons analysis, that a challenged state law might be "commercial" for purposes of
evaluating a preemption case (meaning in this instance that Congress has actually exercised
its Commerce Clause powers), but "police" when Congress has failed to do so, and instead,
when the Court must evaluate a state law under the Commerce Clause operating in its
dormant capacity.
52. In a later case, Pennsylvaniav. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13
How.) 518 (1852), the Supreme Court, over Chief Justice Taney's dissent, appears to have
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In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,5 3 the Court addressed the constitutionality of an 1803 Pennsylvania statute that required local
pilots on ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia.
Operating in the background of the case was a 1789 federal statute
that provided for local regulation of pilotage unless Congress sought
to impose a uniform rule in the future.5 4 The Court did not consider
the federal statute controlling, however, because under the thendominant thinking about the separate spheres of federal and state
powers, if the regulation of pilotage was local, Congress lacked the
power to regulate in any event, and if it was national, it remained
unclear whether Congress had the power to delegate that power
back to the states.' But the Court observed that the federal statute
did "manifest[D the understanding of Congress"" that regulation of
pilotage was not such as to require exclusive federal regulation.
Unlike in the earlier Marshall Court opinions, Justice Curtis,
writing for the majority, determined that the state pilotage law did
regulate an aspect of commerce.5 7 The Court went on, however, to
qualify its holding, stating:
[Tihe power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field,
containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects,
quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a
single uniform rule ... and some, like the subject now in
exercised dormant Commerce Clause power. In Belmont Bridge, the Court granted an
injunction compelling a company constructing a bridge on the Ohio River pursuant to
Virginia law to remove or to modify the bridge so as to operate consistently with the interests
of Pennsylvania in facilitating traffic along the river to and from its ports. The Court's
reliance upon the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is obscured because the case rested
upon the Court's original jurisdiction (Pennsylvania was a party), and because the Court
relied for its injunction upon an exercise of its equitable powers, without mentioning the
Commerce Clause. In contrast, Chief Justice Taney discussed and rejected dormant
Commerce Clause power in his dissent. In a later case, after the bridge was blown down by
a violent storm and the company planned to rebuild, on defendant's motion the Supreme
Court dissolved its earlier injunction, relying upon a subsequently enacted federal statute
that approved construction at the original location on terms more favorable than those set
out in the Court's earlier decree. See Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 521 (1856).
53. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
54. See id. at 315.
55. Id. at 319-20. For a discussion of the linkage of this issue to slavery, see supra note
45.
56. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 320.
57. Id. at 315-16.
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question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone
can meet the local necessities of navigation.8
The Court went on to articulate the following famous-if not
terribly helpful-formulation:
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for
the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain.59
Finally, in the first of two related Fuller Court opinions, both
written by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Coirt struck down a
state law based upon the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, only
to then in the second case issued one year later, hold that Congress
could confer upon states regulatory power over the same subject
matter. In Leisy v. Hardin,0 the Court applied the "original
package doctrine "l 1-preventing states from taxing items shipped
in original packages in interstate commerce-to strike down an
Iowa law under which a local marshal seized kegs of beer that Leisy
brewed in Illinois and shipped in original packaging to Iowa. 2 Chief
Justice Fuller held that although Iowa could regulate local liquor
consumption, under the Cooley formulation, the Court could not
allow the seizure to stand.6' The Court stated:
Whenever ... a particular power of the general government is
one which must necessarily be exercised by it, and Congress
remains silent, this is not only not a concession that the powers
reserved by the States may be exerted as if the specific power
58. Id. at 319.
59. Id. While the Court appeared to reject the national/local distinction in favor of the
inquiry into whether the challenged statute affected commerce "only indirectly, incidentally,
and remotely," see Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888)], the Court has continued to

draw upon both formulations.
60. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
61. Id. at 110-12. The Court articulated this doctrine in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827), and then restricted its use inMichelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,
298 (1976).
62. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 101-02.
63. Id. at 125.
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had not been elsewhere reposed, but, on the contrary, the only
legitimate conclusion is that the general government intended
that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action
of the States cannot be permitted to effect that which would be
incompatible with such intention.'
Within months of the Leisy decision, Congress passed the Wilson
Act, which effectively exempted liquor traveling interstate from
the original package doctrine.6 5 Even though in Leisy Fuller had
stated that taxing originally packaged liquor violated the dormant
Commerce Clause on the ground that the subject matter demands
the application of a uniform national rule," in In re Rahrer he
proceeded to sustain the Wilson Act. 7 In the latter case, Fuller
stated that:
No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that
certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be
governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an
earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not
within its competency to do so.68
This awkward circumlocution later became unnecessary, once the
Court abandoned the notion that commerce could be delineated as
inherently national or local, and thus that the respective powers of
Congress and the states could not overlap. But even with this later
jurisprudential refinement, the combined Cooley/Leisy/Rahrer
regime helps to frame the modern dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.

64. Id. at 109.
65. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 563 (1891).
66. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 125.
67. 140 U.S. at 562.

68. Id.
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Table 2 summarizes the discussion:
Table 2: Commerce Categories
Congress
Regulates
Inherently
National
(direct)

States cannot act
(per Gibbons v.
Ogden)

Inherently
Local
(indirect,
incidental, or
remote)

States cannot act
(but see New York
v. United States;
United States v.
Lopez)

Congress
Silent
States cannot
act
t

Congress
Delegates
States can act
(per In re
Rahrer)

Cooley
[irrelevant
cell]
States can act

While the first column, which treats the subject matter of the
Congressional Commerce Clause powers, and the third cell, which
treats the subject matter of congressional delegation, are not the
central concern of this Article, filling in these cells will help to
provide the necessary context for the analysis to follow. The upper
left box is easily handled by Gibbons itself. In that case, the Court
held that if Congress regulates in an area that is inherently
national, the federal statute will preempt a contrary state law, and
thus states cannot act. 69 The lower box in the first column is more
problematic. To flesh out that box, which is now complicated by
such cases as New York v. United States70 and United States v.
Lopez, 7 we must briefly consider the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.

69. See Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824).
70. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
71. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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B. A Brief Excursion on CongressionalCommerce Clause Powers
Beginning in the mid 1930s during the New Deal and continuing
until the mid to late 1990s, the Supreme Court had all but abandoned a narrow construction of the Commerce Clause coupled with
a broad reading of the Tenth Amendment to limit Congressional
regulation of commerce. During this roughly sixty-year period, the
Court sustained nearly all exercises of congressional Commerce
Clause powers regardless of the local nature of the underlying
subject matter,72 or the seemingly attenuated connection to
commerce. 71 While the Court's permissive use of the Commerce
Clause generated strong dissents among conservative jurists and
academic commentators, it was not until the 1992 decision in New
York v. United States7 ' that the Court, for the first time in nearly
six decades, struck down a federal statute as extending beyond
federal Commerce Clause powers, or conversely, as violating the
Tenth Amendment.75
The New York holding was narrow and did not rest upon a
finding that Congress had improperly regulated a subject area off
limits to it under the Commerce Clause due to its inherently local
nature.76 In fact, there is little question that the subject matter
---disposal of low level radioactive waste--fell squarely within the

72. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding
application of Fair Labor Standards Act to municipal transit authority and overruling
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), which had exempted "areas of
traditional governmental functions" under a four-part test); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (upholding application of production quota under the Agricultural Adjustment Act to

a farmer growing wheat for his own consumption); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (abandoning temporal formalism in upholding the National Labor Relations
Act as applied in a large scale manufacturing context).
73. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(sustaining the public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit

discrimination against African Americans by a hotel under the Commerce Clause, thus
avoiding the difficult state action problems that threatened to arise if the Court instead
relied upon Congressional enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (applying the same analysis to a restaurant).
74. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
75. Id. at 156 ("In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal
and state governments, the [Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause] ... inquiries are
mirror images of each other.").
76. See id. at 159-60.
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proper scope of congressional commerce powers."v Instead, the
Court objected to a coercive tactic employed in a federal statute,
which imposed draconian sanctions upon states that did not become
self-sufficient in storing low-level radioactive waste in a manner
consistent with a series of progressive deadlines, either by siting a
waste facility in-state or by joining a regional pact. 8 While she
had previously suggested that federalism is designed to limit
excessive governmental powers,79 in New York v. United States,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held for the first time
that Congress lacks the power to "commandeer" state legislatures .o
The anticommandeering doctrine holds that while Congress can
create incentives, for example, by linking the receipt of federal
funds to the passage of certain state law programs, and while
Congress can threaten to preempt contrary state regulations if the
states do not undertake a favored program, Congress otherwise
lacks the constitutional power to force states to regulate on its
behalf."'
Three years later, the Court issued a far more important decision
suggesting a meaningful limit for the first time since the New Deal
on Congress' Commerce Clause powers based on subject matter. In
the 1995 decision, United States v.Lopez,8 2 the Court, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, struck down the Gun Free School Zones
77. Id.
78. See id. at 174-77.
79. For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice O'Connor wrote, "Perhaps the principal
benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power. The
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection ofour fundamental liberties.'" 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)
(internal quotations omitted)).
80. New York, 505 U.S. at 161. "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.'" Id. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981) (alteration in original)).
81. The Court subsequently extended this principle in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997), holding that the Brady Act, which required state chief law enforcement officers
to perform background checks on prospective gun purchasers, violated the
anticommandeering principal even though the Act directed executive officers rather than
state legislatures. But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (employing quasi-market
participant analysis to reject anticommandeering challenge to Driver's Privacy Protection
Act, which regulates disclosure of personal information from records of state motor vehicle
departments).
82. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Act of 1990. The Act made it a federal crime to knowingly possess
a gun in a place that the person knows or has reason to believe is
a school zone."3 In doing so, the Court suggested a far more
significant set of restrictions on Congress' use of Commerce Clause
powers, asserting that the prior expansive use of these powers could
be placed into three categories: (1) "the channels of interstate
commerce," (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce," and (3) "economic
activit[ies]" that "substantially affect interstate commerce." 4 The
Lopez Court determined that however expansive prior Commerce
Clause jurisprudence had been, and without overruling any earlier
cases, the challenged statute extended beyond the permissible
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.8 5
Lopez is relevant to Table 2 in two respects. First, it requires a
qualification in what once had been a clear presentation in the
lower box under column one. Until Lopez, one could predict with
some certainty that if Congress regulated under the Commerce
Clause, the states could be prevented from enacting a contrary
regulation, even if the subject area appeared to be inherently local.
Without suggesting that the pre-Lopez regime was one without
limits on Congressional powers, one could confidently represent
that the Court had not yet found them. In Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not claim to change pre-existing Commerce Clause
doctrine, but there is little doubt that some revisionism attended
his effort to squeeze the expansive jurisprudence in that area into
three doctrinal categories, into which the challenged statute did not
fall. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that while
Congress retains considerable Commerce Clause powers, those
powers are now subject to some limitations affecting inherently
83. Id. 567-68.

84. Id. at 558-59. "Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." Id. at 560.
85. Id. at 567-68. More recently, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the
Court extended Lopez to strike down a provision in the Violence Against Women Act, which

provided a civil remedy against any person "who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender." Id. at 605 (quoting Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1997
& Supp. 2002)). As in Lopez, the Court ruled out the first two categories easily, and
determined that to fit the statute into the third category-"activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce"-would require abandoning the distinction between that which is
"truly national and ... [that which] is truly local." Id. at 618.
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local activity. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Lopez
categories are notable for the dormant Commerce Clause cases that
follow. As one commentator recently observed: "[M]ost ... [dormant
Commerce Clause] cases involve conduct that, were it regulated by
Congress, would be considered regulation of either the channels of
interstate commerce (and things or persons moving therein) or of
instrumentalitiesof interstate commerce-the least controversial
of Lopez's taxonomy of congressional commerce power."' The
discussion of the principal dormant Commerce Clause cases in the
next subpart of this Article is consistent with this assertion."
Before discussing the second column in Table 2, let us briefly
turn to the third. The lower right cell is uninteresting. If a subject
area is inherently local, then there is simply no need for Congress
to delegate as a precondition to a state's exercise of regulatory
power in that area. The upper right cell is important, and has
become analytically problematic, in large part due to Chief Justice
Marshall's formalistic conception of commerce expressed in
Gibbons, namely the idea that federal and state powers with respect to commerce reside in discrete and non-overlapping spheres."
If a power was truly national, then as suggested by Chief Justice
Fuller in Leisy, it requires a uniform rule.89 And while the Court
need no longer rely upon Fuller's awkward formalism,9" Fuller's
ultimate holding in Rahrerthat Congress can delegate to states the
power to regulate an area that would otherwise have been deemed
inherently national9 ' remains good law. As a result, Congress has
full power to delegate to the states regulatory authority over
commerce, with the caveat that any resulting state law will remain
subject to independent constitutional checks.9 2
86. Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Constitutional
Structure 20 (Mar. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
87. See infra Part I.C.
88. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-05 (1824).
89. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890) ("Where the subject matter requires a
uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it is vested exclusively in
Congress .... ").
90. Id. at 109 (suggesting that when "different rules may be suitable for different
localities" Congress may divest powers "of the nature of the power granted to the general
government" to the states "until or unless circumscribed by the action of Congress").
91. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1891).
92. For a case that illustrates this proposition, see Metropolitan Life Insurnace Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), which struck down Alabama's differential tax scheme on
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C. Return to the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Modern Era
We have now established not only the doctrinal context for the
middle column in Table 2 (state regulatory powers in the face of
Congressional silence), which represents the principal focus of this
Article, but also the nature of permissible federal regulations of
commerce against which illicit state interference with commerce is
most obviously compared. When Congress is silent, under the
Cooley formulation it devolves to the federal courts to determine
whether a challenged state law falls into a subject area that is
inherently local, thus remaining within state powers, or inherently
national, thus removed from state powers unless Congress
delegates that power to the states. But as we have already seen,
the Court has abandoned its once dominant jurisprudential conception-prevalent throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries-that unless otherwise clear from context, for example in
area of taxation, 93 the respective spheres of federal and state power
are presumed to be hermetically sealed. 9 ' As a result, even before
we review the modern dormant Commerce Clause cases, we can
appreciate the difficulty that the Court inevitably confronts in
trying to classify challenged laws according to whether they touch
on a matter that is inherently national, or commercial, in nature,
or, as subsequently expressed, whether they touch upon commerce

insurance based upon equal protection notwithstanding a federal statute enacted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause delegating regulatory power over insurance to states.
93. The area of concurrent taxation is noteworthy in that in the chestnut decision,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall, while
acknowledging that taxation powers were concurrent, employed a process-based argument
drawn from political theory suggesting that if individual state legislatures, which answer to
a constituency that represents a subset of the nation as a whole, were permitted to tax a
national entity individually or collectively, the state taxation power could then be-exercised
so as to destroy. Id. at 429-31. In his recent article, Professor Denning argues that the same
analysis provides at least a partial rejoinder to those who read Hamilton's FEDERALIST No.
32 narrowly to argue against an original understanding consistent with construing the
Commerce Clause to operate in a dormant capacity. See Denning, supra note 86. As Denning
argues, the same difficulty with vesting a subpart of the whole with power to tax an entity
of the whole applies in allowing subparts of the whole to regulate commerce as it affects the
whole. Id. While Denning does not construct, or rely upon, game theory in setting forth his
argument, his structural analysis is largely consistent with the model developed in Part II.
94. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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"only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely ..... . Because the
categories of police powers and commercial regulatory powers
necessarily overlap, any implicit limitation derived from the
Commerce Clause on state powers threatens to undermine its
functioning in traditional regulatory areas.9" It is for that reason,
I would suggest, that the Court's doctrinal formulations often
appear inadequate in explaining the contours and import of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.9 7 Only after we have reviewed
the relevant cases arising under the dormant Commerce Clause and
related doctrines-market participation, export taxation, and
Article IV Privileges and Immunities-will we be prepared for the
game theoretical framework that I suggest will help to explain
these cases and to provide a sounder normative foundation for some
of their most criticized features.
In contrast to the prior subpart, the section that follows is not
presented in historical sequence. Instead, I discuss cases that are
most helpful in setting forth the Court's doctrinal formulations for
the major case categories, and then introduce other cases and
95. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888).
96. To fully appreciate this point, it is worth remembering a critical distinction between
federal and state constitutional structures. The United States Constitution operates on a
stripping and vesting model. Powers are stripped from the states, and vested in the various
branches of the federal government or in the federal government generally. In this model,
Congress is presumed to lack power absent a proper constitutional hook, and it is further
subject to independent constitutional constraints. In contrast, state constitutions are
premised upon a plenary powers model. State legislatures are presumed to have power
unless limited by the constraints imposed by the state or federal constitutions, by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, or by laws enacted pursuant to the federal Constitution. See Maxwell
L. Stearns, The MisguidedRenaissanceof Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1258 (1994); see
also James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of PopularSovereignty: Using the Initiative
Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 553 n.329, 554 (1986). As
suggested in the text, especially in a regime of overlapping powers, the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine holds great significance for this combined constitutional scheme. The Tenth
Amendment admonition that "{tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people," U.S. CONST. amend. X, is less meaningful if the limitations on plenary state
legislative powers, especially those understood to operate in the area of traditional police
powers, derive from implicit limits imposed by the Commerce Clause operating in its
dormant capacity, in addition to the explicit limits imposed through Congress's already broad
exercise of power under that expansive clause.
97. This is especially true in the core cases falling into the multiple Nash equilibrium
category, namely Kassel and Bibb. See infra Parts I.C.2.b (explaining anomalies that cases
represent under the Court's own doctrinal framework), III.B.2.a (recasting cases based upon
multiple Nash equilibrium analysis developed in Part II).
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doctrines that reveal the apparent inconsistencies and limits of the
Court's articulated doctrinal formulations. The presentation is not
comprehensive. I add cases and details to the discussion in Part III.
My purpose is to establish both the basic doctrinal framework and
to expose the apparent inconsistencies in applying that framework
that have given rise to the widespread criticism of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine both from members of the Court and
among constitutional scholars.
We will begin with City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,9" a well
known case involving facial discrimination in the increasingly
important and litigious area of waste disposal." Because this case
helps establish multiple doctrinal categories, I quote somewhat
more extensively from it than from the cases that follow.
1. Statutes that Facially Discriminatein Commerce
a. Waste Import Restrictions and EnvironmentalProtection
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,"° a New Jersey statute
prohibited importing most "solid or liquid waste" originating outof-state. The state supreme court sustained the law against a
Commerce Clause challenge by, among others, private landfill
operators, concluding that it "advanced vital health and environmental objectives." 10 ' On appeal, the Supreme Court determined
that there was no controlling federal statute, and thus no preemption. °2 Thus, the case arose under the Commerce Clause
operating in its dormant capacity.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, began by rejecting the
state's argument that the negative value of waste prevents it from
being a commodity in commerce. 0 3 Stewart then articulated his
98. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
99. The proliferation of waste-related cases is well captured in the statement by Judge
Cabranes that the federal judicial docket has become "clogged with ... garbage." SSC Corp.
v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1995).
100. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
101. Id. at 620.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 622 ("All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none
is excluded by definition at the outset.... Hence, we reject the state court's suggestion that
the banning of 'valueless' out-of-state wastes ... implicates no constitutional protection."). In
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vision of the role of the federal courts in dormant Commerce Clause
cases:
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the States, many subjects of potential federal
regulation under that power inevitably escape congressional
attention because of their local character and their number and
diversity.... In the absence of federal legislation, these subjects
are open to control by States so long as they act within the
restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself.'°4
Justice Stewart then relied upon Justice Jackson's famous articulation, expressed in H.P.Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,1 °5 of the
object of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence:
Th[e] principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which
alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the
economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers
against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states
are not separable economic units....
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the
states which make up this federal free trade unit has been the
most impressive in the history of commerce, but the established
interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of
protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens
and repressions....
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craisman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
the more recent decision, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383
(1994), the Court struck down a flow control ordinance that required all waste generated
within Clarkstown to be deposited at a specified waste transfer station, which would then
collect a fee exceeding the cost of disposal, as a means of financing the station's construction.
Id. at 394-95. In that case, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority and striking down the
challenged statute, provided a more obvious justification for treating waste as commerce:
As the town itself points out, what makes garbage a profitable business is not
its own worth but the fact that its possessor must pay to get rid of it. In other
words, the article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather
the service of processing and disposing of it.
Id. at 390-91.
104. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
105. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude
them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him
from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders;

such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it
reality.' °
Relying upon H.P. Hood & Sons, Justice Stewart then asserted
that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtuallyper se rule of invalidity has been erected." 10 7
Stewart noted that the clearest examples of such laws "overtly
block[] the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." 8 He'
added, however, that "where other legislative objectives are credibly
advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate
trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach." 9
Stewart then quoted the balancing test initially articulated by
Justice Stone in Pike v. Bruce Church:' 0
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.... If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on

106. Id. at 537-39. Justice Stewart quoted only the first paragraph of the block quote as
it appears in H.P.Hood & Sons. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623. For Professor
Bittker's description of the Jackson quote as stretching history, see BORIS I. BITTKER,
BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.06, at 6-35 to 6-36

(1999).

107. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Professor Regan has argued
that, at the time of his article, all but one major Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
case in the movement of goods category that purported to apply this, or some other,
balancing test, could be best explained, without the use of balancing, by inquiring whether
the Court found appropriate proxies for purposeful discrimination and that Justice Stone was
the only true balancer on the Court. See Regan, supra note 34, at 1107, 1260. Regan concedes
that the Court does employ a form of balancing in transportation cases, which are not the
primary subject of his article. See id. at 1092-93
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whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities."'
In City of Philadelphia,Justice Stewart did not obviously apply
either the per se rule of invalidity or the balancing test as
articulated in Pike. He began his analysis by evaluating the state's
contention that the statute was motivated primarily by environmental rather than financial concerns." 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court had found that the statute was environmentally motivated,
citing as support findings in the legislative history concerning
the environmental toll resulting from the shortage of landfill
space."' The State refuted the allegation that the statute was
financially motivated, observing that New Jersey landfill operators
were among the plaintiffs and that no commercial in-state interests obviously stood to gain from the regulation. 114 In contrast,
appellants challenged the statute by relying upon statements in the
legislative history that pointed to the need to extend the life of local
landfills to delay "the day when New Jersey cities must transport
their waste to more distant and expensive sites."" 5 For Stewart, it
was not necessary to resolve the dispute: "[Wie assume New Jersey
has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as their
environment.""" Stewart added:
This dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be
resolved, because its resolution would not be relevant to the
constitutional issue to be decided in this case. Contrary to the
evident assumption of the state court and the parties, the evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as
legislative ends." 7
Instead, the problem was New Jersey's chosen method of
advancing those interests. Justice Stewart distinguished cases
111. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624 (alteration in original) (quotingPike, 397 U.S.
at 142); see also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,441-42 (1977) (citing the
Pike balancing test).

112. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 625-26.
113. Id. at 625.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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involving the quarantine of noxious goods, observing that
"quarantine laws ban[] the importation of articles such as diseased
livestock that require [ destruction as soon as possible because their
very movement risk[s] contagion and other evils."11 Rather than
discriminating in commerce, such laws "simply prevent[] traffic in
noxious articles, whatever their origin."119 The difficulty in this
case, however, is that New Jersey affected a patent discrimination
based upon point of origin without having a "reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently."12 ° Stewart then observed
that "New Jersey may pursue ... [its] ends by slowing the flow of all

waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate
commerce may incidentally be affected."' QuotingFoster-Fountain
PackagingCo. v. Haydel,122 Stewart added: "[A] 'State is without
power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being
shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they
are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by
the people of the State.' 12 As a result, Stewart concluded that
"[tihe New Jersey law at issue ... falls squarely within the area
that
12
the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation." '
118. Id. at 628-29.
119. Id. at 629.
120. Id. at 627.
121. Id. at 626.
122. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
123. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627 (quoting Foster-FountainPackaging,278 U.S.
at 10).
124. Id. at 628. Stewart added that there is a sense of fair play that underlies the Court's
ruling: "Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their
waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those States might then claim the
right to close their borders." Id. at 629. Writing in dissent, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
observed that the ruling appeared to present what he regarded to be an unwarranted
Hobson's choice:
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving itself to cast
about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious problem of disposing
of the waste generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste from
every portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety
problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within
the State.
Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an article sympathetic to the Rehnquist dissent,
see generally Paul E. McGreal, The FlawedEconomics ofthe DormantCommerce Clause, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191 (1998) (arguing that the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, especially as applied in the waste disposal cases, is based upon an erroneous set of
premises drawn from neoclassical economics, rather than a better suited prisoners' dilemma
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The City of Philadelphiadecision thus presented something of an
ambiguity as to the test it applied in striking down the waste
import restriction. While the Court articulated two rules, the per se
rule of invalidity and the balancing test, it is not clear which, if
either, of these tests the Court actually applied. The problem is
that while the statute at issue was facially discriminatory against
commerce, it was coupled with an interest that the Court acknowledged to be legitimate for the state to pursue, albeit not by
the chosen means. This leaves open the possibility that when the
fatal defect is the means chosen, the applicable standard might not
be the per se rule, but rather a kind of strict scrutiny, which the
Court hinted at but did not fully articulate in its opinion. Rather
than merely balancing the possibility of a nonrestrictive alternative,
the Court might have demanded the absence of such a possible
alternative as a precondition to sustaining the challenged law. The
following cases help to determine when such a rule, which more
closely resembles strict scrutiny than a balancing test, applies and
whether this test provides a better reading of City of Philadelphia.
We begin with another case evaluating a statute that overtly
blocked the flow of commerce, in which the Court expressly applied
the "strictest scrutiny,"'2 5 but then proceeded to uphold the
challenged law. In Maine v. Taylor,'26 the Court considered a Maine
statute that prohibited the import of live baitfish from out-of-state
where the out-of-state fish commonly had parasites that presented
a danger to native Maine fish, and where the parasite was not
common in Maine." 7 The Court stated that:
model). For a more benign assessment of City ofPhiladelphia,see NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra

note 37, at 170 (positing that case illustrates how the "dormant commerce clause ... steps in
to prevent ... economic Balkanization of the country").
125. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 144 (1986) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979)).
126. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
127. Taylor had a peculiar procedural history. Taylor was convicted under a federal
statute that prohibited interstate shipments in violation of federal or state-law. Taylor
defended by claiming that the Maine statute prohibiting the importation of live baitfish
violated the Commerce Clause, thus providing an unconstitutional state law predicate for his
federal prosecution. While the court of appeals reversed his conviction on that basis, the
State of Maine intervened to defend the constitutionality of its own statute on appeal to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 133. Even though the case was moot as to Taylor, the Supreme Court
found that Maine could invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)

to defend the constitutionality of its statute. Id.

20031

A BEAUTIFUL MEND

[Oince a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate
commerce "either on its face or in practical effect," the burden
falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute "serves
a legitimate local purpose," and that this purpose could not be
served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.128
Because this statute expressly discriminated in commerce, the
Court determined that it was appropriate to apply "strictest
scrutiny." In this case, the Court determined that the test was met:
First, Maine's population of wild fish-including its own
indigenous golden shiners-would be placed at risk by three
types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not
common to wild fish in Maine. Second, nonnative species
inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could
disturb Maine's aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by
competing with native fish for food or habitat, by preying on
native species,
or by disrupting the environment in more subtle
29
ways. 1
While the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, under which the
state bears the burden of proof, it determined that the unique
problem posed by imported live baitfish demonstrated the absence
of a neutral, nondiscriminatory alternative, and thus upheld the
facial restriction on commerce.
Taylor is significant for two reasons. First, it establishes that
even in a case involving facial discrimination against out-of-state
commerce, the Court does not necessarily apply the per se rule of
invalidity. Instead, if the state provides a justification that is not
protectionist or financially motivated, the Supreme Court will
inquire whether the justification is legitimate and whether it can be
advanced in a nondiscriminatory manner.' In Taylor, the Court
128. Id. at 138 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).
129. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
130. It is worth noting that although the state arguably met the requirement that the
objectives cannot be achieved in a nondiscriminatory manner, as Justice Stevens observed
in his dissent, it was possible to devise an alternative method that would achieve the
articulated objective in a less discriminatory manner. Id. at 152-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If the state had set up a regime in which it inspected out-of-state live baitfish, it would have
discriminated, but would have allowed some such fish to be imported.
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deferred to the district court's determination that both prongs were
met. 131 Second, the case provides an important additional datum in
reading City of Philadelphia.If we assume, as New Jersey claimed,
that concerns for environmental protection and the desire to
preserve landfill space motivated its waste import restriction, then
the question arises whether the chosen means would have satisfied
the Court's strict scrutiny test. Framing the issue in this manner
reveals that even without applying the per se rule, the Court would
likely have achieved the same result under the test articulated in
Taylor.13 2 New Jersey could have achieved its legitimate environmental goal-but not its financially motivated goal of benefitting
only the citizens of New Jersey at the expense of commerce-by
reducing waste intake in its landfill sites by specified percentages
each year, and by providing access on a first come, first served basis
without regard to the waste's point of origin. While the City of
PhiladelphiaCourt articulated the per se rule and the balancing
test, its ruling rests upon an application of this strict scrutiny test.
We will now consider one more context of facial discrimination in
commerce, which the Court has prohibited unless pursuant to a
Congressional delegation. The case that follows involves a state law
that appears to facilitate free trade with neighboring states by
conditioning access to their goods or services upon a reciprocal
grant of free trade from the partnering state. Despite the apparent
pro-trade nature of the statute, the Court struck it down.

131. Id. at 140.
132. For another case that, like City of Philadelphia, articulated the per se rule of
invalidity, but instead turned upon the availability of a less discriminatory alternative, see
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994). In that case, Justice
Kennedy articulated the per se rule in striking down the city's waste transfer program, which
required all waste that flowed through the municipality to be processed at a waste transfer
station, but went on to articulate nondiscriminatory "uniform safety regulations." Id. at 39293. The availability of such an alternative would have been unnecessary had the per se rule
actually applied. This suggests that as applied to facially discriminatory statutes for which
the Court is able to identify a legitimate state purpose, the Court will apply strict scrutiny
rather than the per se rule. This appears to apply as a general matter in dormant Commerce
Clause cases involving environmental regulations.

2003]

A BEAUTIFUL MEND

39

b. The Reciprocity Doctrine
1 33 a Nebraska
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
statute
prohibited the withdrawal of groundwater from Nebraska wells
intended for export to any state that failed to grant reciprocal water
export rights to Nebraska. While the Court upheld other Nebraska
water export restrictions requiring that the exports be reasonable
and not contrary to conservation 3 4 on the ground that the state
holds a proprietary interest in its scarce water supply, the Court
applied strict scrutiny to the reciprocity provision, which it then
struck down, holding that it was not "narrowly tailored" to further
the state's conservation goals."' 5 The Sporhase Court relied upon
an earlier reciprocity case, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cotrell,136 in which the Court asserted that reciprocity statutes were
invalid even if intended to produce an incentive to eliminate trade
137
barriers.
The reciprocity doctrine appears peculiar because it is not
obvious that reciprocity statutes fail strict scrutiny. While the state

133. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
134. The challenged provision stated:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other entity
intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State
of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the
Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of Water
Resources finds that the withdrawal of the ground water requested is
reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the
state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and
transport ground water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.
Id. at 944 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).
135. Id. at 942.
136. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
137. In addition to the prisoners' dilemma analysis presented below, the tit-for-tat game
provides a strong theoretical foundation for assuming that such statutes will have a benign
effect in promoting trade. Assuming that the states are repeat trade players, then Robert
Axelrod's study of the tit-for-tat game suggests that reciprocity agreements-despite the
facial discrimination-are more likely to promote than to inhibit open trade. See ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984). So viewed, these statutes are likely
to limit the power of interest groups to pursue restrictive trade measures because legislators
will appreciate that catering to such pressures will impose direct costs on beneficiaries of
imports from those states that carry the reciprocity provisions. And yet, the Court has
disallowed such reciprocity agreements absent Congressional authorization. For a further
discussion of reciprocity statutes, see infra Part III.B.3.c.
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has the alternative of mimicking the law of the potential trade
partner, such a strategy would threaten to undermine, rather than
to promote, free trade. And yet, the Supreme Court has upheld such
reciprocal trade provisions only in the limited context of a federal
statute that conferred regulatory power over the underlying subject
matter. In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,'38 the Court sustained a reciprocity statute in the
context of insurance, where Congress had delegated to the states
regulatory power over the subject area.13 9
The Court has not only presumed against the constitutionality
of laws that facially discriminate in commerce, but also against
legislative efforts to conjoin provisions that would be independently constitutional, but that when put together have a clear
discriminatory effect only on out-of-state interests. The next case
provides an illustration.
c. Tax and Rebates as the FunctionalEquivalent of Facially
DiscriminatoryStatutes
In West Lynn Creamery,Inc. v. Healy,"4 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, struck down a Massachusetts tax and rebate
scheme for milk where the tax operated neutrally on all milk sales,
without regard to the milk's point of origin, but where the revenues
went into a subsidy fund, the proceeds of which were distributed
solely to Massachusetts milk producers. In doing so, Justice Stevens
provided one of the Court's clearest articulations of a political
process, or representation reinforcement, justification for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, one that is parallel to, and more
commonly associated with, the famous CaroleneProductsfootnote
four.14 1 In essence, this model holds that the Constitution's broadly
138. 451 U.S. 649 (1981).

139. These cases thus raise the possibility of an interesting empirical verification of the
Axelrod thesis in the context of reciprocal barriers to trade where Congress has allowed
states to follow the strategy. See AXELROD, supra note 137. If reciprocal trade statutes in
insurance have had the effect of loosening barriers to interstate insurance marketing, then
this would provide an important empirical datum against the Court's presumed contrary rule
in such cases as Sporhase and GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
140. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).

141. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (providing a sympathetic account of this
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worded provisions, especially equal protection, but also the
Commerce Clause, should be construed to further the representation of those who are disadvantaged in the relevant political
process." 2 Because out-of-state competitors are not represented
in the Massachusetts legislature, a law that imposed an obligation
solely upon them would appear to violate this norm. The relevant
question for dormant Commerce Clause purposes is whether an instate interest that is meaningfully represented in the political
process ensures functional representation for the relevant out-ofstate interests. In this case, the law appears neutral, but as Justice
Stevens notes, the combined regime has the practical effect of
excluding those in-state who would otherwise share a common set
of interests with those who are not represented.
In applying the analysis to Healy, it is important to note what
was not in dispute in the case. All justices in the case appeared to
agree that had the component parts of the statute-the neutral tax
measure and the subsidy program-arisen and been challenged
separately, they would have withstood dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. Even so, the Court struck down the combined regime:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue
here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on
interstate commerce, in part because "[tihe existence of major
in-state interests adversely affected ... is a powerful safeguard
against legislative abuse." ... However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by
jurisprudential analysis as applied to equal protection); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistenceof Process-BasedPoliticalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (presenting a more
critical assessment).
142. It is important to note a major criticism leveled against this process-based political
theory. The problem is that the appropriate level of participation that any particular group
receives is a normative question that cannot be answered independently of the underlying
substantive question of whether the law subject to challenge is constitutionally permissible.

Thus, if out-of-state interests are required to be included in a state's political processes, that
effectively answers the question of whether a state law that operates to the detriment of
those interests will withstand constitutional scrutiny. But rather than directly confronting
the question of whether the law is or is not permissible, the representation reinforcement
analysis sidetracks this question by asking instead whether those who were harmed were
adequately represented. For a general analysis of this analytical difficulty, see Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More IntrusiveReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991)
(observing that although this inquiry sounds content neutral, it has the nonneutral effect of
simply masking an underlying substantive question).
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the tax, a State's political processes can no longer be relied upon
to prevent legislative abuse, because one ofthe in-state interests
which would otherwise
lobby against the tax has been mollified
14
by the subsidy. 1
Stevens concluded by observing that "the purpose and effect of the
pricing order are to divert market share to Massachusetts dairy
farmers."14 4
Perhaps the easiest way to conceptualize this case is to appreciate that although the tax portion of the challenged law was
neutral, the scheme as a whole was equivalent to a differential tax
on milk imported from out of state, which was motivated by the
desire to confer an advantage on the local milk industry at the
expense of its out-of-state competitors. Had the statute taken that
simpler form, there is little question that it would have been struck
down under the per se rule of invalidity. So viewed, the case stands
for the proposition that combined schemes that function as facially
discriminatory schemes in practical effect will be subject to the per
se rule, or at least to strict scrutiny.
We have now reviewed a sufficient body of case law to cover the
essential framework for facially discriminatory statutes-or their
operational equivalents-to which ordinary dormant Commerce
Clause analysis applies. We now turn to the body of dormant
Commerce Clause case law that establishes the rules governing
neutral state laws that allegedly burden commerce. After doing so,
we consider a group of cases, under the header of the market
participant doctrine, that involve facially discriminatory statutes,
but that generally have been exempted from dormant Commerce
Clause analysis; an exception to the market participant doctrine
that reinstates a kind of strict scrutiny; and a case that involves an
alleged undue burden on commerce that is further exempt from
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.

143. West Lynn Creanery,512 U.S. at 200 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)) (alterations in original).
144. Id. at 203.
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2. FaciallyNeutral Statutes that Burden Commerce
a. The Movement of Goods Cases
1

5

In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
the Supreme Court considered a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a North Carolina statute, unique among all states, that
prohibited the apples sold or shipped in closed containers in North
Carolina to be identified with any designation other than United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) grading. North Carolina
defended its statute as a necessary means of preventing fraud and
consumer confusion in apple marketing. The Washington State
Apple Commission challenged the statute on the ground that it
burdened Washington apple growers by preventing them from using
an alternative grading system pursuant to Washington law. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger explained the burden that the
North Carolina statute imposed on Washington apple growers as
follows:
[Bly prohibiting Washington growers and dealers from
marketing apples under their State's grades, the statute has a
leveling effect which insidiously operates to the advantage of
local apple producers.... [Tihe Washington State grades are
equal or superior to the USDA grades in all corresponding
categories. Hence, with free market forces at work, Washington
sellers would normally enjoy a distinct market advantage vis-&vis local producers in those categories where the Washington
grade is superior. However, because of the statute's operation,
Washington apples which would otherwise qualify for and be
sold under the superior Washington grades will now have to be
marketed under their inferior USDA counterparts. Such
"downgrading" offers the North Carolina apple industry the very
sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that
the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit.14
The critical datum in the Court's analysis involved the nature of
the differential grading. The distinction is unlike translation from

145. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
146. Id. at 351-52.
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English to Spanish, which generally can be accomplished without
significant loss of meaning.' 7 Instead, as Burger observed, the
Washington grading system was superior in all categories, meaning
that, the top grade under the Washington system was more
stringent than the top grade in the USDA system. Therefore, the
practical effect of the North Carolina statute was to downgrade
Washington apples being marketed in North Carolina." 8 If we
assume, as seems reasonable, that the relevant North Carolina
apples are largely indistinguishable within USDA Grade A, but that
they are not adequate to meet the highest Washington standard,
then it is easy to appreciate149the burden on commerce that the North
Carolina regime imposes.
147. Of course, even here translation does not come without risk. For a somewhat ironic
illustration, consider Castanedav. Partida,430 U.S. 482 (1977), a case in which the Court
rejected a Batson.style challenge to Latino jurors excluded by peremptory strikes, where the
prosecutor defended against the charge that he exercised his challenges in a race-conscious
manner on the ground that he feared that native Spanish speakers would have difficulty
following official translations. If one considers that the proffered race-neutral rationale is
that struck jurors will follow the actual meaning of testimony given in Spanish rather than
potentially erroneous translations (when the translation is accurate this risk does not arise),
the result seems peculiar. In fact, however, the result makes good sense when we realize that
the purpose is to ensure that the jury follows proceedings preserved in the written record on
appeal, which would not be the case if the jurors declined to follow official translations. Of
course, in the event of a false translation, the other side has the opportunity to raise
appropriate objections, which will be preserved in the record.
148. While the Hunt case assumed Washington apples to be superior, subsequent studies
have revealed the Washington growers' focus on physical appearance compromises taste. See
Timothy Egan, 'Perfect'Apple Pushed Growers Into Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at Al
(quoting apple grower as stating that people should not "feel sorry for us-we did it to
ourselves .... For almost 50 years, we've been cramming down the consumer's throat a red
apple with ever thicker skin, sometimes mushy, sometimes very good if done right, but a
product that was bred for color and size and not for taste"); Bob Kasper, Big Red: In Apples,
Color Doesn't Always Mean Quality, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2001, at 3A ("In the pursuit of a
prettier, more uniform apple ... some Red Delicious apples have been bright red, but their
flavor and crispness have suffered."). My own strong recommendation is Nitanny apples
when they are available, even though they are not nearly as attractive.
149. Revealed preferences appear to support, although they certainly do not prove, this
assertion. As the statute reveals, the North Carolina apple industry had sufficient lobbying
power to secure protectionist legislation. If the state's apple industry produced apples of
equal or higher quality relative to those in Washington State, then they likely could have
instead secured legislation making available a grading scheme that mimicked that in
Washington. Had they done so, they could have used that scheme to demonstrate that their
top grade apples were competitive with the top grade Washington apples, and perhaps
superior to alternative apples imported from other states. Instead, they elected to prevent
anyone from marketing above USDA Grade A, which suggests that in general, they would
have been disadvantaged by the availability of a superior grade.
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Chief Justice Burger further noted the potential nationwide
impact of the North Carolina order:
In addition to its obvious consequence-prohibiting the display
of Washington State apple grades on containers of apples
shipped into North Carolina, the regulation presented the
Washington apple industry with a marketing problem of
potentially nationwide significance.... Since the ultimate
destination of [the stored apples] is unknown... compliance with
North Carolina's unique regulation would have required
Washington growers to obliterate the printed labels on
containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving their product
a damaged appearance. Alternatively, they could have changed
their marketing practices to accommodate the needs of North
Carolina, i.e., repack apples to be shipped to North Carolina in
containers bearing only the USDA grade, and/or store the
estimated portion of the harvest destined for that market in
such special containers. As a last resort, they could discontinue
the use of preprinted containers entirely.5 0
Burger then added that "in the event a number of other States
followed North Carolina's lead, the resultant inability to display the
Washington grades could force the Washington growers to abandon
the State's expensive inspection and grading system."'
In evaluating the North Carolina order, Chief Justice Burger
articulated the applicable test as follows: "When discrimination
against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the
burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to perserve the local interests
at stake."5 2 As applied to this case, the Chief Justice rejected the
state's argument that the statute was necessary to prevent
consumer confusion or marketing fraud,' noting that "[slince
Washington grades are in all cases equal or superior to their USDA
counterparts, they could only 'deceive' or'confuse' a consumer to his
150. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337-38.
151. Id. at 338.
152. Id. at 353.
153. To support this finding, Burger further noted that the statute did not prevent the
shipment of closed boxes bearing no grades at all. Id. at 351.
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benefit, hardly a harmful result."" 4 More importantly, Burger
observed: "[Ilt appears that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the
outright ban of Washington State grades are readily available. For
example, North Carolina could effectuate its goal by permitting outof-state growers to utilize state grades only if they also marked
their shipments with the applicable USDA label."'
Hunt demonstrates that in cases presenting neutral statutes
that burden interstate commerce and that appear to be motivated
by economic or protectionist interests, the relevant test is effectively the same as in cases involving facial discrimination where
a state articulates a legitimate-meaning neither financial nor
protectionist-purpose. In both cases, the Court will apply strict
scrutiny, requiring that the state articulate a legitimate purpose
and defend its choice of means by establishing the absence of a
nondiscriminatory alternative. Thus, in both categories, the Court
presumes against the constitutionality of the statute and places the
burden on the state to overcome the burden. In Hunt, this rule
seems appropriate given that the statute appears to have been the
product of an effort by the North Carolina apple industry to benefit
itself at the expense of out-of-state competitors, and at the expense
of the in-state apple consumers who otherwise would have benefitted from the additional information and product availability that
the premium for marketing superior grade apples would allow
Washington exporters to secure in the North Carolina market. In
addition, the North Carolina rule threatened to affect Washington
apple marketing not only in North Carolina, but on a nationwide
scale.
While the choice of rule in Hunt is relatively clear, its application
appears problematic when we compare another case that also
involves similar special interest legislation benefitting a narrow
class of in-state firms at the expense of both out-of-state competitors and in-state consumers. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland,' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, sustained a
Maryland statute that prohibited refining companies from owning
154. Id. at 354.
155. Id. Burger added that "some potential for'confusion' might persist. However, it is the
type of 'confusion' that the national interest in the free flow of goods between the States
demands be tolerated." Id.
156. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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and operating retail service stations in Maryland against a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge. As Stevens noted, the statute grew out
of the 1973 oil embargo and the resulting petroleum shortage.15 7
The Governor commissioned a study in response to the complaints
of various independent service stations, and the study determined
that service stations owned by producers or refiners received
preferential treatment during the shortage period.'5 8
Critical to Stevens' analysis was the fact that no producers or
refiners of oil were located in Maryland, and that only about five
percent of service stations in Maryland were producer or refiner
owned. Stevens noted that "slince Maryland's entire gasoline
supply flows in interstate commerce and since there are no local
producers or refiners ... claims of disparate treatment between
interstate and local commerce would be meritless."'5 9 Stevens
further rejected the argument that because the entire burden
of divestiture fell on out-of-state companies, while in-state independents received a benefit, the statute should be struck down.
Stevens concluded that "the Act creates no barriers whatsoever
against interstate independent dealers; it does not prohibit the flow
of interstate goods, place added costs upon them, or distinguish
between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market.""6
One difficulty with Stevens' analysis is that although the statute
did not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state firms, and
did not solely benefit in-state firms,' 6 ' the entire burden of the
statute fell on an easily defined subset of out-of-state firms. 6 2 To
appreciate the dynamics of the statute, we must consider why the
commissioned study revealed differential treatment between the
producer or refiner owned firms and their independent competitors,
whether or not locally owned. Recall that the statute went into
effect in response to the 1973 oil embargo. In this period, there was
considerable uncertainty as to whether the multi-fold price increase
157. Id. at 121.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 125.
160. Id. at 126.
161. Out-of-state firms that were not vertically integrated also benefitted from the
Maryland law.
162. While I am postponing most economic analysis until the next Part, the discussion in
this paragraph is necessary to expose the seeming doctrinal inconsistency between Hunt and

Exxon, which the game theoretical model developed in Part II is in part intended to explain.
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following the 1973 oil embargo would be followed by still further
price shocks. As a result, producers and refiners were concerned
about the effects of future price increases on their long-term
supply contracts. To hedge against such increases, a rational
pricing strategy would include adding the equivalent of a price
insurance premium in long term supply contracts. This price
premium would leave independents with the following alternatives:
(1) secure a long term supply on less favorable terms, or (2) go to
the spot markets, where they could secure the going market price,
but subject themselves to unpredictable supply. In contrast, for
service stations that the producers or refiners themselves owned,
there would be no need to include a hedge against future price
increases. Since the service station's profits inured to the benefit of
the parent company, the producers or refiners could immediately
pass on the burdens or benefits of any future price shocks, thus
providing the equivalent of spot market pricing to their retail
service stations, while, at the same time, ensuring a steady
supply. 163
In effect, the Exxon case is about the benefits associated with
vertical integration in a period in which long term supply contracts
required a functional insurance premium to cover against unknown
pricing contingencies beyond the supplier's control. So viewed, this
case appears structurally similar to Hunt. The beneficiaries of the
prohibition against refiner-owned firms are in-state independent
stations, which remove from competition those firms that can
receive superior pricing and supply terms due to the ability of the
parent companies to pass on actual costs without the need for a
price insurance premium. The losers are out-of-state vertically
integrated firms and in-state consumers who lose the benefits
that such firms can provide in the marketplace in such a period of
price fluctuation and uncertainty. And yet, despite these apparent
163. The analysis is a bit more complicated. The price premium would benefit vertically

integrated retail service stations provided that there was no actual price shock, at least if the
price were fixed, as opposed to being placed on some sort of sliding scale. But if the feared
price shock were realized, then the independents would have secured the benefit, at least for
the period of the contract, of a lower price than would actually be passed on to the vertically
integrated retail service stations. The analysis suggests that the nature ofcontractsfolowing
a substantialbut isolated price shock is likely to benefit vertically integrated firms. This
characterizes the historical period during which the statute in Exxon was enacted and the
case itself was decided.
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similarities, these two cases-both involving special interest
legislation in the form of facially neutral statutes imposing an
identifiable burden on commerce-are resolved in opposite fashion.
This is among the apparent doctrinal inconsistencies that have been
the focus of critics of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine," 4 and
that the game theoretical model is intended to explain. We will now
turn to another group of facially neutral statutes that burden
commerce, but that involve instrumentalities rather than the flow
of goods.
b. Instrumentalitiesof Commerce Cases
The principal contemporary dormant Commerce Clause case
that we will consider before discussing the various doctrinal
6 Before
exceptions is Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp."'
doing so, however, it will be helpful to consider briefly three earlier
instrumentality of commerce cases. In South Carolina Highway
Department v. Barnwell Bros.,166 Justice Stone, writing for the
majority, upheld a state statute setting forth a maximum truck
weight based upon a deferential rational basis test, where the state
claimed that the statute promoted highway safety, even though
trial evidence demonstrated that axle weight was more closely
correlated with highway safety than total truck weight. Stone
observed that "[flew subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of
local concern as is the use of state highways."' Stone determined
that because it was easier to identify truck weight than axle weight,
South Carolina legislators had a rational basis for selecting their
chosen means.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,"8 Justice
Stone abandoned the rational basis test in considering the
constitutionality of a state regulation setting forth a maximum
train length. The Court determined that the heavily regulated area
164. See, e.g., Twyman, supranote 16, at 403 ("Thus, Exxon ... suggests a limited review
for discriminatory effects produced by a regulation, a position that is inconsistent with the
Court's analysis in Hunt.").

165. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
166. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
167. Id. at 187.
168. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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of trains, unlike highways, was of predominently national concern.
Thus, Stone stated:
The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total
effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and
casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the
national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local
regulation which does not have a uniform
effect on the
169
interstate train journey which it interrupts.
Justice Stone struck down the law, finding the burdens the statute
imposed on commerce outweighed the alleged safety benefits.
Finally, in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 70 Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, struck down an Illinois statute that alone
required the use of curved mudflaps, where forty-five other states
permitted straight mudflaps and one other state, Arkansas,
prohibited curved mudflaps. Douglas observed that Bibb was "one
of those cases-few in number-where local safety measures that
are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce."' 7 ' The case most obviously appears in tension
with Barnwell Bros.,1 2 given that both the South Carolina total
truck weight regulation and the Illinois mudflap requirement
imposed comparable burdens on commerce.
These cases provide the necessary doctrinal backdrop for the
Court's most recent major decision that involves the applicable
standard in cases that present challenges to state highway safety
regulations based upon the dormant Commerce Clause. Kassel
is unusual in that it is a divided opinion in which no majority
embraces a single test. 17 Although the case does not resolve the
169. Id. at 775-76.
170. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
171. Id. at 529.
172. See id. at 523 (distinguishing Barnwell Bros.).
173. See generally Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). For an
analysis that relies upon a lurking vote cycle in Kassel to explore implications for the

Supreme Court's decision making rules, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUIONAL
PROCESS: ASOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000); Stearns,
supra note 96. For present purposes, Kassel is important for its doctrinal implications on the
dormant side of the Commerce Clause, more so than for its implications for Supreme Court
decisionmaking.
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choice of test, 74 it provides the foundation for subsequent doctrinal
formulations. In addition, the game theoretical model developed in
Part II sheds light on the Supreme
Court's division in this group of
175
apply.
to
test
which
to
cases as
An Iowa statute prohibited the use of sixty-five foot twin trailers,
and contained a series of exceptions benefitting only Iowa residents.
Specifically, the statute allowed such trailers to make deliveries
from out-of-state to border cities, 7 6 to make deliveries from point to
point within the state, and to allow Iowa truck manufacturers to
ship trucks up to seventy feet in length. Otherwise, such trailers
were prohibited even though they were permitted in all states that
surrounded Iowa. As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent,
while the states surrounding Iowa allowed sixty-five foot twin
trailers, the states in the Northeast and Southwest corridors
177
and in the District of Columbia, like Iowa, prohibited them.
Consolidated challenged the statute, which required it to limit its
shipments through Iowa to fifty-five foot singles or sixty-foot
doubles, to detach sixty-five foot doubles and take each through the
state separately, or to divert sixty-five foot doubles around the
state. The state defended the statute, claiming that sixty-five foot
twins were more dangerous than fifty-five foot singles and that
the law promoted safety and reduced wear and tear on the state
highways by diverting truck traffic out-of-state. The federal
district court employed the balancing test previously articulated in
Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice,'78 under which the
Court "weigh[ed] ... the asserted safety purpose against the degree

The case is also unusual in that it involved a challenge to an Iowa statute found to be
protectionist based in considerable part upon the Iowa governor's failure to sign into law a
bill repealing the statute, rather than based upon the enactment of the statute itself.
Because the two opinions consistent with the outcome relied upon this peculiar form of
subsequent legislative history as if it were part of the actual legislative history, I will not
dwell on this point in the analysis to follow.
174. For an analysis demonstrating that because the two opinions consistent with the
outcome are decided along different analytical dimensions, the narrowest grounds rule does
not apply, see STEARNS, supra note 173, at 99-102.
175. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a.
176. The state enacted the border cities exception and the Governor signed it into law
after he vetoed the repeal bill. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 666 n.6.
177. Id. at 688 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
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of interference with interstate commerce."' 7 9 Applying that test, the
district court rejected the safety rationale on the ground that the
prohibited sixty-five foot twins were no less safe than permitted
fifty-five foot singles.
On appeal, the Supreme Court fractured. Justice Powell, writing
for a plurality of four, struck down the statute. Justice Brennan,
writing for two, concurred in the judgment. Then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist, writing for three, dissented. Justice Powell began by
observing that the mere incantation of a highway safety benefit
was insufficient to preclude independent balancing under the
Raymond test. Powell noted that the appropriate "weighing"
requires "'a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the
state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed
on the course of interstate commerce.'"18 ° Applying this test, Powell
found that "the Iowa truck-length limitations unconstitutionally
burden interstate commerce."' After going through and refuting
the state's claimed safety justifications, Powell noted that the
"special deference" normally accorded state highway safety regulations
derives in part from the assumption that where such regulations
do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce,
their burden usually falls on local economic interests as well as
other States' economic interests, thus insuring that the State's
own political processes will serve as a check against unduly
burdensome regulations.18 2
Here, Powell determined, less deference is appropriate because
the statutory regulation "bears disproportionately on out-of-state
residents and businesses.""a
Powell then reviewed the history of a 1974 bill that would have
repealed the sixty-five foot twin restriction. In vetoing the bill,
Governor Ray had stated:

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670-71 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 441).
Id. (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 675 (quotation omitted).
Id. at 676.
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I find sympathy with those who are doing business in our state
and whose enterprises could gain from increased cargo carrying
ability by trucks. However, with this bill, the Legislature has
pursued a course that would benefit only a few Iowa-based
companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state
trucking firms and competitors at the expense of our Iowa
citizens."4

Powell observed:
It is thus far from clear that Iowa was motivated primarily by a
judgment that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles.
Rather, Iowa seems to have hoped to limit the use of its
highways by deflecting some through traffic.... [A] State cannot
constitutionally promote its own parochial interests by requiring
safe vehicles to detour around it.185
After considering the evidence in support of the safety justification
introduced at trial, Powell concluded that "[blecause Iowa has
imposed this burden without any significant countervailing safety
interest, its statute violates the Commerce Clause."' 86 Powell voted
to strike down the law using a balancing test after considering and
rejecting the proferred safety benefits.
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, rejected the
balancing test in the context of highway safety in favor of a test
that inquired whether the Iowa legislature had a rational justification in support of the law at the time it enacted the statute.
Brennan objected to the reliance in both the opinions of Justice
Powell for a plurality, and Justice Rehnquist in dissent, on evidence
in support of safety justifications offered initially at trial. 18 7 In
addition, while at various points he spoke in terms of a balancing
inquiry, Brennan made clear that he preferred the rational basis
184. Id. at 677 (quotation omitted).
185. Id. at 677-78.
186. Id. at 678-79 (footnote omitted).
187. Thus, Brennan stated: "Both the opinion of my Brother Powell and the opinion of my
Brother Rehnquist are predicated upon the supposition that the constitutionality of a state
regulation is determined by the factual record created by the State's lawyers in trial court."
Id. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, Brennan asserted that "a court
should focus ultimately on the regulatory purposes identified by the lawmakers and on the
evidence before or available to them that might have supported their judgment." Id.
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test. Thus, Brennan asserted: "It is not the function of the court
to decide whether in fact the regulation promotes its intended
purpose, so long as an examination of the evidence before or
available to the lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not
wholly irrational in light of its purposes." 88 Reviewing the contemporaneous evidence, Brennan determined that it evinced a pure
protectionist motive, and thus subjected the state's law to "a
virtually per se rule of invalidity."'8 9
Finally, Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, highlighted the
anomaly in the Court's opinions. Like Justice Brennan, Rehnquist
rejected Powell's application of the balancing test. Other than to
determine whether the stated rationale is a pretext for an illicit
protectionist purpose, Rehnquist asserted:
It is emphatically not our task to balance any incremental safety
benefits from prohibiting 65-foot doubles as opposed to 60-foot
doubles against the burden on interstate commerce .... The

question is rather whether it can be said that the benefits
flowing to Iowa from a rational truck-length limitation are
"slight or problematical." The particular line chosen by Iowa-60
feet-is relevant only to the question whether the limit is a
rational one.' 90
While Rehnquist agreed with Brennan that other than to identify
an illicit pretext, the only relevant inquiry was whether the law had
a rational basis, he agreed with Powell that it was proper to
consider evidence introduced by the state's lawyers at trial. Thus,
Rehnquist stated: "Justice Brennan can cite no authority for the
proposition that possible legislative purposes suggested by a State's
lawyers should not be considered in Commerce Clause cases.""' He
further observed that: "As I read the various opinions in this case
... only four Justices invalidate Iowa's law on the basis of the
analysis in Raymond."92 While Rehnquist agreed that the Raymond
test applied, based upon his review of the trial evidence, he
determined that the law did rationally further a legitimate safety
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
686 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
697-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
702.
700 n.10.
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55

interest, and thus he voted to sustain the statute. The analysis
demonstrates that while the Court generally agreed that something
less than strict scrutiny was appropriate in this context, it was
unable to agree on whether the relevant test was rational basis or
the somewhat more stringent balancing test. 193

193. I have previously demonstrated that this case reveals a collective preference
aggregation problem. See STEARNS, supra note 173, at 99-102. To explain the anomaly, it is
important to articulate a premise that is fully consistent with the analyses in all three
opinions: If the Court determines that the appropriate test is rational basis and if it applies
the more liberal evidentiary rule, thus considering evidence in support of the chosen test
introduced initially by the state's trial lawyers, then it should reject the dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to the Iowa statute. Based upon this assumption, we can identify a logical
voting progression supporting the dissenting result. One majority favored the rational basis
test (the Brennan plus Rehnquist camps for a total of five). A second majority favored
admitting newly introduced evidence to determine if the chosen test is met (the Powell plus
Rehnquist camps for a total of seven). And yet, the controlling majority voted to strike down
the Iowa statute (the Powell plus Brennan camps for a total of six). Justice Rehnquist
apparently recognized this anomaly. After noting that no one supported Brennan's insistence
upon contemporaneous legislative justifications for the Iowa statute, he further observed: "It
should not escape notice that a majority of the Court goes on record today as agreeing that
courts in Commerce Clause cases do not sit to weigh safety benefits against burdens on
commerce when the safety benefits are not illusory." Kassel, 450 U.S. at 692 n.4 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The majority he had in mind, of course, was the Brennan plus Rehnquist
camps. In spite of this anomaly, the general consensus is that the applicable test is some
form of balancing, albeit one that is more deferential than strict scrutiny, at least absent
some clear evidence of pretext.
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The following flow chart summarizes the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause analysis presented thus far:
Table 3: Dormant Commerce Clause Flow Chart

Facially
Discriminatory

Category

Rule

Illustrations/Cases

1. Protectionist/Economic motive

Per se rule of
invalidity

Traditional
Tarriffs/
Embargoes

2. Non-economic
motive

Strict scrutiny
with burden on
state (requiring
legitimate state
interest and
absence of nondiscriminatory
alternative)

Environmental
Protection
Statutes; e.g., City
of Philadelphiav.
New Jersey;Maine
v. Taylor;
Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas; Great
Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Cotrell

3. Protectionist/Economic motive

Strict Scrutiny
(same test as in
category #2)

Hunt v.
Washington. But
see Exxon v.
Maryland

4. Legitimate
Interest with
Incidental
Burden on
Commerce

Balancing test
with burden on
challenger
(weighs claimed
benefits of law
against alleged
burdens on
commerce)

Raymond Motor
Transp. v. Rice;
Bibb v. Navajo
FreightLines;
Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways

Facially
Neutral
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Table 3 summarizes the doctrinal discussion of the dormant
Commerce Clause cases. While some case placements required
extrapolations, set out in the prior discussion, from the Court's
imprecise (e.g., City of Philadelphia, Sporhase) or conflicting
(e.g., Kassel) doctrinal analyses, I based the vast majority of case
categorizations entirely upon the Court's own doctrinal formulations. The table is ultimately the starting point in our analysis, as
the next group of cases will show. In fact, the point of presenting
this table now is to use it as a basis of comparison for the case
categories in which the Court has exempted the challenged statutes
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Surprisingly, perhaps, given the per se rule of invalidity, the
principal exception to the dormant Commerce Clause is the market
participant doctrine, which appears to meet all of the criteria
for Category 1. In fact, as we will see in the next subpart, the
market participant doctrine removes entirely the relevant cases
from presumptive invalidity under the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine notwithstanding facial discrimination and a clear
discriminatory or economic purpose. Similarly, the export taxation
doctrine removes statutes from strict scrutiny under Category 3
notwithstanding a clear intent to benefit the state economically at
the expense of out-of-state purchasers of the exported good. And
finally, we will consider the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
doctrine, which effectively restores a kind of scrutiny similar to that
employed in cases falling into Category 2, even though the case
appears to satisfy the requirements of the market participant
doctrine. The inconsistencies revealed thus far only scratch the
surface.
3. The Market ParticipantException to the Dormant Commerce
Clause194
I will now describe the four principal market participant cases.
In three cases, the Court created an exemption from ordinary
194. Portions of the discussion in this subpart are based upon Maxwell L. Steams, A
Private-Rights Standing Model to Promote Public-RegardingBehaviour by Government
Owned Corporations,in FROM BUREAUCRACY TO BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: LEGAL AND POLICY

ISSUES IN THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES 121 (Michael J. Whincop, ed.
2003).
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dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. In the most recent of these
four decisions, South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 95 the Court summarized and distinguished the earlier
three cases in a successful effort to bypass the market participant
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. In doing so,
the Wunnicke Court applied the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to strike down the State of Alaska's inclusion of an in-state
processing requirement in a contract for the sale of forty-nine
million board feet of lumber with a Japanese buyer. Without the
benefit of the market participant exception, the case fell squarely
into category one of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, given the facial discrimination and the economic motive
underlying the in-state processing requirement, in which the per se
rule of invalidity applied. " The issue in Wunnicke was whether the
state, acting as an entrepreneur rather than as a regulator, could
not only select with whom it would deal, but also could establish its
own terms of contracting without dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. To support its argument that the market participant
doctrine rather than the dormant Commerce Clause applied, the
state relied upon the following three market participation cases.
In the first case, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,'9 7 an out-ofstate processor of junked cars challenged a scheme in the State of
Maryland designed to reduce the number of junked cars in the
state. The Maryland legislature had established a "bounty" for cars
that bore a Maryland license plate, and imposed more stringent
documentation requirements on out-of-state scrap processors
than on in-state processors. An out-of-state processor challenged
the program, which facially discriminated in commerce, claiming
that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Alexandria
Scrap Court rejected the challenge on the ground that the state was
acting in an entrepreneurial rather than regulatory capacity.
Thus, the Court stated: "Nothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others."'9 8
195.
196.
197.
198.

467 U.S. 82 (1984).
See id. at 100.
426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
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In the second case, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,' 99 the Court rejected a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a South Dakota law that
restricted the sale of cement from a state-owned plant to state
residents. The Reeves Court stated: "The basic distinction drawn in
AlexandriaScrap between States as market participants and States
as market regulators makes good sense and sound law."00 The
Court then acknowledged "the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal."' In describing this case, the Wunnicke Court stated:
"In essence, the [Reeves] Court recognized the principle that the
Commerce Clause [in its dormant capacity] places no limitations
on a State's refusal to deal with particular parties
when it is
20 2
participating in the interstate market in goods."
Finally, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc.,2 °3 the Supreme Court rejected a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to an executive order issued by the
199. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).

200. Id. at 436.
201. Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).

202. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 94 (1984). In addition to
benefitting in-state purchasers planning to use the cement secured at a favorable price, the
Reeves Court implicitly acknowledged that the challenged scheme also likely benefitted
South Dakota middlemen who would then charge a premium to out-of-state purchasers.
Thus, the Court stated:
Nor has South Dakota cut off access to its own cement altogether, for the policy
does not bar resale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers.
Although the out-of-state buyer in the secondary market will undoubtedly have
to pay a markup not borne by South Dakota competitors, this result is not
wholly unjust. There should be little question that South Dakota at least could
exact a premium on out-of-state purchases to compensate it for the State's
investment and risk in the plan. If one views the added markup paid by out-ofstate buyers to South Dakota middlemen as the rough equivalent of this
"premium," the challenged program equates with a permissible result.
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443 n.17. See also Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitationand Judicial
Intervention,69 VA. L. REv. 563,578 (1983) (describing out-of-state resale market facilitated
by South Dakota scheme). If so, the scheme benefitted a narrow and organized group of
relatively wealthy purchasers at the expense of dispersed state residents who would have
benefitted from the direct sales to out-of-state purchasers at a higher price. This is
consistent with the theory of this Article, which characterizes the market participant cases,
as examples of in-state rent seeking that neither promotes mutual defection in a prisoners
dilemma nor undermines the pro-commerce pure Nash equilibrium strategies of other states.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
203. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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Mayor of Boston that required all city-funded construction projects
to be performed by a workforce with at least fifty percent Boston
residents. As the Court acknowledged, the critical difference
between White on the one hand, and Alexandria Scrap and Reeves
on the other, was that in White, the Mayor of Boston had demanded
that a provision be included in contracts to which the city was not
in privity. Specifically, the city required its contractors to demand
that their subcontractors ensure a minimum fifty percent in-city
employment. The White Court nonetheless sustained the municipal
employment requirement, applying the market participant doctrine.
The Court stated that while there were undoubtedly some limits on
the power of a state or local government to impose restrictions
beyond the immediate parties to a contract, it was not necessary to
determine those limits in the present case. The Court relied upon
what it deemed a "crucial fact" that "[elveryone affected by the
order 0[was],
in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the
24
city."
The White case is particularly interesting for two reasons. First,
on its facts it was the closest to Wunnicke in that it imposed a
restriction on a downstream transaction to which the state would
not be a party. Second, as shown below, 205 it is in virtually all
respects factually identical to a case decided just one year later that
appears to have produced a seemingly opposite result in the form
of a remand under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.
It was against the backdrop of these three market participant
cases that the divided Wunnicke Court considered whether to apply
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine or the market participant
exception to Alaska's in-state processing requirement. As stated
above, because the contract provision was facially discriminatory
and economically motivated, it was certain that under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine the provision would fail. The
Wunnicke plurality set about distinguishing the three prior market
participant cases, thus holding the provision invalid under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The plurality distinguished
Alexandria Scrap on the ground that that case involved the direct
purchase of goods, without the state imposing any downstream, or
204. Id. at 211 n.7.
205. See discussion infra Part I.C.4.
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out-of-privity, requirements. The plurality distinguished Reeves on
the same basis, stating that the right to choose with whom the state
deals did not include the right to impose conditions downstream.
The plurality also noted that dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
might be more appropriate in Wunnicke, which involved the sale
of a natural resource, than in Reeves, which involved the sale of
cement, a complex, manufactured good.20 6 As stated above, the
more difficult case was White, which did involve an out-of-privity
restriction. The Wunnicke plurality held that while White allowed
the imposition of such a provision, it did so in the relevant market
in which the city was operating." 7 Applying antitrust principles,
the Court added: "Unless the 'market' is relatively narrowly
defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule
that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate
with the permissible state purpose of
commerce even if they act
20 8
industry."
local
fostering
As then-Associate Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent, the
Wunnicke plurality's economic analysis appears to have provided
the timber purchaser a windfall, at least if we assume, as seems
reasonable, that the contract price capitalized the in-state processing requirement. For present purposes, the more important
point is to recognize the seeming incongruity that these cases pose
for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. In each case, the Court
has exempted the state from ordinary dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny, effectively giving the state a pass in the very case category
in which it has insisted that a virtual per se rule of invalidity
applies. Although the stated rationale-that the state is acting in
an entrepreneurial rather than regulatory capacity-provides a
doctrinal basis for distinction, it is not grounded in an obvious
policy justification for giving the state preferential treatment. In
fact, the incentives that the doctrine creates might well be perverse.
If the state, when acting in an entrepreneurial capacity, is supposed
to mimic private market actors, then the doctrine has the effect
of allowing the state to select with whom it deals without the
206. The Court added that close scrutiny might also be more appropriate when dealing
with foreign purchasers. See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 96.
207. Recall Justice Rehnquist's assertion in White that everyone was, at least in an
informal sense, working for the city. See supranote 204 and accompanying text.
208. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97-98.
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competitive pressures that discipline private firms making such
choices under market conditions. 9 The doctrinal anomaly only
deepens when considering the next case, in which on virtually
identical facts, the Court identified another constitutional clause
upon which to rest its decision to remove the case from the lax
scrutiny of the market participant doctrine, effectively restoring a
level of scrutiny closer to that arising under the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
4. Article IV Privileges and Immunities
In a case that appears to create a tension with the market
participant doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a
decision declining to apply the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause210 to a challenged municipal ordinance that was in all
relevant respects identical to the one sustained against dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny in White. In United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,2 1' the Court
considered the constitutionality of an ordinance enacted by the city
209. For a recent paper in which I explore this theme in greater depth, see Stearns, supra
note 194; see also Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (describing different incentives
confronting private firms and state actors operating as entrepreneurs). The doctrinal
incentives become all the more perverse when we consider the recent decision, Florida
PrepaidPost Secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999). In that case, the Court rejected a market participant analysis offered to deny an arm
of the State of Florida the benefit of sovereign immunity when appellant, a private New
Jersey bank, alleged that the state had engaged in unfair trade practices by making false
claims in marketing its competing college annuity savings plan in violation of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); see also College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post
Secondary EducationExpense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating provision of federal
statute waiving state sovereign immunity in case in which the same New Jersey bank
alleged that Florida Prepaid had infringed its patent). If the Court is going to provide a state
the benefits of selecting with whom to deal and on what terms under the market participant
doctrine, even though the state is not subject to private sector competitive pressures in
making its decisions, one could argue that the Court should at least be consistent and hold
the state to the same legal obligations as its private competitors when the state puts on an
entrepreneurial mantle.
210. Article IV states: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens of the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. As stated
previously, see supra note 31, Article IV Privileges and Immunities do not apply to
corporations. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
211. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
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of Camden, New Jersey that required the city's contractors to
ensure a minimum of forty percent city employees in their contracts
and their subcontractors' contracts for all city contracts. The New
Jersey Supreme Court had rejected a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge on the ground that the state was acting as a market
participant, and further rejected a challenge under the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that the clause applied
only to state legislation, and not to municipal ordinances.2 12
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist held that under the
circumstances of the case, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause did apply, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the two-part test-whether municipal employment is
fundamental and whether out-of-state employment is a peculiar
source of the problem that the ordinance seeks to remedy-was
met.2 1 In addition to the obvious tension with the then-recent
ruling in White, the Camden ruling was unusual in that prior
to Camden, it was not obvious that Article IV Privileges and
Immunities applied at all to municipal ordinances that discriminated against all nonresidents, as distinguished from state
statutes that discriminated against out-of-state citizens." 4 The
challenged ordinance instead was passed by a city and seemed to
discriminate equally against New Jersey citizens who resided
outside Camden. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that because the
Camden ordinance was enacted pursuant to a state-wide scheme
that allowed individual municipalities within New Jersey to enact
municipal employment preferences for construction work, thus
ultimately benefitting the state's residents as a whole, the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause applied. Otherwise, in theory,
a state could pass a statute dividing itself into two units and then
allow each subdivision to discriminate against citizens of the state
that reside in the other subdivision in addition to discriminating
against citizens of other states, thus producing an end run
around the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.21 5 Before
212. See id. at 212-13.
213. Id. at 221-22.
214. In Camden, Justice Rehnquist rejected this distinction on the grounds that the
municipal ordinance itself was facilitated by a state statute that allowed municipalities to
enact such preferences and that municipalities are political subdivisions of states. Id. 214-15.
215. For a case arising under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that also turns on
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returning to, and revising Table 3, we have one more case to consider, which creates one more exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
5. The Export Taxation Doctrine
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,2 16 the Court, per
Justice Stevens, addressed a challenge to a Montana statute that
applied a thirty percent tax on the contract price for the severance
of coal-substantially higher than that in most other states-when
ninety percent of Montana coal was shipped out-of-state. Montana
holds twenty-five percent of the nation's coal reserves and over fifty
percent of the nation's low-sulfur coal reserves.2 1 7 The tax produced
twenty percent of the state's tax revenues. While the case met the
criteria for category three, namely a facially neutral law that was
economically motivated, thus appearing to subject it to strict
scrutiny, the Court instead applied a four-part test that effectively
translated to a form of rational basis scrutiny. Under the test, the
tax must (1) be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to
the state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate in interstate
commerce; and (4) be fairly related to services provided by the
state.2 18 The fair apportionment requirement provides the state
considerably broader discretion than does the strict scrutiny rule in
category three dormant Commerce Clause doctrine cases.
The Court rejected the dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
stating that it was wrongly premised upon the assumption that outof-state purchasers of a scarce resource are entitled to a reasonable
price regardless of the price paid by in-state purchasers. Had the
Court instead applied the tax and rebate analysis in C & A

preventing the states from employing a divide-and-conquer strategy, see Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 361
(1992) (striking down Michigan statute barring private landfills from accepting solid waste

from outside the county in which they are located and stating that "a State (or one of its
political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the
movement of articles ofcommerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the
State itself').
216. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
217. Id. at 638-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 617.
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Carbone,2 19 and considered that twenty percent of the state's tax
revenues derived from the coal export, then it would have
recognized that those paying more for coal in-state are likely
compensated for this burden through the corresponding reduction
in their tax burdens. This is especially likely if we assume, as seems
reasonable, that the actual purchasers are able to pass on the
additional costs to a dispersed group of in-state consumers.2 2 ° So
viewed, the case appears in tension with Justice Stevens' own
analysis thirteen years earlier'in West Lynn Creamery.22 1
We are now ready to reconsider the basic doctrinal framework set
out in Table 3, this time including the additional inconsistencies
from the three associated doctrines described above.

219. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
220. In other words, it seems plausible to assume that the demand over the relevant range
was likely inelastic, thus ensuring that the incidence of the tax was not borne by the initial
purchaser, but rather was spread to dispersed end purchasers. If this is correct, the
incentives of those who initially bore the tax to invest in opposing it are substantially
diminished, if not altogether removed.
221. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healey, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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Table 4: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Related
Doctrines: Inconsistencies Exposed
Category

Rule

Illustrative
Cases and
Doctrines

Problem Cases
and Doctrines or
Other
Difficulties

1. Facially
Discriminatory:
Protectionist/
Economic motive

Per se rule of
invalidity

Traditional
Tarriffs/Embargoes; Sporhase;
GreatAtlantic &
Pacific Tea Co.

Market
participant
doctrine: e.g.,
Hughes, Reeves,
White.
But see
Wunnicke,
Camden

2. Facially
Discriminatory:
Non-economic
motivation

Strict scrutiny
with burden on
state (requiring
legitimate state
interest and
absence of nondiscriminatory
alternative)

Environmental
Protection
Statutes, e.g.,
City of
Philadelphiav.
New Jersey

Perverse
incentives in
Waste Disposal
Cases; see also
Maine v. Taylor;
Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas;
United Building
& Construction
Trades Council
v. Camden

3. Facially
Neutral:
Protectionist/
Economic motive

Strict Scrutiny
(see category
#2)

Hunt v.
Washington. But
see Exxon v.
Maryland

Export Taxation
Doctrine; e.g.,
Commonwealth
Edison v.
Montana

4. Facially
Neutral:
Legitimate
Interest with
Incidental
Burden

Balancing test
with burden on
challenger
(weighs claimed
benefits of law
against alleged
burdens on
commerce)

E.g., Raymond
Motor Trans. v.
Rice; Bibb v.
Navajo Freight
Lines; Kassel v.
Consol.
Freightways

Lack of certainty
concerning
application of
balancing test or
rational basis
scrutiny
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Table 4 reveals a number of inconsistencies running through the
four principal doctrinal categories under consideration: the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, the market participant doctrine, the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the export
taxation doctrine. Let us now consider the exposed anomalies by
category.
Category 1: In this case category, the Court appears to have
provided the clearest guidance, applying the per se rule of
invalidity to facially discriminatory statutes that have an obvious
protectionist or economic motive. And yet, the Court has carved out
a major exception that applies when the state operates in an
entrepreneurial rather than regulatory capacity. The market
participant exception applies notwithstanding facially discriminatory means and an obvious economic motive. Rather than
applying the per se rule of invalidity, the Court effectively gives a
free pass to discriminate in commerce. Moreover, the Court has
created exceptions to the exception itself, either based upon a
dubious factual distinction (whether the out-of-privity transaction
that the state seeks to regulate is outside the relevant market), or
based upon using the alternative textual hook of Article IV
Privileges and immunities.
Category 2: The Court applies strict scrutiny in evaluating
facially discriminatory statutes when the state articulates a nonprotectionist, non-economically motivated purpose. In this category
we have seen the Court strike down a restriction on waste imports
even though the effect of the ruling appears likely to have reduced
the provision of waste disposal services, whether accepting waste
in-state or from interstate commerce, by encouraging the state to
refuse necessary permits, or even to shut down existing facilities.
In addition, while the Court applies strict scrutiny, Maine v. Taylor
reveals that the test is not necessarily fatal. Finally, Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglasreveals that the Court has created a rule
of thumb against reciprocity agreements, when in fact, such
agreements are likely the least restrictive means of promoting free
trade among competitor states.
Category 3: The Court applies strict scrutiny to facially neutral
laws that evince a protectionist or economically motivated purpose.
Although the application of this test is usually fatal, the Court produced a seemingly inconsistent result in Exxon Corp. v. Maryland
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based upon a questionable economic analysis. And in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, the Court carved out an exception,
similar to that arising under the market participant doctrine in
Category 1, when the state structures its burdensome law in the
form of an export tax. This doctrine appears further in tension with
West Lynn Creamery from Category 2.
Category 4: In this final category, we have seen a division within
the Court concerning the appropriate test to apply. The division is
of sufficient magnitude that in the most recent principal case to
address the issue, the Court was so closely divided that the case
appears to have produced an unstable doctrinal, or cyclical, result.
The game theoretical model cannot eliminate every one of these
doctrinal anomalies or eliminate every apparent inconsistency
within the relevant cases. But I hope to show that it is capable of
explaining most of them, and most importantly, that it manages to
do so by including, rather than excluding, the major doctrinal
exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause, which have plagued
traditional doctrinal analysis. More importantly, the analysis
provides a sound normative foundation for these much criticized
doctrines and case results. Unlike most studies of the clause, which
consider one doctrine or one category of cases within a given
doctrine, the model presented in the next part cuts across all four
doctrines that I have described. In the next Part, I set out the game
theoretical model, and in the Part that follows, I explain its power
in making sense of these much contested doctrines.
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II. A GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE DOCTRINE

Rent, rent, rent, rent, rent
We're not gonna pay rent2 2
Mark & Roger: 'Cause everything is rent
Company:

A superficial reading of public choice literature might suggest a
picture not unlike the refrain in the song "Rent" from Jonathan
Larson's 1996 Tony Award- and Pulitzer Prize-winning musical of
the same name. The public choice caricature presents all legislative
activity as a self-interested pursuit in which "everything is rent,"
and recommends that the judiciary, which we are to assume-like
the company-represents our collective interests, somehow ensures
that "we're not gonna pay."
The following analysis rests not only on game theory, but also on
an understanding of "rents" and "rent seeking." While the latter
terms are more closely associated with public choice, rents and rent
seeking are highly relevant to analysis of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine because, as the game theoretical analysis reveals,
states can and do play cooperative and noncooperative games
concerning various forms of rent. In the analysis developed below,
however, the caricature of legislative behavior in which everything
is rent-and in which all pursuits of rent are illicit-serves as a
point of departure. The critical inquiry is not whether legislatures
are prone to rent seeking (they are), or whether legislative rent
seeking is good or bad (it's both). Instead, the critical inquiry is how
the federal judiciary furthers its legitimate role in a scheme of
separation of powers by curbing particular manifestations of rent
seeking that are of concern to the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, while at the same time allowing state legislatures to
pursue, subject only to state law constraints or other independent
constitutional checks, other forms of legislative behavior that can
also credibly be characterized as the product of rent seeking.
This Article shows that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
properly understood, does not target state law rent seeking as such,
222. Jonathan Larson, Rent, RENT (1996).
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but rather targets two particular types of state rent-seeking laws.
First, it targets those laws that, if sustained, would likely encourage other states to pursue similar harmful rents. The end
result of such a prisoners' dilemma game would be a regime of
mutual defection. As a general matter, even those who are generally
critical of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine accept these case
results. 22' Second, in a more controversial group of cases, the
doctrine targets state laws that undermine other states in their
efforts to pursue cooperative, pro-commerce strategies in a
multiple Nash equilibrium game. This occurs when a group of
states, through tacit coordination, adopts a common regime from
among two or more available pure Nash equilibrium strategies with
the benign effect of reducing the impediments to interstate
commerce. When an individual state enacts a law that undermines
such a benign scheme, it has the effect of appropriating quasi-rents
that would not have come into being but for the pro-commerce, pure
Nash equilibrium strategy selected by the adversely affected states.
In this Part, I define and illustrate the concepts necessary to
develop the game theoretical model of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. In the Part that follows, I apply that model to the
cases and doctrines introduced in Part I. To place the two dominant
games-the prisoners' dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium
game-in their appropriate context, it is important to define and
illustrate several related economic concepts. This will also help to
get past the superficial assertion that "everything is rent" by
allowing us to distinguish benign rents from illicit rents, and
further to distinguish among those rents that are illicit, and those
that are within and without the proper reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. The analysis begins with a definition of
"rent" and the various specialized forms of rent, including economic
rents, legislative rents, 224 Ricardian rents, and finally appropriable
223. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1112. The authors observe:

Even Justice Scalia, who dissented in Camps Newfound, and who has been a
vociferous critic of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, has

accepted the doctrine insofar as it prohibits states from facially discriminating
against interstate commerce or enacting protectionist legislation designed to

benefit local producers at the expense of out-of-state commercial enterprises.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
224. The economic foundation -for legislative rent seeking is most commonly associated
with the following seminal works: Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
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quasi-rents. In addition, I will consider the closely related-and
sometimes overlapping---concepts of transactions costs, bilateral
monopoly, and empty core bargaining (or cycling). I first present an
overview of the game theoretical model, and then, in a more
detailed exposition, I define and illustrate each of these terms. After
developing the game theoretical model in the remainder of this
part, which includes the prisoners' dilemma and the multiple Nash
equilibrium games, in Part III, I will reevaluate the cases and
doctrines discussed in Part I. Analyzing the cases and doctrines
according to whether they are the likely product of efforts to secure
rents that invite retaliation and thus mutual defection, or efforts to
secure appropriable quasi-rents in a manner that undermines other
states in their efforts to adopt benign Nash equilibrium strategies
that facilitate the flow of commerce, provides both a positive
explanation and a sound normative foundation for the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause and related doctrines.
A. A Brief Overview of the Model
Without disputing that many, if not most, of the cases discussed
in Part I possess features that can properly be characterized as
furthering some aspect of the public good, as a general matter it is
not an outstanding theoretical accomplishment to identify the
desire to secure some form of rent as the probable motive for
securing the statutes subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
in these cases.2" To illustrate, consider just a few of the more
obvious cases. In Hunt, the North Carolina apple producers sought
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967), and Anne 0. Krueger, The PoliticalEconomy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302 (1974).
225. Professors Martin H. Redish and Kirk J. Kaludis have offered a similar observation
about the relationship between the assumptions of interest group theory and underlying
legislative motivations:
While public choice theory's extreme characterization of the legislative process

appears to have little empirical support, it would be naive to doubt the impact
of interest groups and other questionable influences on the legislative process.
Although legislatures will generally characterize their actions in public interest

terms, in reality their motives often focus more on advancement of one interest
group at the expense of competing groups.
Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in FirstAmendment
Theory: RedistributiveValues and the DemocraticDilemma, 93 NW. U. L. Rvv. 1083, 1109-10

(1999) (footnotes omitted).
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to secure a rent in the form of additional profits that would result
from effectively downgrading superior out-of-state competitive
apples at the expense of in-state apple purchasers, who would
benefit from the additional information and the superior quality
apples that the Washington supplemental grading system would
have provided.2 26 In Exxon, the Maryland independent service
stations secured a rent in the form of additional profit that would
result from removing competitors who, as a result of market
conditions favoring vertically integrated retail service outlets in the
relevant historical period, were able to secure more favorable price
and supply terms, at the expense of in-state consumers who would
benefit from this form of competition, and of the owners of the
competitive retail gas outlets.22 Finally, in White, prospective municipal employees of city contractors secured a rent in the form of
more favorable wages or opportunities for employment that would
result from limiting the eligible labor pool for half of the contractor
and subcontractor slots for construction jobs on behalf of the city at
the expense of taxpayers who would offset the additional costs in
terms of higher taxes and of other potential workers who did not
reside in Boston.22 While each of these cases, and virtually all of
the others described in Part I, can comfortably be characterized in
rent-seeking terms, the results, and the doctrines that emerge from
the cases, have been much criticized as inconsistent.
Although I begin with the premise that virtually all state
legislation that has been challenged as a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause can reasonably be understood in terms of rent
seeking, this premise does not contradict my earlier assertion that
the underlying legislation in each case is also susceptible to a
competing public goods characterization. Rather, I am asserting
that even if we begin our analysis by imposing a common-and
negative-rent-seeking story on each underlying set of case facts,
the game theoretical model developed in this Article provides a
positive account of why the Supreme Court has elected to
countenance some rent-seeking statutes, while prohibiting others.
More importantly, perhaps, in identifying the most likely rentseeking explanation of each challenged statute, I will avoid the
226. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
228. See supranotes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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inherent danger of employing a post-hoc classification method of
looking more optimistically after the fact for the public good in
those laws the Supreme Court has sustained, while scrutinizing
with a more jaundiced eye those statutes that the Court has struck
down. Employing a consistent method of classifying the underlying
case facts thus facilitates a sharper focus in analyzing the various
manifestations of state law rent seeking that underlie the challenged statutes. Doing so further allows us to determine whether
there exists a meaningful pattern in those cases in which the Court
sustains challenged state laws that allegedly infringe on commerce,
and those cases in which the Court strikes them down.
While it is not difficult to characterize each challenged law as the
product of rent seeking, the game theoretical model reveals that not
all rents are created equal from the standpoint of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Simply put, the dormant Commerce
Clause is concerned with some manifestations of rent seeking, and
is indifferent to others. To be clear, I do not import intuitions about
public good versus rent seeking through the back door. I do not
suggest, for example, that those forms of rent seeking that are
beyond the purview of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are
somehow more benign than those that are of particular concern to
the dormant Commerce Clause. Indeed, some manifestations of
state law rent seeking, which the Court sustains against a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, impose costs that are as great as or
greater than those which the Court has struck down. But because
it is the nature of the rent, and not the magnitude of the cost that
the rent imposes, that determines whether to apply the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, the game theoretical model proves
2"29
essential in distinguishing permitted from prohibited rents.
229. Professor Saul Levmore has offered a similar insight. See Levmore, supra note 202.
Levmore distinguishes (1) exploitations ("the potential use of monopoly power to exploit other
states"), (2) interferences ("laws that substantially burden out-of-state interests in
nonexploitative fashion"), and (3) laws "that impose virtually all of their costs on in-state
interests." Id. at 573; see also id. (positing that "some interferences can generate welfare
losses that exceed those generated by exploitative monopolies, even though they do not
exploit customers in other states"). As suggested in the text, I agree that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine does not target those laws that impose burdens primarily on
adversely affected in-state interests (Levmore's category three).I also agree that the potential
for geographic exploitation helps to assess the various dormant Commerce Clause related
doctrines. Professor Levmore and I offer different explanations, however, of the specific
mechanisms that distinguish those laws adversely affecting out-of-state interests that the
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Holding aside the practical difficulties with operationalizing the
distinction, most would agree that in exercising its Commerce
Clause powers, Congress is on more solid ground when enacting
provisions that affect underlying conduct across more states than
one. In fact, the game theoretical model developed below reveals
that the theoretical difficulties associated with defining commerce
in a manner that properly limits the scope of Congressional
Commerce Clause powers are more problematic than in defining the
scope of that term as it applies to the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. There are two reasons. First, on the affirmative side of the
Commerce Clause, at least if we accept the post-New Deal
formulation, even as modified in United States v. Lopez,' ° Congress
can regulate any economic subject matter that substantially affects
commerce. The substantial effects test, as the Court demonstrated
throughout the post-New Deal period, raises intractable questions
of degrees of impact. Indeed, prior to Lopez itself, the difficulty in
defining meaningful categories had forced the Court into the
business of drawing seemingly arbitrary lines. 3 ' In contrast, the
game theoretical account of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
links permitted and prohibited state legislation not to the extent of
harm that particular manifestations of rent seeking impose, but
rather to different kinds of rent seeking or to whether rent
seeking is likely to produce a particular form of interstate effect.
Second, and relatedly, in the long course of developing its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court has identified
-wittingly or not-a set of meaningful proxies that correlate with

Court sustains or strikes down. While Professor Levmore focuses on the more serious and
persistent nature of exploitations and the inability of adversely affected states to retaliate
against such laws as justifying a strong presumption against exploitations (in contrast with
the more case-by-case approach taken in the context of interferences), see id. at 565-66, this

Article asserts that the Court presumes most strongly against the constitutionality of
challenged state laws that, if sustained, would likely promote defection by other states in a
manner that would either induce mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma or in a benign
multiple Nash equilibrium game. For a discussion exploring the implications of these two
approaches in assessing Commonwealth Edison CO. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), see
infra note 278.
230. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
231. Of course, it remains an open question whether the tripartite Lopez formulation will
stand the test of time. For a more detailed discussion of Lopez and its implications for the
dormant Commerce Clause, see supra Part I.B.
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the factual contexts in which these various kinds of rent seeking or
rent seeking with particular interstate effects take place.
Articulating the economic foundation for these proxies will allow
us not only to provide a positive picture of the present state of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but also to establish a
normatively defensible account for this much criticized body of
default constitutional law. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
I argue, has been used primarily as a vehicle to check state laws
that have the effect of undermining the laws or dominant practices
of other states that would otherwise facilitate the flow of interstate
commerce. So viewed, the doctrine is motivated by the effect of
challenged laws on the relationships between and among states.
It is not motivated by the effect of the challenged laws on the
relationship between states and private business interests. It is for
that reason, I claim, that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
is fundamentally concerned with political, rather than economic,
union.
We can thus appreciate the Court's application of the per se rule
when faced with financially motivated facial discrimination, which
predictably invites retaliatory measures by other states. In these
cases, the Court's concern for the legislative reaction in other
states, rather than its concern for the economic impact on adversely
affected business interests, explains the application of the per se
rule. But setting aside such cases, as a general matter rent-seeking
legislation as such should be presumed beyond the bounds of the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. That is because while ordinary
legislative rent seeking, especially of the sort that distributes
wealth from diffuse groups (for example consumers or taxpayers) to
organized special interests has an adverse economic effect, the
magnitude of that effect is invariably at least as great if not greater
at the state level than at the national level." 2 The same cannot be
232. It is perhaps for this reason that state constitutions, in contrast with the United
States Constitution, routinely contain provisions that are specifically designed to establish
a process for combating excessive in-state rents both before they are negotiated, and after

they have been successfully passed by the legislature. For example, state constitutions
routinely have provisions that appear nominally intended to limit rent seeking, including

various forms of the item veto, term limits, and balanced budget amendments, when such
proposals have not succeeded at the federal level. For a discussion of these differences
between state and federal legislative processes, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice
Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385 (1992).
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said, however, of the particular category of rent seeking that I
contend is of central concern to the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. Statutes that confer rents that have only become available
as a consequence of the pro-commerce laws or practices of other
states have an effect on commerce that transcends the economic
burdens that such laws impose on the enacting state.3 3
Just as it would be presumptively improper for Congress to
intervene in state political processes under the guise of the
Commerce Clause in an effort to minimize the probability that state
legislatures pass inefficient rent-seeking statutes, so too it would
be improper for the federal judiciary, relying upon the dormant side
of the Commerce Clause, to strike down laws that are routine
matters of in-state rent seeking. But there are some manifestations of in-state rent seeking that are the proper object of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. And it turns out that the
Supreme Court has done fairly well-but by no means perfectly-in
identifying the factors that correlate with such cases. As stated
previously, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has been
properly used to strike down state rent-seeking laws that have a
considerable likelihood of inviting a retaliatory response, thus
playing into the most obvious prisoners' dilemma affecting
interstate trade. The doctrine has also been used to isolate for
presumptive invalidity those state laws that procure rents in a
manner that undermines the pro-commerce, pure Nash equilibrium
laws or dominant practices of other states. To identify the factors
that correlate with the latter category of laws, we must introduce,
and then generalize, the economic concept of appropriable quasirents .4
A central insight of the transactions costs literature, appropriable
quasi-rents become available after parties who have entered into
contractual relationships under competitive conditions acquire
specialized assets-either human or physical capital-to facilitate
233. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court engage in any sort of impact analysis,
as for example, has been suggested by Julian N. Eule, Laying the DormantCommerce Clause
to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 437-43 (1982), which raises difficult questions of institutional
competence. Instead, I am suggesting that the very proxies that the Court has been using
correlate in a meaningful manner with the kind of rent seeking that is of central concern to
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
234. For a general discussion, see Benjamin Klein et al., VerticalIntegration,Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
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performance or receipt of performance of the respective contractual
obligations. When this occurs, the parties find their relationship
transformed from one entered into competitively, into one that
is best understood in terms of a bilateral monopoly. Bilateral
monopoly is characterized by opportunities to secure rents on
both sides of the relationship.2 5 As a result, opportunities for
strategic, post contractual behavior can plague long-term contractual relationships.23 One of the foundational insights of law
and economics has been in recognizing the firm as an institution
that ameliorates some of the difficulties of long-term contracting by
allowing a single economic entity to coordinate the activities of
those who produce positive synergies and then to allocate the gains
from their collaborative efforts in a manner that avoids the
potential strategic interactions that would plague the same set
of relationships if handled contractually.2 " 7 Scholars have also
recognized that one of the functions that management provides is
in allocating the superadditive gains of contributing factors in a
manner that promotes optimal productive incentives within the
various components of the firm."8
Because the concept of quasi-rents is generally used to study
private institutions, some translation is required to apply the
concept to this important area of public law. And translation always
carries with it an attendant risk of loss in meaning. We know, for
example, that states do not enter into formal bilateral or multilateral contracts. The Compact Clause expressly prevents them
from doing so without prior Congressional approval.' 9 We also
know that vertical integration is not an option available to states
seeking to prevent strategic behavior by other states in the form of
rent-seeking legislation enacted at their expense.24 ° What then are
235. Id. at 299-300.
236. See J.A. Brickley & F.H. Dark, The Choice of OrganizationalForm: The Case of
Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 406 (1987); Klein et al., supra note 234, at 301.
237. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprintedin
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELoPMENT 18, 21 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) [hereinafter Coase, Nature]; Brickley & Dark,
supra note 236.

238. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233 (1979).

239. The Compact Clause states: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
240. In fact, while single states have divided throughout our history, never once have two
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the circumstances under which states can seek to appropriate the
functional equivalent of quasi-rents that become available only as
the result of the laws or dominant practices of other states?
When a group of states has formally or informally undertaken a
coordinated pro-commerce regime, a single state can seek to
appropriate the resulting quasi-rents by enacting legislation that
operates to defeat that regime. Such legislation is different in kind
from ordinary in-state rent seeking, which merely redistributes
wealth internally from diffuse to organized constituencies. This sort
of state law confers an in-state benefit that could only have come
into being because of the opportunities that the coordinated efforts
of other states presented, and any benefit that is conferred is at the
direct expense of the other states.
The classic appropriable quasi-rent context transforms a
competitively entered-into relationship into a sort of bilateral
monopoly. The contractual relationship itself produces an opportunity for one party to gain at the expense of the other in a manner
that is not consistent with either party's ex ante expectations. But
this divergence between ex ante and ex post expectations is not
limited to formal contracting. The concept of appropriable quasirents can be generalized to include a second context-empty core
bargaining or cycling-in which a single player can secure a gain
that thwarts what would otherwise have been a mutually beneficial
regime achieved through formal or informal coordinated efforts
among multiple players.
In the context of interstate rent seeking, empty core bargaining
or cycling has the potential to arise when three or more states
would benefit from a common legal regime and when a single state,
by defecting from that regime, can prevent the other states from
realizing those benefits. Using the language of game theory, the
common legal regime produces a superadditivity, meaning an
additional value that could not be realized if the individual states
failed to coordinate their efforts.24 1 The superadditivity is much like
a capital gain in that it presents the actors with a chance to
increase the return to capital simply by coordinating the use of that
or more states merged.
241. For a general discussion of core theory, see LESTER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY
AND THE CORE (1978); see also John S. Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 556 (1987).
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capital with others. But with the creation of the capital gain
comes the problem of allocation, and thus the incentive to seek
appropriable quasi-rents. If a group of states shares a common
legal regime that has the effect of facilitating a capital gain or
superadditivity, for example that arising from a coordinated flow
of commerce facilitated by a regime that permits a widely used
variety of truck, mudflap, maximum shipment weight, or maximum
train length, a single state in the middle of this group can effectively undermine the benefits of the coordinated scheme, taking a
substantial amount of the available gains onto itself, simply by
enacting a contrary rule.24 2 The problem is particularly acute in
coordination games in which from a reasonable ex ante perspective,
all would agree to one of two or more pure Nash equilibrium
strategies, but in which a defecting state can benefit from the mere
fact of defecting and thus producing instead a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. The analysis shows that the defecting state is not
seeking to supplant one possible pure Nash outcome with another,
but rather is seeking to thwart the gains to other states by
producing an undesirable, nonpure result.
If, for example, a state benefits by not having trucks in interstate
commerce travel through it, either because of the reduction in the
flow of traffic or because of the reduction in the cost of highway
maintenance, then the contrary law takes on the characteristics of
appropriable quasi-rents produced as a result of the pure Nash
242. Although he does not discuss Kassel or Bibb, or attempt to reconcile the general body
of dormant Commerce Clause cases, in an important article Professor Richard Epstein has
recognized a holdout problem among states in the production of interstate public goods. See
Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 159-61
(1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Exit Rights];see alsoRICHARDA. EPSTEIN, BARGAININGWITHTHE
STATE 127-45 (1993) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, BARGAINING] (providing comprehensive
assessment of how individual states can obstruct interstate business practices and extending

holdout analysis to explain discriminatory taxation). Epstein posits that the holdout problem
is particularly acute when businesses require universal assent among states to promote
conditions that facilitate interstate business practices. For that reason, Epstein maintains

that federalism sometimes has the counter intuitive effect of undermining, rather than
promoting, effective exit strategies for businesses. In an informative article on cyberspace,

Professor Burk has extended Epstein's holdout analysis to describe Kasseland Bibb. See Dan
Burk, Federalismin Cyberspace,28 CONN. L. REV. 1095,1123-26 (1996). For an analysis that
distinguishes this Article's game theoretical analysis from the holdout analysis offered by
Professors Epstein and Burk, see infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text (positing that
defection from pure Nash equilibrium strategy provides a direct benefit to a defecting state,
rather than any anticipated payoff, as in a holdout game, for eventual compliance with
regimes of other states).
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equilibrium, pro-commerce strategy of the other states. The
opportunity for the rent could not have come about but for the
dominant practices of other states, which the defecting state seeks
to thwart. The divergence between ex ante and ex post expectations
is highlighted if we consider that no reasonable set of legislators,
had they been given the power to legislate for the entire group of
states, including the defecting state, would have selected a regime
in which one state in the center has a rule that is out of sync with
those of the surrounding states. And state highway safety laws are
not the only context in which the laws of other states create
potential opportunities to secure appropriable quasi-rents.
A critical insight that follows from this analysis is that, contrary
to traditional doctrinal approaches to the dormant Commerce
Clause, the relevant inquiry should not be whether the subject
matter of the challenged statute-whether it be truck safety
regulations, the quality indicators for imported produce, or gasoline
marketing-implicates the Commerce Clause versus state police
powers. This question is unanswerable. Instead, the better inquiry
is whether, without regard to the statutory subject matter, the
challenged statute seeks to secure a quasi-rent that would not have
become available but for the laws or dominant practices of other
states.
The analysis further explains why the dormant Commerce Clause
is necessarily a default doctrine of constitutional law. Because
much dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is targeted against
opportunities to secure appropriable quasi-rents, and because such
rents can arise from coordinated schemes that would potentially
admit of more than one possible Nash equilibrium strategy,2 43 the
decision by one group of states to select a particular regime should
not prevent Congress from changing from one such coordinated
outcome to another. Provided that the outcome remains coordinated, and thus pure Nash (for example, either to allow straight
mudflaps, curved mudflaps, or both), then the objectives of the
Commerce Clause are met.
While Congress is well situated-better for example than the
federal judiciary-to monitor and change dominant legal regimes,
it might be less well situated than the federal judiciary to monitor
243. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORYAND THE LAW 19-28 (1994).
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and punish states that seek to secure rents at the expense of other
states. Public choice reveals that in situations that present intense
conflicting lobbying pressures on both sides of a given issue, a
common legislative response is to either decline to legislate
altogether, or to delegate. 2 " Interstate disputes over commerce
present just this sort of conflict paradigm, and the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine can be interpreted in a manner that is
consistent with either of these Congressional responses. Congress'
failure to legislate, with the knowledge that the federal judiciary
stands ready to intervene in response to efforts by states to
appropriate quasi-rents made available as a consequence of other
states' Nash equilibrium, pro-commerce strategies, is the operational equivalent of a silent, or de facto, delegation. The difficulty,
as we have seen, however, is that all state laws that are challenged
'as violating the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can be
characterized as a form of rent seeking because virtually all such
laws share the characteristic of redistributing wealth from one
group that is diffuse and poorly organized to another that is
concentrated and well organized.245
In the course of developing its dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the Court has articulated tests that operate as
stronger or weaker presumptions of validity or invalidity. This is
captured in Table 3,246 which presents four sets of rules, which are
often inconsistently applied. As Table 4247 reveals, once we introduce the most prominent doctrinal exceptions to the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the apparent inconsistencies
become even more pronounced. In short, the doctrine operates as a
meaningful guide only if we accept at face value the Court's
articulated exceptions. And those exceptions often appear hard to
defend when we consider them in light of the Court's own dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. I argue, however, that if we instead
employ the game theoretical model developed more fully below,
we can line these cases up along two complementary analytical
spectrums. The two spectrums turn on the presence or absence of
244. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1982).
245. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION (1965) (setting out this thesis
in rigorous detail).
246. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
247. See supra Part I.C.5.
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the best available proxies for laws that, if sustained, are likely to
provoke a retaliatory response from other states or laws that
represent state efforts to appropriate quasi-rents that have become
available only as a result of other states' pro-commerce, pure Nash
equilibrium regimes.
B. Developing the Game TheoreticalModel
1. The Prisoners'Dilemma
The prisoners' dilemma characterizes the conditions under which
rational behavior leads two players to pursue individual strategies
that yield outcomes for each player that are inferior to those
associated with mutual cooperation. The payoffs in the standard
prisoners' dilemma are such that without regard to what the other
prisoner does, it is rational for each prisoner to defect. To illustrate,
assume that two prisoners are separated and are prevented from
communicating with each other. Each prisoner is told that if neither
confesses, the state will be limited in its proof, and each prisoner
will receive a six month sentence based upon a conviction for a
minor offense. If one rats out the other while the other remains
silent, the one who speaks will go free, while the other will be
sentenced to eight years. If both rat out the other, each will get six
years. These reciprocal payoffs are presented in Table 5.248
Table 5: The Prisoners' Dilemma
(Payoffs for A, B)

A cooperates

A defects

B cooperates

(6 months, 6 months)

(no time, 8 years)

B defects

(8 years, no time)

(6 years, 6 years)

The prisoners' dilemma reveals that without regard to what the
other prisoner does, it is rational for each prisoner to defect. If B is
silent, A can improve her position from six months to no time by
248. Please note that in Table 5, cooperation and defection are presented with reference
to the remaining prisoner, rather than the police. Thus, cooperation means declining to rat
out the other prisoner; defection means the opposite.
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ratting out B. If B defects, A can improve her position from eight
years to six years by ratting out B. The payoffs are reciprocal and
therefore B has the same incentives. The end result is that both A
and B are motivated to defect even though mutual defection
produces a payoff for each prisoner (six years) that is substantially
lower than that available if the two prisoners instead pursued a
strategy of mutual cooperation (six months).249 The payoffs in the
lower right box, which represent the dominant set of strategies, are
presented in bold.
Several scholars have recognized that the prisoners' dilemma
characterizes the relationships that confront states, 250 and nations,"1 in choosing whether to enact special interest legislation
that limits free trade. Other scholars who have not formally relied
upon game theory in their analyses have identified dynamics within
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that can readily be recast
in such terms. 5 2 While each state would be better off in a free trade
249. As stated in the text, the prisoners' dilemma is built on the assumption that the
prisoners cannot cooperate and that any implicit agreements cannot be enforced. The
problem could be avoided in a regime in which the prisoners can reward cooperation and
punish defection, as seen in the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. While this game is
discussed in more detail below, it is important to emphasize two points here. First, infinite
iterations do not solve the prisoners' dilemma; rather, by providing enforceable rewards for
cooperation and punishments for defection in the next successive period, they alter the
payoffs such that the game no longer is a prisoners' dilemma. Second, the iterated prisoners'
dilemma game achieves a cooperative result only if there is no known end period. If the
players know the end period, or can safely anticipate a probable end period, then the game
"unravels" such that every period is subject to single period prisoners' dilemma payoffs.
When this occurs, mutual defection is again the dominant strategy. See also infra note 254
(discussing implications of research on probabilistic end periods for this Article's analysis).
250. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraintson State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377,456 (1996) (relying
upon prisoners' dilemma analysis to argue that the proper test for evaluating state-law tax
incentives "should be whether a particular tax provision distorts economic decision making
in favor of in-state activity, not whether it treats in-state and out-of-state actors
disparately"); Richard E. Levy, Federalismand Collective Action, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1241, 1268
(1997) (positing that "the expansion of federal authority under the Commerce Clause makes
sense from a collective action perspective because ofexternalities and the prisoner's dilemma
(or race to the bottom) problems"); Daniel P. Petrov, Note, Prisoners No More: State
Investment Relocation Incentives and The Prisoners'Dilemma, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
71 (2001) (arguing that states might not face a prisoners' dilemma concerning relocation tax
incentives).
251. See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 137, at 5-6, 16 (describing trade relationship between
nations as prisoners' dilemma).
252. Thus, for example, Professors Dan T. Coenen and Walter Hellerstein have addressed
the question why the Supreme Court allows state subsidies but not tax breaks under its
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regime-one that promotes specialization and exchange-than in
one of mutual defection, free trade regimes also have distributive
consequences that can adversely affect particular industries that
would fare poorly with direct competition from other states. Such
industries have a strong incentive to secure legislation at the state
level that will insulate them from interstate competition. As a
result, special interests are strongly motivated to pressure their
state legislatures to defect from the norm of free trade. And
although such protectionist legislation harms diffuse constituents
who are deprived of the superior products and lower prices that
open trade brings, the extent of harm to any individual is likely to
be sufficiently small that it will be less worthwhile for diffuse
constituents to invest in lobbying to oppose protectionist measures
than it will be for special interests who directly benefit to lobby
in their favor. This familiar public choice insight,' 3 reveals that
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the
DormantCommerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen,
Commerce ClauseRestraintson State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
789 (1996). Professor Coenen notes that
[T]ax credits, exemptions, and the like are resistant to repeal because
legislatures typically enact them as presumptively permanent features of state
tax codes. In contrast, because subsidies involve the direct expenditure of funds,
they routinely show up-and are subject to recurring reevaluation-as expense
items in perenially controversial state budget bills.
Coenen, supra at 988 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Hellerstein and Coenen argue that
"Ijiust as surely as use of the will or the deed impresses upon the individual mind the
significance of its contemplated act, consideration of a subsidy forces the mind of the public
body to consider most pointedly the cost and consequences of moving forward." Hellerstein
& Coenen, supra at 869. While scholars have rightly noted that subsidies and tax breaks
"may have the same effects," Levmore, supra note 202, at 566, the Coenen and Hellerstein
analyses, supra, suggest that the process through which the rent-seeking law is created
might affect the probability of reciprocal behavior by other states. See also Regan, supranote
34. So viewed, the more transparent the special interest legislation, the more costly it is to
procure. As a result, transparent rents are less likely to invite a retaliatory response from
other states. Conversely, the more well-hidden the rent, the less costly it is to procure and
thus the more likely it is to provoke retaliation. This somewhat counterintuitive observation
(that hidden laws are more likely to invite retaliation than transparent laws), can be
explained in terms of the prisoners' dilemma. Interest groups have a strong incentive to
identify even well-hidden rent-seeking laws that adversely affect them in other states and
to secure reciprocal protectionist measures in their own state. The Court's dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is consistent with this observation in that it appears to raise the
cost to interest groups of securing retaliatory special interest legislation that is consistent
with a regime of mutual defection in a standard prisoners' dilemma. For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part III.B. 1.
253. See generally OLSON, supra note 245, at 133-67 (describing tendency of organized
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behaving rationally, state legislatures are likely to provide protectionist legislation even though the aggregate effect reduces
welfare. States that enact such legislation are responding rationally
to interest group pressures, but if all states react in this manner,
the effect is economic Balkanization, the game theoretical equivalent of mutual defection in a multilateral prisoners' dilemma game.
Players can avoid the prisoners' dilemma through unlimited
repeat plays in which they anticipate the ability to punish the
defector in any given period in the next round of play. In a game
with endless iterations, the anticipated punishment that will
necessarily follow from any defection alters the payoffs by reducing
the benefits of defection and increasing the benefits of cooperation.
The altered payoffs have the potential to produce a matrix in which
it is rational for each player to pursue a cooperative strategy
regardless of what the other player does. If so, mutual cooperation
emerges the dominant strategy. If instead, however, the game has
a known end period, the game "unravels." For example, if there are
six periods, in the sixth and final period, the players behave as if
there is no more opportunity to punish (because there is no seventh
period), and therefore rationally defect. In period five (or n-i), the
players again realize that there is no opportunity to punish, because
they anticipate mutual defection in period six regardless of what
happens in period five. The same problem confronts the players in
periods four, three, and two. Eventually, this continues down to the
first period, thus ensuring that the entire game will fall victim to
mutual defection as the dominant outcome. 2 s
groups to secure special interest legislation at the expense of diffuse groups); MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 540-46 (1997)

(describing legislative prisoners' dilemma).
254. For a general discussion, see STEARNS, supra note 253, at 540-46. The presentation
in the text is admittedly stylized. As behavioral economists have observed, known or
anticipated end periods do not invariably result in a defection regime. See Ronald J. Gilson
& Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing ThroughAgents: CooperationandConflictBetween Lawyers
in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520 (1994). The authors explain that in contrast with
formal models, "W[more recent research ... suggests that cooperative behavior can develop in
a multi-round prisoner's dilemma under certain conditions." Id. at 520. Depending on the
payoff function, cooperation can result if the players in any given round suspect a high
possibility of a subsequent round in which cooperation can be rewarded and defection can be
punished. See id. Fortunately, it is unnecessary here to reconcile the formal models with the
claimed contrary results from behavioral economics research. As explained in the text that
follows, the single period prisoners' dilemma better captures the relationships between and
among states not due to unraveling, but rather due to the stochastic nature of opportunities
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In the context of interstate trade, the single period prisoners'
dilemma likely provides a more apt description than either a game
with unlimited iterations or an unraveling game. While the states
may be repeat players in a general sense, laws that cater to narrow
constituencies in most instances arise stochastically. In most
instances, state A is unlikely to reciprocate in kind against state
B in response to a particular law that state B has enacted
affecting state A. In Hunt,' for example, while the challenged
North Carolina law targeted Washington apples, it is unlikely that
Washington had a direct and ready means of punishing North
Carolina for that isolated instance of defection. Because we are
dealing with fifty states, rather than two, each state likely views
itself as playing in what is effectively a single period prisoners'
dilemma with respect to potentially adverse trade laws of any
particular state. This holds even if any given state is a repeat
player with respect to the remaining states in general.2 6
At a minimum, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can be
understood as a judicial effort to prevent states from enacting laws
that, if sustained, threaten a regime of mutual defection in a
standard, noniterated prisoners' dilemma game. If states were
immune from challenge in enacting discriminatory legislation that
is motivated by a protectionist purpose, as is widely understood to
have been the case under the Articles of Confederation, 7 then
for retaliation against another state's isolated but harmful protectionist measure.
255. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).

256. There are exceptions. For certain exports, trade between adjacent states is more
likely than trade with distant states. In that context, reciprocal punishments become more
plausible. This likely describes the relationships between states enacting or affected by
reciprocity statutes. See supra Part I.C.1.b and infra Part III.B.3.c.

257. It is contested historically whether in fact the Articles were unduly plagued by state
laws obstructing interstate trade. See Edward Kitch, Regulationand the American Common
Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9-19 (A. Tarlock ed.,
1981). Without attempting to resolve this historical debate, my own intuition is that it is

more relevant to identify what the Framers feared than it is to determine whether their fears
were well grounded in historical experience. Accord Regan, supra note 34, at 1114 n.55. It
is also worth noting that to the extent that trade barriers did motivate the enactment of the
Constitution, some have argued that the import-export clause, rather than the Commerce
Clause, was directed at such offensive state law practices. See BrrrKER, supra note 106, at
§ 6.06, 6-35 to -36. It is for that reason that Professor Bittker contends that the reference to
free markets in the famous Justice Jackson quote from H.P.Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 539 (1949), "may stretch history a bit." BITrKER, supra note 106, at § 6.06, 6-35.

Bittker explains:
The "commercial strife" that the Constitution was expected to pacify consisted
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notwithstanding the aggregate gains to the individual states and to
the nation as a whole from free trade, each state would instead
have an incentive to cater to narrow constituencies, thus defecting
from that norm. The mutual incentives to defect from a free trade
regime would threaten to produce the lower payoffs by isolating
each state as an economic unit than would arise in the absence of
such defection.
While this story is widely understood, the fact remains that it
fails to capture most, or at least the most interesting, cases. At one
level that should not be surprising. If the legal doctrine solves an
easy category of cases, then the doctrine should be credited rather
than faulted when its obvious target cases discontinue, or arise
only infrequently. So viewed, we might appreciate the per se rule
of invalidity, set out in Category 1,258 which applies to facially
discriminatory statutes that are motivated by a protectionist
or economic purpose, as the Court's effort to use the dormant
Commerce Clause to prevent a mutual defection outcome in this
prisoners' dilemma game.
Because most cases do not present such blunt attempts at
discrimination in commerce, we can appreciate the Court's use of
strict scrutiny as a presumption against those state laws that likely
represent creative state legislative efforts to produce the same
result through means that would otherwise be more likely to
withstand judicial scrutiny. Thus, the Court applies strict scrutiny,
presuming against the constitutionality of laws that discriminate
in commerce, but that are arguably linked to some other legitimate
purpose (Category 2) and against the constitutionality of laws that,
although facially neutral, appear to have been motivated by
protectionist or financial concerns (Category 3). In cases that fall
into these two categories, the Court intuits that sophisticated state
legislatures have packaged otherwise harmful state laws in a form
that avoids the strictures of the per se rule. Strict scrutiny thus

primarily of taxes laid by seaport states on products in transit to and from
inland islands--a fiscal measure that, of course, inured to the benefit of the
residents of the taxing states, but in the form of revenue, not by aiding local
producers; and the tax malady was addressed explicitly by the Import-Export
Clause ....
Id. at 6-35 to -36.
258. See supra Table 3, Part I.C.2.b; Table 4, Part I.C.5.
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raises the cost of mutual defection by signaling close review based
upon the nature or object of the challenged state law.
While the prisoners' dilemma thus advances our understanding
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, it provides only a partial
explanation. Three problems remain. Two involve the prisoners'
dilemma theory itself. The third requires a complementary game
theoretical account that involves a different type of defection
strategy from a regime of beneficial cooperation. I will now summarize each of these limitations with the traditional prisoners'
dilemma account.
First, in the context of waste disposal, a rule that prevents states
from discriminating in commerce does not necessarily transform a
potential regime of mutual defection into a probable regime of
mutual cooperation. That is because states that are prohibited from
discriminating against waste based upon point of origin retain an
alternative outlet for discrimination. As long as states retain the
ability to decline permit applications, forcing states to regulate
neutrally or not at all might have the effect of introducing the same
prisoners' dilemma in alternative form. While all states might in
theory benefit from a regime of open commerce in waste disposal,
if each state knows that others are permitted to deny permit
applications, thus closing off in-state waste disposal facilities, it
becomes rational to follow the same strategy. So viewed, cases like
City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,25 9 and C & A Carbone v. Town
of Clarkstown,26 ° might have the perverse effect of limiting, rather
than expanding, outlets for waste by removing the incentives that
states would otherwise have to approve waste-processing permits
if they could capture the entire benefit of doing so by ensuring that
the waste outlet would service only those who traffic in or produce
waste within the state.
Second, in the context of reciprocity statutes, states have
undertaken a regime that imposes limits on their partner states in
pursuing a defection strategy. While state A's reciprocity statute,
providing that it will ensure free trade with state B only if state B
ensures free trade with state A, does not undermine the incentives
of special interests to lobby for protectionist legislation in its
various forms, it does raise the costs to legislators of providing it.
259. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
260. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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Instead, the tit-for-tat game reveals that such statutes provide a
filter that requires state legislators to account for those who would
be harmed by the restrictive trade practices that will follow from
their protectionist measures in the other state.2 6 1 The Court's
rejection of these laws, unless Congress has approved them, further
undermines the power of the prisoners' dilemma to provide a
complete account.
Third, and finally, a significant category of cases in which the
Court strikes down the challenged state law simply fails to fit a
prisoners' dilemma paradigm. Most notably, the burden on commerce cases, for example the prohibition of sixty-five foot twin
trailers struck down in Kassel,6 2 the requirement of curved
mudflaps struck down in Bibb,2 63 and the train length limit struck
down in Southern Pacific2M do not threaten to invite others to follow
suit. In fact, in each of these cases, the Court struck down the
challenged law because other states had adopted an opposite
strategy. In short, if game theory is to do the work of explaining the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, we need to expand its reach.
In the next subpart, I offer a complementary game theoretical
model that also draws upon elements of price theory and the theory
of transactions costs.
2. The Multiple Nash Equilibrium Game
We will now introduce more formally the second game that will
help us understand the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. As stated previously, it is helpful to apply a common
framework, that of rent seeking, to each set of case facts. This will
allow us to distinguish those rents that are benign from those that
are illicit, and between those that although illicit are beyond the
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause from those that are
properly within its scope. In the multiple Nash equilibrium game,
the players, without any formal coordination, have an incentive to
pursue a common strategy to achieve higher payoffs from either of
two or more pure Nash equilibrium strategies as compared with
261.
262.
263.
264.

See AXELROD, supra note 137.
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1958).
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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the low payoffs associated with the alternative mixed-strategy
equilibrium outcomes. To illustrate, let us return to the driving
game. 265
Imagine that automobiles are in their infancy and that no law or
custom yet establishes whether to drive on the left or right side of
the road. Assume a world with two drivers who must decide upon
which of four possible combined driving regimes to adopt. The
possibilities are presented in Table 6. Further assume that neither
driver much cares about which side he or she drives on, but that for
reasons of personal safety, both care greatly that the two drivers
adhere to the same driving regime. When the drivers opt for the
same regime they each receive a payoff of ten, but when they opt for
different regimes, they each receive a payoff of zero.
Table 6: The Driving Game
(Payoffs for A, B)

A drives left

A drives right

B drives left

10,10

0,0

B drives right

0,0

10, 10

Unlike the prisoners' dilemma game presented in Table 5, in
which the single outcome of mutual defection represents a stable
equilibrium, in the driving game, two of the possible four combinations (represented in the upper left and lower right quadrants)
represent stable pure Nash equilibria. Conversely, the two mixedstrategy equilibria (represented in the lower left and upper right
quadrants) are unstable because the second mover could improver
her payoffs by moving to the initial mover's preferred regime. 26 If
265. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.

266. I do not intend to suggest that whenever actors confront games presenting multiple
Nash equilibria, the result is invariably a pure Nash equilibrium. It is possible that if each
player tries to anticipate the other player's dominant strategy, but does so incorrectly, that
the resulting regime will be a mixed strategy equilibrium even though each player has
attempted to achieve a pure Nash equilibrium outcome. Professors Baird, Gertner, and
Picker have explained this phenomenon as follows:
One can point to games in which the unique Nash equilibrium may not be the
combination of strategies that the players would in fact adopt. Moreover, the
Nash solution concept often does not identify a unique solution to a game. When
there are multiple Nash equilibria, we may not be able to identify one of these
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A drives right and B begins driving left, B can then increase her
payoffs from zero to ten by changing to the right driving regime.
The same incentives apply if A drives left and B begins driving
right, or if B is the initial mover, whether she chooses right or left.
As in Table 5, the pure Nash equilibrium results are presented in
bold.
We will now consider a multiple Nash equilibrium game that
involves the states, rather than individuals, as players. The extension raises a question as to the nature of any rent seeking that*
would encourage one state to defect from the benign cooperative
regime pursued by other states. To answer that question, it will be
helpful to introduce more formally the concept of appropriable
quasi-rents, which grows out of the transactions cost literature.6 7
Appropriable quasi-rents analysis is generally employed to
explain the development and structure of firms, but has also
been fruitfully used to explain various types of long term contracts, for example, those involved in licensing agreements or
franchises. The essential insight is that individuals, or individual
companies, entering into contracts under competitive conditions,
often specialize their assets to facilitate performance under the
contract. Thus if Bob contracts to paint Sue's house, Bob will purchase the necessary equipment, which will include a particular
color of paint, appropriate brushes, a ladder, sanding materials, and
the like. It is possible that all of these materials can be readily used
on otherjobs, such that if Sue reneges, Bob can redeploy any assets
that he has acquired in anticipation of performing his contract with
Sue at little or no additional cost. This is most likely if Sue selected
a neutral color, if her home was in a standard development, and if
it had no unusual architectural features requiring customized
as that which the players are likely to choose. Indeed, when there are multiple
Nash equilibria, there is no guarantee that the outcome of the game is going to
be a Nash equilibrium. Each player, for example, might adopt a strategy that
is part of a different Nash equilibrium, and the combination of strategies might
not be Nash.
BAIRD ET AL., supra note 243, at 22. In the hypothetical in the text, I have avoided this
difficulty by presenting the decision of the two drivers sequentially, rather than
simultaneously. Because the drivers are assumed to care only about sharing a common
driving regime, whether right or left, sequential decisionmaking increases the probability of
achieving a pure Nash equilibrium outcome.
267. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 273-74 and
accompanying text.
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equipment for access to areas in need of painting. Although this
might well characterize most contracts to paint a home, it certainly
does not capture all such contracts or all contracts generally.
In addition, parties seeking performance are also frequently
forced to customize. When Ann considers purchasing a new car, she
has a wide range of choices. She can select not only the make and
model, but also who will perform necessary service. Once the
purchase decision has been made, however, her service options
become more limited. Depending upon the nature of the warranty,
for example, she might be required to have all service work
completed at a licensed dealership. If so, Ann has specialized her
receipt of services to the dealership, thus inviting the dealership to
seek to procure appropriable quasi-rents. Most contractual arrangements require at least some level of customization in anticipation
of performance, or of receipt of performance, and the degree of that
customization can vary considerably from contract to contract. The
degree of customization and the anticipated losses associated with
sacrificing the economic benefits that motivated the contract are the
causal factors that give rise to opportunities to appropriate quasirents.
To illustrate, assume that Sue lives in an old, Victorian home
painted in a color that is sufficiently uncommon that it must be
custom mixed, with architectural features that render access
impossible without special equipment, and with wood that is no
longer commonly used to build but that is in need of repair or
replacement. To complete the job, Bob is required to make significant performance-specific investments. Assume for example
that the contract is for $15,000, including supplies, and that the
nonstandard supplies will cost Bob $2500. Bob might be able to
return or sell off some specialized supplies in the event that Sue
reneges, for example, special ladders. But other supplies-for
example, the custom mixed paint and the supplemental wood-are
of little or no value other than as used in the performance of
the contract with Sue. If Bob could only recover $500 of the $2500
contract-specific investment, and if the cost and inconvenience
of litigating exceed the difference of $2000, Sue could force Bob
to incur up to that amount in additional performance costs as
her appropriable quasi-rent. Bob would be willing to perform unanticipated work up to that amount before it would be economically
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feasible for him to withdraw on the ground that the additional
demands constitute a material breach.
As stated above, the same phenomenon can arise in the other
direction. Thus, if Ann has purchased a lemon, and if it would cost
the dealership an additional $2000 to repair the car properly above
whatever the cost of repairing it sufficiently to get the car through
the warranty period, then assuming the cost of legal recourse to
Ann exceeds $2000, the dealership can again seek to appropriate
the quasi-rents created through the bilateral contracting relationship by shirking in its performance up to that amount.
I do not intend to suggest that the parties in these situations
cannot devise contractual or other solutions to these sorts of
difficulties as a means of limiting the opportunities on the other
side to secure such rents. Indeed, my point is the opposite. Parties
can and do devise any number of arrangements to avoid the
difficulties that are associated with minimizing opportunities for
post-contractual strategic behavior that result from appropriable
quasi-rents. These solutions are remarkably varied. Within the
economics literature, several important studies have identified the
conditions that give rise to these sorts of post-contractual strategic
bargaining, and the nature of various market solutions.2
We can imagine Bob avoiding the problem with Sue by insisting
that she purchase all customized materials and that he deduct the
cost of those materials from the contract price. By arranging the
contract in this manner, he will negatively affect Sue's overall
costs, 269 and will avoid a potential cost in the form of strategic

behavior that can result in bargaining for a sum up to the amount
of the appropriable quasi-rent. Similarly, we can imagine the
automobile dealership bonding itself by providing a warranty and

268. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 271-72 and

accompanying text.
269. In fact, he might affect her cost in a favorable manner. If we assume that Bob would
include some premium to cover the contingency of post-contractual opportunistic behavior,
then minimizing the opportunities for Sue to engage in such behavior can allow him to avoid
adding that premium, thus lowering the contract price. So viewed, optimal contracting
arrangements can reduce contracting costs by the product of the probability of producing an
appropriable quasi-rent times the costs that would be imposed if the rent were realized. By
reducing the contract price, the suggested purchasing arrangement is thus welfare
enhancing.
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a contract that specifies a low cost mediator in the event of shirking
in servicing the vehicle.27 °
There are other, more complicated solutions as well, depending
upon the nature and depth of the problem. In the context of
franchising, for example, in which the franchisor anticipates that
some franchisees might shirk in ensuring quality output, thus
compromising the brand name, we can imagine contract provisions
that require all inputs be purchased from the franchisor along with
periodic quality checks. To avoid the potential appropriable quasirent that could then result on the other side from raising costs
above the market price for supplies, we can imagine linking the
cost of supplies to some identifiable economic indicator, or fixing
the annual rate of increase in advance. Of course, for some truly
complicated contractual relationships, those involving a protracted
performance period and an inability of the parties to anticipate
the precise conditions that create appropriable quasi-rents, we can
imagine vertical integration, or establishing a firm. This approach
optimizes the use of superadditive gains, while reducing the feared
depletion of quasi-rents through mutual strategic behavior.2 7 1
The benefits of the firm in minimizing opportunities for strategic
behavior among long-term contracting parties are well known, and
are the focus of a large literature.2 7 2 The critical point for present
purposes is that merging institutions that would otherwise suffer
contracting difficulties is a ready solution in the event that
separate contract provisions prove inadequate to meet the needs of
the parties. The effect of uniting productive resources within a
single firm, like contractual solutions in less complex settings, is to
promote behavior that is more consistent with the parties' ex
ante expectations, thus preventing the depletion of unnecessary
270. There are also other, noncontractual methods of signaling to prospective purchasers
that a dealership, or manufacturer, is unlikely to shirk. A program of certified pre-owned

vehicles with extended warranties that operate for a significant number of years or miles
informs the prospective purchaser of a new car that the dealership retains an interest in the
sold or leased vehicle even after the initial contract.
271. See Klein et al., supra note 234; Williamson, supra note 238.
272. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 234; Williamson, supra note 238. The terms
"appropriable' and"expropriable" quasi-rents are sometimes used interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Armen A. Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First
National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 235 (1982); Jonathan R.
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:
Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanationof Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 290 (1990).
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resources in performance through efforts to secure appropriable
quasi-rents or through insuring against such contingencies. As seen
below, in the public law setting, splitting institutions is often an
equally important response to the problem of avoiding strategic
behavior. Specifically, supplemental institutions like the federal
judiciary in the dormant Commerce Clause context often operate to
devise solutions that the parties would likely have agreed to in
advance, but that they are now unable to reach because one or the
other has a rational incentive to behave strategically.
Before proceeding to other forms of rent, it is important to
reiterate that appropriable quasi-rents become available only after
the parties to a contract have selected each other as partners and
ironed out their contracting terms, presumably under competitive
conditions. The rent opportunity thus arises as a function of the
contractual relationship. Once the contract has been formed, the
parties are suddenly in a specialized relationship in which the
competitive conditions that initially gave rise to the contract no
longer hold.2"'
The central insight that emerges from this analysis is that while
parties have many choices at the stage of entering into even
complex contractual relationships, once the contractual relationship
is formed, the more the contract requires specialization of physical
assets or of human capital for its performance, the more likely it
becomes that the contract itself will transform the relationship
from one characterized by competition into one that more closely
resembles a bilateral monopoly. The contract transforms the relationship because while the contract itself produces a gain from

273. Oliver Williamson has captured this intuition as follows:
Idiosyncratic goods and services are thus ones where investments of
transaction-specific human and physical capital are made and, contingent upon
successful execution, benefits are realized. Such investments can and do occur
in conjunction with occasional trades where delivery for a specialized design is
stretched out over a long period (for example, certain construction contracts).

The transactions that I wish to emphasize here, however, are exchanges of the
recurring kind. Although large-numbers competition is frequently feasible at
the initial award stage for recurring contracts of all kinds, idiosyncratic
transactions are ones for which the relationship between buyer and supplier is
quickly thereafter transformed into one of bilateral monopoly-on account of...
transaction-specific costs .... This transformation has profound contracting
consequences.
Williamson, supra note 238, at 241.
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trade to each party, the necessary specialization for completion of
the contract, or for anticipating competition by the other side,
creates an opportunity for the strategic player to behave in a
manner that will allow him or her to receive a portion of the
contractual gain that was, at the time of contracting, intended for
the other party. But contracting is not the only means of creating
wealth between parties, and post-contractual strategic bargaining
is not the only opportunity to strip other parties of the gains that
they reasonably anticipated from their interactions with others.
We can now state the problem in more general terms. Quasirents are created and become subject to appropriation when the
relationship between the parties creates an increase in wealth, but
the problem arises when that relationship itself provides an
opportunity for one party to secure a part of the increase in wealth
at the expense of the other party in a manner that was not
reasonably anticipated by the terms of the contract or by the parties
at the time of contracting. This form of rent thus arises when there
is a divergence between the parties' ex ante expectations (at the
time of contracting) as to how the wealth produced by contractual
performance would be allocated, and the incentives produced ex
post (after the contractual relationship is formed) with knowledge
of the other party's specialization, and thus his or her attendant
cost in redeploying contract specific assets to some other use. As
shown below, appropriable quasi-rents aptly characterize the
nature of rents one state can procure by disrupting a specialized
relationship between and among other states that absent the
disruption represents a benign pure Nash equilibrium strategy.
Rents that possess this characteristic divergence between ex ante
and ex post expectations occupy only a subset of the cases in which
two or more states find themselves in potential cooperative or
noncooperative games implicating the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. Because many other state laws challenged under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine are the product of other specific
forms of rent seeking, it is important to place appropriable quasirents in the broader context of rents and rent seeking.
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a. Defining Other Forms of Rent
The following discussion will refer to Figure 1, produced below.
We will begin with monopoly rent. Although this term is undoubtedly familiar, it is important to provide a precise definition for
the analysis to follow.274 We must first distinguish monopoly profit
from monopoly rent. Monopoly profit is the level of profit that a
firm with market power can generate by engaging in marginal
revenue, or monopolistic, pricing. Such a pricing strategy means
that the firm reduces the level of output associated with competitive
conditions, in which supply (assumed to equal marginal cost)
meets demand, to the point where marginal revenue meets
marginal cost. If we assume that the firm is unable to engage in
price discrimination, then the firm faces a downward sloping
marginal revenue curve as a consequence of its need to reduce the
price for all purchasers as it sells more of its goods along the
downward sloping demand curve. Because the firm must reduce
the price for each additional unit sold, its revenue declines as it
increases its output. The price maximizing strategy for the monopolistic firm is to set output where supply, or marginal revenue,
meets marginal cost. This will allow the profit maximizing firm to
then set a monopolistic price along the corresponding demand
curve. In Figure 1, the monopoly price and output are indicated by
Pm and Qm respectively, as compared with Pc and Qc under a
non-monopoly (or competitive) pricing strategy. The monopoly profit
is indicated by regions A plus B. Welfare economists are concerned
about a monopolistic pricing strategy because it creates a welfare
loss triangle, representing the additional amount consumers would
pay for increased production under competitive production (region
C) and the additional revenue that producers would receive as a
consequence of that production (region D).

274. For a more detailed presentation of these various forms of rent, with accompanying
graphical depictions, see STEARNS, supra note 253, at 113.
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Figure 1

Supply
(marginal cost)

Qm
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To distinguish monopoly profit from monopoly rent, we must now
introduce Ricardian rents. Even under competitive conditions,
meaning only that individual firms are price takers, some producers
have greater productive talents or resources than others. Some
farmers have superior land or livestock; some laborers have
superior strength or talent; and, most significantly for our immediate purposes, some states have superior natural resources,
whether for export, for example, water or coal, or for import, for
example, land conditions that are better suited for long-term waste
storage. Thus, for any given price set by competitive market
conditions, some market suppliers will profit more than others as
a function of superior resources or skill. As a result, some producers
are capable of generating greater "profit" even if they cannot set
price. This additional profit is known as Ricardian rent.27 5 In Figure
275. Armen Alchian distinguishes Ricardian Rent from Differential Rent, both of which
represent a form of infra-marginal competitive rent, as follows: "Insum, 'Ricardian rents'
indicate differences in rents to units that are equal in their best alternative use values, but
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1, Ricardian rents are represented in regions B plus D. Monopoly
rent is the difference between monopoly profits and Ricardian
rents, which is the profit such firms would receive under nonmonopoly pricing. To calculate monopoly rent, therefore, we must
subtract from the monopoly profit (A plus B) the Ricardian rents (B
plus D). Because (A + B) - (B + D) = (A - D), region A minus region

D in Figure 1 represents the monopoly rent.
With this introduction to the various forms of rent, we can now
define rent seeking. Rent seeking is the process of attempting to
secure legislative protections that provide a value to the firm or
industry of monopoly rents. From the perspective of welfare
economics, it is important to encourage the pursuit of Ricardian
rents, which is promoted through specialization and exchange, and
to discourage rent seeking, which facilitates monopoly rents
through artificial barriers to trade, precisely because competitors
elsewhere have a comparative advantage in the particular industry.
Of course not all monopoly rents arise through legal protections.
In industries with very high start up costs-for example, utilitiesdeclining average costs tend to drive out competition in favor of a
single dominant firm.277 In addition, the mere presence of a scarce
resource in a given location can give those who control that resource
substantial market power. Thus, a state that has a peculiar but
highly valued export resource, say coal, can extract monopoly rents
on coal by engaging in a monopolistic pricing strategy. This strategy
will confer those rents without any obvious rent seeking, for
example, that associated with a narrow constituency seeking to
derive benefits from a Widely dispersed constituency. This can prove
significant for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
because if the doctrine's concern is that condoning state rent
different in their value here, while 'differential rents' are the premia to units that are the
same value here but different in their best alternative use value." Armen A. Alchian, Rent,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 591,595 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).

In this context, the distinction is unimportant; rather, the critical point is that the inframarginal competitive rent generates an upward sloping supply curve, as shown in Figure 1.

276. For simplicity, I assume that there are no recurring fixed costs; otherwise the inframarginal rent equals B plus D minus recurring fixed costs. Because a monopolist in this
situation incurs the same recurring fixed costs, there should be no difference on the margin
as between the infra-marginal rent and the monopoly rent with respect to those costs.
277. This is the traditional justification for regulating utilities. For a more detailed
discussion, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 490-92 (5th ed. 1979); STEARNS, supra note 253, at 112-15.
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seeking encourages retaliation by those adversely affected in
other states, thus threatening to produce a regime of mutual
defection in a standard prisoners' dilemma, then one can appreciate
why monopolistic pricing strategies for scarce export commodities
are presumed beyond the doctrine's reach. Simply put, this sort
of rent seeking is unlikely to provoke a retaliatory response. The
opportunities for states seeking to engage in marginal revenue
pricing with respect to scarce export resources are limited by
happenstance and those who possess such opportunities over one
export commodity are unlikely to be those harmed by the efforts of
other states that can pursue the same strategy over other export
commodities."' As a result, we might imagine the Supreme Court
declining to treat such pricing strategies as candidates for strict
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. This is so even though such a
facially neutral regime, one that clearly burdens commerce, is
economically motivated. So viewed, the export taxation exception
fits nicely with the prisoners' dilemma account of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Let us now contrast economic rents
resulting from scarce export resources that are secured through

278. The analysis in the text helps to explain a critical anomaly in Professor Levmore's
analysis. While his analysis distinguishes between state interference and state exploitation,
Levmore maintains that the Commonwealth Edison case is likely incorrect because of the
challenged law's seemingly exploitative nature. Professor Levmore explains:
The major excise tax case that does not it' is Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, in which the Court upheld Montana's facially discriminatory
severance tax on coal. Normatively, this case is troubling and was probably
wrongly decided. It can, with a deep breath, be forced into the interferenceexploitation scheme using the project-as-a-whole argument....
Levmore, supra note 202, at 605 (footnote omitted). The project-as-a-whole argument
recognizes that for certain projects, including, for example, toll facilities, investors who
anticipate an inability to recoup monopolistic rents will be deterred in undertaking
substantial original investments. See id. at 604. A simpler explanation, and one that does not
require any "forcing" of the case facts, is set out in this Article. Simply put, whether or not
the Montana severance tax was exploitative, sustaining it failed to afford adversely affected
states the opportunity to respond in a manner that would result in mutual defection in a
standard prisoners' dilemma or that would interfere with a benign pro-commerce Nash
equilibrium game among states. As a result, despite its seeming unfairness to purchasers in
other states, the challenged Montana tax did not fit the core value of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. This analysis, moreover, has important normative implications for the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. By focusing on the relationships between states, as they
are affected by challenged state laws, rather than on the burden that a particular law
imposes on private actors from other states, the analysis underscores the motivation behind
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as furthering political, rather than economic, union.
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monopolistic strategies with the more common forms of legislative
rent seeking.
In what is certainly among the most important articles in the
field of public choice, Gordon Tullock challenged the then-prevailing
conventional wisdom among welfare economists that the principal
279
problem with monopolistic pricing is the welfare loss triangle.
Instead, Tullock posited that the more problematic welfare loss was
associated with incentives by special interests to secure the benefits
of monopoly rents through the legislative process. Specifically, it is
rational for special interests to invest up to the anticipated value of
a monopoly rent in lobbying efforts to secure the rent. So viewed,
the danger of rent seeking is not only the welfare loss triangle,
however difficult to measure that might be, but also the further
deadweight loss of attempting to secure monopoly rents through
legislative means. Thus, organized groups will attempt to secure
the benefits associated with actual market power (as in the coal
hypothetical) through artificial legislative protection against out-ofstate competition. Of course, some of the cases that we have already
seen fit this paradigm. Thus, a tax-and-rebate scheme in which all
sales of milk are taxed, but the funds are then distributed to instate producers, is a classic case in which the industry receives the
benefit of a differential tax against the interest of out-of-state
purchases, thus conferring a rent.2 ° Similarly, a law that prevents
an out-of-state competitor from advertising its superior product in
state operates as a legislatively conferred rent.28 1
At this point, we have defined four different kinds of rent:
monopoly rent, Ricardian rent, legislative rents, and of course,
appropriable quasi-rents. As stated previously, the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is concerned with those forms of
state rent seeking that encourage defection either in a prisoners'
dilemma or multiple Nash equilibrium game. We have already
explored the manner in which various forms of rent seeking do
or do not encourage mutual defection in a standard prisoners'
dilemma. We must now consider how state efforts to secure quasirents can thwart other states in their efforts to benefit from pure
Nash equilibrium strategies that facilitate the flow of commerce.
279. See Tullock, supra note 224; see also Krueger, supra note 224.
280. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
281. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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This will further allow us to determine the nature of rents that are
of particular concern to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
The opportunities for states to appropriate quasi-rents takes a
somewhat different form than the same opportunities among
parties to a contract. For example, states do not formally enter into
bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states, at least
without prior Congressional approval, 2 and when they do, any
resulting rents, because they would be subject to that approval,
would not be challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. The concept of appropriable quasi-rents must therefore be
recast to allow us to identify the nature of the underlying rent
seeking in multiple Nash equilibrium games between and among
states that implicate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The
analysis requires a brief exploration of the closely related economic
concept of transactions costs.
b. Defining Transactions Costs
Like rent seeking, "transactions costs" is a ubiquitous term and
one that is often used to express a range of meanings. As Stanley
Fisher has noted: "Transactions costs have a well-deserved bad
name as a theoretical device ... because there is a suspicion that

almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified
transactions costs."m And as Oliver Williamson has stated:
"[Tihe concept wants for definition." 4 The pervasive interest in
transactions costs, of course, dates back to Ronald Coase's early
study on the firm, 2s and his later study on the problem of social
cost.' In his first study, Coase posited that the firm is best
understood as a nexus of contracts, which avoids many of the
problems associated with long-term relational contracting. 7 In
the second, for which he won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1991,
282. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
283. Stanley Fisher, Long-Term Contracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy:
Comment, 3 J. MONETARY ECON. 317 (1977).
284. Williamson, supra note 238, at 233.
285. See Coase, Nature, supra note 237.
286. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase, Social Cost]; see also Ronald H. Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in R.H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 157 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Notes on Social

Cost].
287. See Coase, Nature, supra note 237.
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Coase considered whether and when the assignment of property
rights affects resource allocation.2' The Coase Theorem posits that
in a world with zero transactions costs and perfect information,
resources will flow to their most highly valued uses without
regard to initial property endowments. While the article was widely
read to suggest that transactions costs are generally irrelevant
to resource allocation, Coase's point was just the opposite. His
essential insight was that because transacting is most often costly,
it is important for the legal regime to mimic the parties' ex ante
expectations concerning the allocation of property rights, lest
transactions costs themselves inhibit the efficient flow of resources
to their most highly valued uses. For our immediate purposes, it is
important to begin with the zero transactions costs assumption. We
do not do this because transactions costs are zero, but rather
because the model is intended to inform us as to the nature of state
law strategies, taking the form of transactions costs, that can
inhibit a benign pure Nash equilibrium regime among states that
facilitates the flow of resources to their most highly valued uses
within the context of interstate commerce.
c. Empty Core Bargainingas a TransactionsCost
We can illustrate Coase's essential insight by imagining a world
with two entities, a laundry and a factory that pollutes into a river
to the detriment of the laundry. 9 Assume that the factory is worth
$11,000, but that as a result of its pollution, it reduces the value of
the laundry from a potential of $40,000 to $24,000. Further assume
that for the laundry to receive the maximum benefit of its output,
and thus to be valued at $40,000, it must close the polluting
factory down. In a world with zero transactions costs and in which
the parties have perfect information, the factory will close and the
laundry will operate. This result will be achieved regardless of
whether the laundry holds the property right to prevent the factory
from polluting or the factory holds the property right to pollute
288. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 286.
289. The following hypothetical is adapted from Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen,
The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & ECON. 175, 176-81 (1981). The
hypothetical that follows is the actual version that appears in that article. For my earlier
analysis of this article, see Stearns, supra note 96, at 1234-40.
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without regard to the harm to the laundry. If the factory has the
right to pollute, the laundry will pay up to $16,000-the difference
in its value with and without the factory polluting-to purchase
that right from the factory. Because the factory is worth only
$11,000 even with the right to pollute, it has an economic incentive
to sell the pollution right to the laundry. If instead the laundry
owns the right to prevent the factory from polluting, then the
factory will not be able to justify purchasing from the laundry the
right to pollute because the factory values that right at $11,000,
which is $5000 less than the laundry values the contrary right.
In this simple story, resource allocation is indifferent to liability
rules for one very good reason: we have assumed away all of the
complexities that can plausibly inhibit the claimed efficient result. Of course we can readily envision any number of costs that
might break the deal. For example, the factory owner might derive
psychological satisfaction from keeping the factory open, the
laundry might not know the relative value of the factory with and
without pollution and might decline to invest in acquiring that
necessary information, or the parties might simply not wish to deal
with one another even if there is a potential financial gain from
doing so. There are numerous costs that can inhibit any potentially
fruitful deal, whether they are psychological or informational in
origin. For now, let us simply follow Coase's lead and assume that
these costs, or any other costs that could inhibit the transactions,
are zero. In the original version of the laundry/factory hypothetical,
Professors Aivazian and Callen demonstrated that in a world with
no transactions costs and perfect information, empty core bargaining itself can prevent the flow of resources to their most highly
valued uses.
To illustrate, we will now alter the facts to restore the original
hypothetical. This time, assume that instead of one polluting
factory operating to the detriment of the laundry, there are two
factories, with a combined value of $11,000. Assume that operating
alone, factory A is worth $3000 and factory B is worth $8000. As
before, the laundry, C, is worth $24,000. Further assume that any
combination of two will increase the value to the coalition members.
If the factories merge, then they increase their output from $11,000
to $15,000 due to economies of scale. If factory A merges with the
laundry, then that factory will close down and the merger will
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increase the value of the laundry from $24,000 to $31,000, leaving
the value of factory B unaffected. If factory B merges with the
laundry, factory B closes down and the merger will increase the
value of the laundry from $24,000 to $36,000, leaving the value of
factory A unaffected. And if both factories join a grand coalition
with the laundry, they both close down, increasing the value of the
laundry from $24,000 to $40,000. For every coalition that includes
the laundry, all of the value that the coalition produces results from
the laundry operating alone and without the pollution that the
other coalition member would have generated if it were not in the
coalition. The resulting values of the possible coalitions are follows,
where V means "value," the parenthetical includes the parties to
the coalition, and the bracketed entries represent the amounts
earned (in $1000 increments) within or outside the coalition:

V (A) [31 + V (B) [81 + V (C) [241 = $35
V (AB) [151 + V (C) [241 or V (AC) [311 + V (B) [81 or
V (BC) [36] + V (A) [3] =$39
V (ABC)= $40
In this hypothetical, a stable outcome arises if the laundry
possesses the property right to prevent the factories from polluting.
The combined value of the two firms, now $15,000, is insufficient to
bribe the laundry, which increases in value by $16,000 if the firms
close down, into allowing them to operate. But if instead there is no
pollution liability rule, meaning that the factories are free to
pollute, then there is no stable outcome. To illustrate, assume that
we begin with a two-party coalition, for example (AB), and that they
evenly divide their superadditive profits from $11,000 to $15,000,
such that A now earns $5000 (from $3000), B now earns $10,000
(from $8000), and the excluded C earns $24,000. C can now lure A
away and offer to split evenly the additional $2000 that A and C can
collectively earn in the superior (AC) coalition. In this superior
coalition, A earns $6000 (from $5000), B earns $8000, and C earns
$25,000 (from $24,000). B, who is now excluded can approach C and
offer to split the $3000 superadditive profits that would arise in a
superior (BC) coalition. In this superior coalition, A earns $3000, B
earns $9500 (from $8000), and C earns $26,500 (from $25,000). A
can approach B, yet again, and offer to split the superadditive
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profits of $15,000, which exceed their combined earnings in the (BC)
coalition by $2500.
We have now come full circle, from (AB) to (CA) to (BC) to (AB).
In each round, the defector and new coalition member have
achieved superadditive gains.290 The same anomaly arises if we
instead began with the grand (ABC) coalition, in which the three
members divide evenly the $5000 superadditive profits, at $1666
each. A now earns $4666, B earns $9666, and C earns $25,666. A
and B can now evenly divide the difference between their superadditive profits of $15,000 and their present combined earnings of
$14,332, placing them in a superior coalition. At this point, we are
at the initial state (albeit with different initial payoffs)
from which
291
the cycle began in the two-party coalition game.
Empty core bargaining games like this one are easy to criticize
because they abstract from the prevalent rules that tend to produce
stable outcomes in most real world situations. But the criticism
misses the point. The games are helpful in analyzing why such
stabilizing rules emerge in the first place, even though their effect
is often to produce a result that is normatively inferior, given the
payoffs, to some conceivable alternative. For our purposes, the
critical point to glean from the empty core game is that it produces
an opportunity for one or more entities (here a laundry or two
firms) to secure the functional equivalent of appropriable quasirents that arise in a contract setting. From an ex ante perspective,
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

290. In response to this hypothetical, Ronald Coase presented two arguments. First, he
observed that the regime envisioned is peculiar in that it anticipates multiple coalitions that
could be entered into and breached at will. Second, Coase claimed that the hypothetical was
trivial because if the parties consistently divided the superadditive gains evenly, they would
discover that the payoffs asymptotically approach the highest amount as they move toward
the grand coalition. See Ronald H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A
Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981). On both grounds Coase is correct. But the first
criticism is founded on something of a trick. While a contract damages rule would deplete
any gains from defection in favor of a superior coalition, a contract damages rule is not a rule
establishing an initial property right, which, along with zero transactions costs and perfect
information, is all that the Coase theorem posits is necessary for efficient resource allocation.
As for the second argument, nothing in the Coase theorem dictates how superadditive gains
are to be allocated, and thus the even division assumption again derives from outside the
Coase theorem itself. More importantly, whether the hypothetical is significant on its facts,
it does demonstrate an outcome that in a zero transactions cost world does not ensure the
predicted result of the Coase theorem.
291. For a more detailed presentation that walks through each step, see Stearns, supra
note 96, at 1234-40.
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most would agree that given the values attached in the hypothetical
to each economic activity and holding all else constant, the optimal
result would be to close the factories in favor of the laundry, and to
divide the surplus evenly among the players. Indeed, many legal
rules follow such a default pattern when one could formalize an
empty core bargaining game.2 92 And yet, despite the apparent
appeal that such a solution holds, we do see shadows of empty core
bargaining in the real world.
While most situations in which one can infer possible empty
core payoffs produce some actual meaning noncyclicals outcome,
sophisticated economic actors understand the genuine dangers that
opportunities for strategic bargaining over this form of appropriable
quasi-rents can produce. Thus, it is well known that a company,
like Disney Corporation, seeking to acquire a large piece of land
would be ill advised to announce the superadditivity in advance,
and offer up a reasonable portion for affected landowners to share
evenly if each agrees to sell. Disney understands that one or more
potential sellers will likely try to extract a disproportionate share
of the rent by "holding out" for a superior deal, even if the effect is
to thwart the entire set of transactions. After all, a landowner in
the middle of a potential theme park has the potential to seek to
appropriate unto herself a hugely disproportionate amount of the
available rent that would arise if all the land were converted into
the more highly valued use.29
Legal scholars have recognized that individual states can "hold
out" in the production of a public good by defecting from what I
292. This includes inheritance laws. For a more detailed illustration that draws upon
social choice theory, see STEARNS, supra note 173, at 54-58.
293. When this sort of event arises, the parties do not cycle into oblivion, but the result
and payoffs reached are "arbitrary" in the sense that some other set of ultimate
arrangements could have provided a superior benefit to some alternative coalition. It is
possible to hold out too long. Thus, when a developer seeks to acquire a large plot with the
intent to develop the land into a substantially more highly valued use, the final holdout or
group of holdouts are roughly in a game of chicken with the corporation. If the holdout fails
to jump off short of the cliff, thus accepting a credible final bid, the prospective buyer might
elect to build around holdouts. See also David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and
Stability in Anitrust Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2001) (noting connection between
holdout and chicken games in intellectual property context involving technical innovations).
For a recent illustration of the merger ofthese two games, see Tom Gorman, When Residents
Won't Sell, Mogul Builds Around Them, BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 2002, at 6A (quoting one of the
final holdouts of Las Vegas resort development as stating "[i4f Wynn [the developer]
continues at this ... pace, he'll make these homes uninhabitable").
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have presented in this Article as a benign pro-commerce solution
to a multiple Nash equilibrium game.29 4 But unlike in the standard
holdout game, those seeking compliance-namely those states
whose Nash equilibrium, pro-commerce strategy is thwarted by the
holdout state's defection-have no direct means of paying off the
defecting state to secure compliance in the provision of the public
good. Instead, the payoff to the defecting state comes not from a
hopeful payoff from the threat of defection as in the Disney
hypothetical, but rather comes somehow from the defection itself.2 9
For this reason, it is helpful to recast the defecting state's effort
from holding out in the provision of a multistate public good to rent
seeking.
Appropriable quasi-rents, including those that become available
as a result of empty core bargaining games, can obstruct otherwise
beneficial transactions. Recall the Coase theorem: In a world with
zero transactions costs and perfect information, resource allocation
is indifferent to liability rules. In the actual Aivazian and Callen
hypothetical, the more highly valued use of the resources would
come about if the party who valued the property right more
highly-the laundry-held the right in the first instance. But if the
less valued polluting firms instead held the right, then the Coase
theorem result is no longer guaranteed. One possible theoretical
escape hatch is to include as a transactions cost the very form of
appropriable quasi-rents, namely empty core bargaining, that
threatened to obstruct efforts to bring about the desired result.
While this "rescues" the Coase theorem, it does so through a
seemingly dissatisfying ploy. Including as a transactions cost
whatever prevents the desired Coasian result from being realized
threatens to turn the theorem into a tautology. It is perhaps for this
reason that in his response to the Aivazian and Callen hypothetical,
Coase did not take this approach.

294. See EPSTEIN BARGAINING, supra note 242; Burk, supra note 242.
295. Unlike the holdout game described supra note 293, the interstate commerce game
does not threaten to become a game of chicken. In the multiple Nash equilibrium game that
arises in the context of interstate commerce, the defecting state is not motivated to
discourage the other states from adopting a contrary strategy; rather, the defecting state
directly benefits from the fact that other states have adopted a common strategy from which
it can defect.
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Even so, economists have recognized appropriable quasi-rents as
a transactions cost.29 Whether this is satisfying in light of the
Coase theorem, it is a useful characterization for our purposes. If
we accept the proposition that one of the objects of the Commerce
Clause is to facilitate a common Nash equilibrium strategy among
the states that facilitates commerce, at least unless Congress says
otherwise, then the question arises: What prevents Congress and
the states from achieving the desired pro-commerce result: And
here, appropriable quasi-rents-generalized to encompass empty
core bargaining games-reveals a critical cost that can impede
"transactions" among states, left to their own devices, to achieve
that preferred regime. That is because the relationships between
and among the states themselves, like the relationship between
contracting parties, give rise to a divergence between ex ante and
ex post expectations.
d. Recasting the Multiple Nash EquilibriumGame in Terms
of TransactionsCosts
To complete the model it is important to add one more layer to
the preceding analysis. In the above hypothetical, the cycling
problem arose when we split a single polluting firm into two,
creating three businesses for which every two- or three-party
coalition produced a superadditivity. We will now consider a variant
of the driving game previously introduced.29 7 We will begin with two
players, this time the states themselves, rather than individuals
within a state, and then we will introduce a third. As before, the
two options are driving on the right or the left. With two states and
two driving options, the matrix presented in Table 62' characterizes
the choice of regime as with two drivers in a state. If we assume
that vehicles are designed to drive on one side of the road or the
other-for example, left steering wheels for driving on the right as
in the United States or right steering wheels for driving on the left
as in Britain-then states seeking to facilitate the flow of interstate
commerce will have an incentive to adopt the same regime, whether
it is (right, right) or (left, left). Conversely, an individual state can
296. See supra notes 235-38, 273-74 and accompanying text.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
298. See supra Part II.B.2.
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improve its position by moving from either of the two available
mixed-strategy equilibria--(right, left) or (left, right)-to a pure
Nash equilibrium outcome.
Even if the states desire such a benign outcome, it is by no
means guaranteed. Thus, if we assume that the states would
prefer to share a common regime, and if we further assume that
they were unaware of the other states' choices at the time that
they had to select their own, then the result would be a mixedstrategy equilibrium. This means that each would guess at what the
others will choose, with a fifty percent chance of success. While
the individual states are attempting to secure the benefit of a
pure Nash equilibrium strategy, the collective outcome might not
be a pure Nash equilibrium.29 9 If the decisions are not made
simultaneously, as will most often be the case, this problem is likely
to be avoided. Path dependence implies that returns rise when
others follow the lead of the initial mover. In this context, if one of
a group of states elects driving on the right, it is likely that others
will follow suit precisely to secure the benefits flowing from a
common regime. In this situation, there is little risk of a mixedstrategy equilibrium, at least assuming that the incentive is to
benefit from a common traffic regime.
But now imagine that a group of states has succeeded in adopting
a common driving regime. Further imagine that a single state, or
city, for example Manhattan, would like to reduce its own traffic.
One might imagine a proposal to limit driving to in-city taxicabs or
limousines. The city might approach this in any number of ways, for
example, by passing a law that prevents anyone with a license that
is not issued with a Manhattan address from driving in the city, or
prohibiting all cars other than registered Manhattan taxicabs. It
seems quite probable that such laws would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause, and perhaps also the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Now imagine that the city chooses a different
means of achieving the same objective. The city will permit all
drivers with valid licenses to drive through Manhattan, but
whereas the rest of the nation drives on the right side of the road
in vehicles with steering wheels on the left, driving in Manhattan
will be on the left side of the road with steering wheels on the right.
299. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 243, at 22.
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Assuming that such a regime were legal, only those with a very
strong incentive to invest in a conforming vehicle would do so. Local
taxi drivers and wealthy urban residents might fit this description,
but few others would.
Notice that by introducing the left side driving regime,
Manhattan is not rejecting the chosen solution to the multiple Nash
equilibrium game because the wrong pure Nash outcome was
selected. This is most easily illustrated by imagining that the rest
of the nation had instead followed the British driving rule. In that
case, Manhattan would have elected the United States driving rule.
The whole point from the perspective of the state or city passing
the defecting law is to have a rule that is contrary to the prevalent
regime among other states. Also notice that the benefit accruing
to Manhattan could not have arisen but for the dominant procommerce regime of other states."° And finally, the rent that
Manhattan achieves imposes a direct cost on other states, which
have chosen to facilitate a common regime that promotes the flow
of traffic throughout the nation. But Manhattan's goal is not to have
the surrounding states purchase its submission, as in the standard
holdout game. And it is for this reason, I argue that the holdout
analysis does not fully capture the dynamics of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Instead, the Manhattan driving rule is
motivated by the desire to divert traffic around Manhattan, and
thus to secure whatever "rent" derives from the very fact of
enacting the contrary rule. Stated differently, the benefit to the
defecting state is the act of defection itself, not the anticipated
payoff by others hoping to entice eventual compliance. Because
that ,rent arises only as a result of the relationships established
through pure Nash equilibrium, pro-commerce laws of other states,
Manhattan's effort can be fairly characterized as an effort to
appropriate quasi-rents made available through the benign pure
Nash equilibrium strategies of affected states.3 °'
300. Such a rent would not be available, for example, if the sum of the other states'
strategies produced a mixed-strategy equilibrium, rather than one of the two preferred pure
Nash equilibria.
301. The difficulty of allowing a single state or city to thwart a pure Nash equilibrium
outcome can be further illustrated by imagining that the driving regimes in all states were
regulated by Congress. We could readily imagine Congress selecting a right or left driving
regime. But it seems implausible to imagine Congress electing a mixed-strategy equilibrium
regime.
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The game theoretical account of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine not only provides a more robust account of the various
cases and doctrines, but it also helps to explain several peculiar
features of the doctrine. Among those features is the default nature
of the resulting constitutional doctrine, which Congress is at liberty
to change through ordinary legislative means. The default nature
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is most easily understood
by recognizing that defection from a pure Nash equilibrium strategy
represents a special kind of transactions cost impediment to the
flow of interstate commerce that the Court can reduce or eliminate
by striking a challenged law under its dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, subject to the caveat that the resulting regime might
prove inferior to another potential pure Nash outcome over time.
To illustrate, imagine that driving regimes could be altered
without cost. In this zero transactions cost world, the Manhattan
rule would introduce a cycle. The rest of the states start with right
driving and Manhattan defects to left driving. Because the other
states care more about the benefits of coordination than about
whether driving is left or right, they follow suit and switch to left
driving. But since Manhatttan also does not care about which side
its residents drive on, provided it is contrary to the rest of the
nation (or at least the Northeast corridor), it then switches to right
driving. Now the other states switch back, and on and on it goes.
e. DisruptingPath-InducedEquilibrium(or Network
Externalities)as a TransactionsCost
Of course the transactions costs of switching driving infrastructures and investing in new vehicles make the hypothetical
cycle seem implausible, perhaps even absurd. To complete the
model, therefore, we must introduce more formally the concept of
path dependence. Once a state or group of states selects from one
of two or more potential pure Nash equilibria, the decisions of other
states to follow suit create increasing returns to all states-those
that previously selected the initial strategy and those that followed
suit-relative to a mixed-strategy equilibrium. While economists
usually assume that as the amount of any given activity increases,
marginal returns are diminishing, when activities are pathdependent, meaning that the activities produce positive network
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holds.30 2

externalities, the opposite assumption
Path dependence
has been applied to a variety of subject matters, including such
303 and VCRs, 30 4 political 30 5
discrete goods as typewriter keyboards
and economic systems, 3 and various legal doctrines, including
stare decisis. 0 7 In each case, the coordination of the activity
produces positive gains for others who benefit from their common
use. It is the fact of coordination, whether express or tacit, that
increases returns to those who elect to follow the lead strategy.
Because of the high transactions costs of shifting from one set of
pro-commerce regimes to another, path dependence characterizes
the choice among states of common legal regimes that facilitate
the flow of commerce. So viewed, the harm from a single state's
defection from a commerce-based multiple Nash equilibrium game
can now be recast in terms of undermining the superior gains
302. For discussions of path dependence and its relationship to legally created network
externalities, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641, 643-46 (1996) (applying principles of path dependence to challenge various
conventional wisdoms about the presumed efficiency of American corporate and bankruptcy
structures). For a useful general discussion of path dependence and network externalities,
see S.J. Liebowitz & Steven E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (describing limited conditions under which remediable path
dependence can occur).
303. Paul A. David, CLIO and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985)
(linking selection of claimed inferior QWERTY typewriter keyboard over claimed superior
DVORAK keyboard to path dependence); S.J. Liebowitz & Steven E. Margolis, The Fable of
the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (documenting counter-evidence against claimed path
dependence of selection of QWERTY over DVORAK typewriter keyboard).
304. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, IncreasingReturns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989) (modeling conditions giving rise to path
dependence); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92 (1990)
(same).
305. Paul Pierson, IncreasingReturns,Path Dependence,and the Study of Politics,94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000).
306. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE (1990) (linking differential economic performance across wealthy and poor
nations to path-dependent effects of historical price differentials); Douglass C. North, A
Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL ECON. 355 (1990) (same).
307. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Justiciabilityand Social Choice]
(demonstrating that stare decisis is a cycle-breaking rule that renders the evolution of legal
doctrine path-dependent and that standing operates as a constraint that raises the cost to
private litigants and interest groups of seeking to favorably manipulate the path of case
decisions); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standingand Social Choice:HistoricalEvidence, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995) [hereinafter Steams, Standing and Social Choice] (testing social
choice theory of standing against historical and case evidence).
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associated with path-induced increasing returns resulting from
positive network externalities. These two consistent characterizations help to underscore the nature of the rent seeking at issue in
these cases. The facts of Kassel and Bibb, for example, fairly
resemble efforts by defecting states to secure benefits simply by
thwarting a pro-commerce pure Nash equilibrium outcome that is
dominant in the surrounding states. While all states would benefit
from a common, pure Nash equilibrium outcome, a defecting state
can appropriate a peculiar rent by deliberately thwarting that
strategy and thus undermining the gains to other states from
following a pure Nash regime. The likely benefit in these cases is
diverting traffic around the state and reducing the maintenance
costs associated with the flow of truck-based interstate commerce.
The benefit is most pronounced in Kassel, a case in which the
governor expressly acknowledged these objectives.
While the Court uses the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to
prevent mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma game and to
restore a benign multiple Nash equilibrium game, the Court does
not use the doctrine to eliminate all forms of rent seeking. Some
rent seeking distributes wealth from diffuse to organized groups,
but does so at the expense of interests in-state, as well as at the
expense of private interests out-of-state. Because such rent seeking,
which provides special interests with the equivalent of economic
rents, has such a distributional effect within the state, we can
understand the Court's disinclination to direct the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine against rent seeking as such. First,
there are political forces within the state to counteract such rent
seeking, especially since the burdens are at least as great within as
outside the state. Second, to the extent that these forces are
overcome by the stronger lobbying incentives of special interests,
the power of individuals to vote with their feet imposes at least
some additional discipline." 8 Finally, even if this proves inadequate, the fact remains that the Commerce Clause has not
been-and in my view should not be-used as a subterfuge for
economic substantive due process." ° The Commerce Clause in its
308. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (positing that ability of local residents to vote with their feet disciplines governmental
abuses of taxation and expenditures).
309. While a normative defense of this proposition is beyond the scope of this Article,
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dormant capacity is directed at laws that affect commerce. While
the other two categories-mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma
and restoring a multiple Nash equilibrium game-fit this description, intrastate redistributional legislative rent seeking does
not.
3. Summary
We have now completed the formal model, and are ready to
revisit the cases set out in Part I. Before doing so, I will briefly
summarize the three relevant case categories that emerge from the
foregoing analysis. As we will see in Part III, these case categories
can best be viewed as endpoints on a spectrum. The task then is to
identify those factors that can be used to place cases closer to the
most relevant endpoint.
1. State Laws that Risk Promotinga Regime ofMutual Defection:
While the per se rule of invalidity has largely eliminated the most
obvious state law efforts to secure legislative rents in a manner that
is likely to invite retaliation by other states and thus a regime of
mutual defection, state legislatures are sufficiently sophisticated
that they are able to devise other methods of achieving the same
objectives. The prisoners' dilemma analysis provides a means of
evaluating these types of state laws and of understanding the
Court's use of strict scrutiny to assess those categories of laws that
are likely substitutes for blunt regulations that would have been
subject to the per se rule. Even in the context of cases in which a
prisoners' dilemma analysis applies, however, anomalies remain. In
the waste cases, for example, the Court's refusal to allow statutes
that discriminate against waste in commerce threatens to transform, rather than to eliminate, the prisoners' dilemma. And in the
which is motivated by the need for a positive account of existing doctrine, suffice to say that
in general the same structural justifications for allowing in-state political processes to
counter inefficient rent-seeking laws apply regardless of whether the failure of these
processes to prevent undesirable rent-seeking legislation results in a substantive due process

or a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Even if one rejects this process-based argument,
however, that does not undermine my argument that reliance upon the Commerce Clause
is improper to challenge what is in effect a claim resting on principles of economic

substantive due process. My own view remains that it is better to debate the merits of
economic substantive due process in the context of the Due Process Clause than in the
context of the Commerce Clause, which is targeted to the very specific concern of facilitating

political union among states and not to demanding efficient state laws.
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reciprocity cases, the Court has eliminated a mechanism through
which states unilaterally discourage defection by partnering states.
Third, and most importantly, the prisoners' dilemma fails to
account for those cases in which states secure rents at the expense
of pro-commerce regimes of other states and in which other states
are seeking to act in concert, rather than to defect. In short, the
prisoners' dilemma provides a useful starting point in thinking
about the dormant Commerce Clause, but falls short of providing a
comprehensive model.
2. State Laws that DisruptBenign Multiple Nash Equilibrium
Games: The most controversial dormant Commerce Clause cases
involve statutes that are facially neutral and that are linked to a
purpose that the Court admits is legitimate. It is for that reason
that in Category 4, within the framework in Part I, the Court has
gone back and forth on the appropriate test, variously suggesting
that the balancing test or the rational basis test should apply. And
yet, while the Court does not apply strict scrutiny in this context,
it has struck down laws alleged to burden commerce that fit this
paradigm. The game theoretical model provides a sound normative
justification for the Court's decisions that strike down state statutes
grounded in admittedly legitimate concerns over highway safety if
those laws appear to fit the paradigm of thwarting what would
otherwise have been a simple multiple Nash equilibrium game by
introducing a third, mixed-strategy regime, the effect of which is
not truly to advance safety, but rather to secure an appropriable
quasi-rent at the expense of the pro-commerce regimes or dominant
practices of other states. So viewed, these cases reveal that rather
than operating on the periphery of the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, as reflected in the Court's ambivalence
over the choice of test, they represent a second core value of this
doctrine. These cases further underscore the importance of maintaining a default regime in this area to allow Congress to select an
alternative pure Nash outcome (as distinguished from a mixedstrategy equilibrium) should Congress determine that the dominant
pure Nash outcome selected by the early moving states (which may
well be the product of path dependence) is inferior to such an
alternative outcome.
3. IntrastateLegislative Rent Seeking: Because both of the two
preceding categories lie at the core of the Court's dormant
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court should apply an
opposite presumption to those laws that fall into neither category.
The market participant cases and the export taxation cases fit this
description. While market participant cases involve laws that discriminate on their face against commerce and that are economically
motivated, they operate in a manner that is more like a subsidy
that distributes wealth from diffuse to organized groups within the
state. The laws are rent-seeking, and they burden commerce in the
sense that all rent-seeking laws produce inefficiencies. But the
burden falls at least as heavily on the enacting state as on any
outside interests. As a result, if sustained, these laws are not likely
to provoke a retaliatory response or a regime of mutual defection.
In addition, these laws do not operate at the expense of pure Nash
equilibrium, pro-commerce regimes of other states. In fact, they do
not affect the decisions of other states to pursue or decline to pursue
the same sorts of schemes on their own. Because market participant
cases fall into neither core category, we can appreciate the Court's
decision to carve out a doctrinal exception involving the state as
market participant.
A similar analysis applies to the export taxation doctrine. In this
context, the opportunities of other states to retaliate is limited
because of the random allocation among states of scarce resources
that might be of value to the state that initially enacted the
burdensome law. In addition, while the law "burdens commerce" by
imposing a heavy tax on foreign purchasers, it does not burden
commerce in the sense of undermining coordinated pro-commerce
regimes of other states. The burden here falls on private parties,
not states, and is likely to have a limited effect in encouraging
states to respond.
Although the market participant cases and the export taxation
doctrine are often viewed as enigmatic, the game theoretical model
reveals that they fall outside the categories of prisoners' dilemma
or multiple Nash equilibrium games. Of course the cases will not
always be as neat as the case paradigms in the model. As stated
above, the model is intended to reveal meaningful end points on two
spectrums along which the actual cases can be graded.
We are now ready to revisit the cases and doctrines introduced in
Part I in light of the game theoretical model.
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III. APPLYING THE GAME THEORETICAL MODEL: THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES REVISITED

In Part I, I reviewed the cases from the dormant Commerce
Clause, the market participant exception, the export taxation
doctrine, and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities doctrine.
The presentation was motivated by the desire to set out the
principal doctrinal categories and then to expose the inconsistencies
within those categories. Applying the model developed in Part II, I
now start at the back end, explaining away the most anomalous
categories-the market participant doctrine and export taxation
-and then proceed to the dormant Commerce Clause cases
themselves. In doing so, I also articulate a vision of the dormant
Commerce Clause and related doctrines that provides a sturdier
normative foundation than its critics would have us believe.
A. The Exceptions that Help Define the Rule: Market Participation,
Export Taxation, and Article IV Privilegesand Immunities
While most analyses of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
exclude the market participant and export taxation doctrines, the
game theoretical analysis provides both a positive explanation and
a normative foundation for their different treatment. It also allows
us to understand the Article IV Privileges and Immunities doctrine,
which functions as an exception to the market participant doctrine,
as more than a clever exercise in pleading. That said, this Article
does not contend that all of these cases should receive the level of
scrutiny attached under the various dbctrines. Rather, the market
participant cases are problematic in a particular respect. But the
important point for our purposes is that this Article's objection to
those cases is not grounded in concerns that relate to the Commerce
Clause.
The Court articulated the market participant doctrine in a
trilogy of cases: Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,3 10 Reeves, Inc. v.

Stake,3 ' and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
310. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
311. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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Employers, Inc. In the first two cases, the Court exempted the
challenged statute from its ordinary dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny, asserting that when the state operates in an entrepreneurial capacity, it can select with whom it deals. 1 ' In the third
case, White, it extended the principle to allow the state to impose
downstream conditions upon its contractors, suggesting that the
state not only can choose with whom to deal, but also on what
terms.3 14 The Court's more recent decision, South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 31 r appears to cut back on the White
extension by suggesting that if the out-of-privity contract requirement operates in a different market from that in which the
contract takes place, then the state is beyond the proper bounds of
its entrepreneurial functions. The effect, then, is to reintroduce
ordinary dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. As applied to the
case facts, the result was to subject Alaska's in-state processing
requirement for its forty-nine million board feet of lumber to the
virtual per se rule of invalidity.3 1 Finally, in a context that is
factually closest to White, United Building & Construction Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 17 the Court remanded a case
involving a forty percent municipal employment requirement for
Camden contractors and subcontractors for findings on whether it
met the stringent scrutiny imposed under the Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause.
The initial trilogy of market participant cases have been
criticized on the ground that they sustain laws that expressly
discriminate in commerce based solely on the fact that the
discrimination takes a different form. The game theoretical
analysis, however, provides a sound normative basis for their
separate treatment. These cases each involve a fairly simple instate rent-seeking story, in which the entrepreneurial activity
operates as an effective subsidy to an identifiable in-state interest, and does so in a manner that operates to the detriment of a
readily identifiable, albeit diffuse, group of in-state taxpayers.
Thus, in Alexandria Scrap, the state elected to subsidize those who
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

460 U.S. 204 (1983).
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440; Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
See White, 460 U.S. at 209-10.
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
Id. at 100.
465 U.S. 208 (1984)
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trafficked in junked cars within Maryland, at the expense of those
within the state who would have helped to defray the costs of the
state's entrepreneurial efforts, but who would not have received the
benefit.3 1 While those who trafficked in junked cars out-of-state
would have preferred the opportunity to receive the benefit of the
more favorable terms in Maryland, the state's decision to exclude
them was unlikely to provoke any retaliatory scheme that resulted
in a regime of mutual defection. Simply put, the scheme redistributed wealth from one group of Maryland residents to
another, and if other states sought to engage in a similar scheme of
redistribution, they were free to do so.
This case did not involve an interstate prisoners' dilemma. The
scheme did not burden an out-of-state interest in a manner likely
to foment state law retaliation. Nor did it involve a multiple Nash
equilibrium game in which a defecting state was attempting to
secure quasi-rents made available only as a consequence of other
states' pro-commerce strategies. Again, the effect of the scheme was
to redistribute wealth through a legislative conferral of rent within
Maryland. Such a policy might have been unwise, but one of the
benefits of a federalist scheme-captured in the Tiebout model3 19
-is that it might well be meritorious at the federal level to leave
such policy decisions, however unwise they might be, to the
states.3 2 °
The more difficult task is to explain the exceptions to the market
participant doctrine itself, especially given the striking similarities
between White and Camden. In White, the Court sustained a fifty
percent municipal employment requirement against a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge,3 2 ' applying the market participant
doctrine. In Camden, the Court remanded for additional findings
on whether a forty percent municipal employment requirement
violated the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. 32 2 The
reconciliation does not grow out of the prisoners' dilemma and Nash
318. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 799.
319. Tiebout, supra note 308; see also ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 40-41
(1970) (positing that while the Tiebout model might understate the difficulty of relocation as
a disciplining technique for interjurisdictional competition, voice provides more powerful
discipline at state and local levels than at the national level).
320. A similar analysis can be used to characterize the Reeves decision.
321. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983).
322. Camden, 465 U.S. at 222-23.
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equilibrium analyses, at least directly. These games reveal the
conditions under which the Court presumes the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine inapplicable to in-state rent seeking that takes the
form of state entrepreneurial efforts. It does not suggest anything
else about the soundness or constitutionality of such schemes.
While an analysis of the purposes underlying Article IV Privileges
and Immunities is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice to say
that the clause expresses concern for the manner in which a home
state treats a citizen of a foreign state when that foreign state
citizen is in the home state. It is certainly a credible construction of
this clause to assert that employment is among the privileges that
a state cannot confer upon its own citizens but deny to the citizens
of other states, especially in a context that involves construction, as
opposed, for example, to state or local governance. 23
The Wunnicke exception remains problematic. In Wunnicke, the
Court rejected the application of the market participant doctrine,
which itself is an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, by importing a quasi-antitrust analysis to create a
further doctrinal exception that restores dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny.3 2 4 The result, as then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
observed in his dissent, appears dissatisfying because it provides
the purchaser with a clear windfall, at least if we make the
seemingly reasonable assumption that the contract price capitalized
any additional costs that the purchaser was required to bear as a
result of the in-state processing requirement.3 2 5 If that assumption
holds, then the effect of the requirement is to offset in-state
contract revenues (benefitting Alaskans generally), the governmentally conferred rents paid to the processing industry. This is
classic in-state rent seeking that is unlikely to engender any
reciprocal efforts within other states and that does not undermine
the pro-commerce, pure Nash equilibrium regimes of other states.
323. While this does not answer the objection that the clause speaks to states, rather than
to municipalities within states, the relative ease of an end-run around the clause, as seen in
the split-the-state hypothetical developed in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan
Departmentof NationalResources, 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992), and the fact that the municipal
scheme grew out of a facilitating state statute, provide credible bases for this doctrinal
extension. But ill am wrong, this simply undermines the Court's application ofthe Privileges
and Immunities doctrine, not its decision to apply that doctrine separately from the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.
324. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97-101.
325. Id. at 102-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, the law does not undermine any public interest readily
identified with the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Moreover,
because the case likely produced a windfall, applying the market
participant doctrine would not likely have adversely affected any
significant private interests. Perhaps the fact that the buyer was
foreign, 326 and th
the difficulty in fitting the case facts into the
confines of the seemingly more applicable Import-Export Clause,
explain the Court's disinclination to exempt the contract provision
from scrutiny. Regardless, the purpose of the model is not to justify
the outcome in every single case, but rather is to explain more
generally the relationships between and among the cases and
doctrines under review.
Before proceeding to the dormant Commerce Clause cases
themselves, it is important to consider Commonwealth Edison,2 7
which the Court treated as an export tax case, rather than as a
dormant Commerce Clause case. The case fits the game theoretical
model nicely. The peculiar factual circumstances giving rise to
export tax opportunities were sufficiently rare that sustaining the
law was unlikely to invite retaliation and thus a regime of mutual
defection in a standard prisoners' dilemma. And the tax in question
did not undermine any pure Nash equilibrium, pro-commerce
strategies in other states.
While the case fits the model, it remains disturbing because
Montana's high concentration of low sulphur coal deposits affords
it a seemingly unfair opportunity to exploit neighboring states. 2
Commonwealth Edison implicates the difficult question of how to
determine the appropriate tax level assessed in one state when the
burdens fall in significant part on those residing out-of-state, a
problem exacerbated by the apparent inelastic demand over the
relevant range for low-sulfur coal at the time the law was
challenged. 2 9 In the ordinary course, we presume that those who
pay taxes receive some set of benefits, or largess, that correlates
with the amount paid in. In Commonwealth Edison, that is a
difficult proposition to defend. Clearly, Montana understood that
it was exporting a considerable portion of its tax burdens to
326.
327.
328.
329.

See supra note 206, and accompanying text.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
See supra note 278 (discussing Levmore's analysis of Commonwealth Edison).
See supra note 2220 and accompanying text.
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nonresidents, and did so based upon its market power with respect
to an export good. Here there was no need for legislative rent
seeking. Instead, the legislature taxed the good knowing that the
inelastic demand would allow out-of-state buyers to fill the state's
tax coffers with the proceeds. The Court's decision to decline to
apply dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, even though the case
falls well within Category 3 (facially neutral/financially motivated)
in Part I, can be attributed in part to the inability of other states to
retaliate. But there is one additional justification for the result,
having to do with institutional competence. While the facts of the
Commonwealth Edison case are extreme, if the Court applied
ordinary dormant Commerce Clause principles, it would necessarily
invite claims that rest upon tax laws that allegedly impose
disproportionate obligations on nonresidents that are substantially
closer to a seemingly appropriate line.
The difficulty here is not merely one ofjudicial burdens, but also
one of judicial competence. Incidence analysis is extraordinarily
difficult even for those with the requisite training, and it requires
the person undertaking the analysis to undertake assumptions that
are invariably contestable. The Court's decision to allow Montana,
which had a scarce natural resource, to maximize its tax revenues
by linking a seemingly disproportionate tax burden on exports is
likely attributable in large part to the Court's own appreciation that
the federal judiciary is ill-suited to undertake the kind of analysis
required if it were to open the federal courts up generally to such
suits.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Cases Revisited
We have now seen how the game theoretical model reconciles the
most criticized exceptions to the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. We are now ready to return to the dormant Commerce
Clause cases. We begin with cases that reveal the core values of the
Court's dormant Commerce Clausejurisprudence and then consider
cases that do not fall into the previously discussed doctrinal
exceptions, but in which the Court has nonetheless applied more
relaxed dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. The analysis concludes
with two tables that replace the decision tree in Tables 3 and 4, and
that place the combined set of doctrines along two normative
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spectrums that together summarize the game theoretical analysis
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
1. The FirstCore Value: Inhibitinga Regime of Mutual
Defection in a StandardPrisoners'Dilemma
a. City of Philadelphia Revisited
3 ° in which the
We begin with City ofPhiladelphiav. New Jersey,"
Court struck down a New Jersey statute that limited waste intake
from outside New Jersey. The Court articulated the per se rule of
invalidity and the balancing test, but appears to have applied strict
scrutiny. The state could have achieved its legitimate objective of
prolonging the life of its landfills by limiting the intake of waste
without regard to the waste's point of origin. 3 1 Thus, even though
it had a sufficient justification for its law, it did not select an
available waste-neutral means.
In some respects, the challenged law represents a paradigm case
of facial discrimination. And one might imagine a regime in which
other states reciprocate defection by enacting similar state-specific
waste-intake laws. 3 2 Rather than facilitating this regime of
defection dominance, the Court struck down the law as inconsistent
with the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 33 3 The difficulty,
however, is that the very decision to prevent New Jersey from
providing its residents a waste outlet might not have the desired
effect of promoting a free trade regime among states over waste
intake. Instead, it might simply change the outlet for mutual
defection in waste. In this prisoners' dilemma game, New Jersey
joins other states in failing to approve waste disposal facilities,
leaving those who generate the waste-whether in-state or
not-with no waste outlet. Scholars have noted this problem, "34 and
in the context of low-level radioactive waste, it was the primary
justification for federal legislation attempting to coerce states to
330. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
331. Id. at 626-27.
332. Notice that in this context the geographical proximity ofthe importing and exporting
states makes the possibility of the threat of reciprocal defection, and of rewards for
cooperative strategies, all the more plausible.
333. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
334. See, e.g., McGreal, supra note 124, at 1199-1200.
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provide waste outlets. In New York v. United States,335 the Court
struck down the challenged amendments applying the newly
articulated anticommandeering doctrine. While that case arose on
the affirmative side of the Commerce Clause, the conceptual
difficulty that Congress faced was by no means limited to low-level
radioactive waste. Thus, one could imagine a comparable waste
management crisis confronting the nation-perhaps it has
already-respecting ordinary solid and liquid waste.
If states respond to the inability to provide state-specific
solutions by denying permits altogether, then the effect of the City
of Philadelphiaruling is not to prevent a prisoners' dilemma, but
to push it into another form. The problem with the Court's ruling
is that it creates a default rule that Congress generally has been
unable to change. If states were required to grant permits to
those who qualified, then the City of Philadelphiasolution would
be entirely sound. It may well be that certain states have soil
conditions that allow for Ricardian rents in processing solid and
liquid waste. A regime that promotes the creation of waste without
regard to point of origin would encourage the pursuit of such
economically beneficial rents. On the other hand, if the dormant
Commerce Clause requires state neutrality in the provision of waste
storage facilities, but is not coupled with any obligation to approve
valid permit requests, City of Philadelphiainstead promotes the
perverse result that Rehnquist feared in his dissent." 6 And if
Congress were to coerce permit approval subject to specified
regulatory criteria, it would risk running afoul of the anticommandeering principal. At a minimum, the analysis highlights
the need for the Court to consider more closely the two sides of its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Perhaps the Supreme Court
should be more willing to accommodate states in restricting waste
based upon point of origin under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine when the Court itself has applied its affirmative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to prevent Congress from devising solutions
that might encourage states to continue providing waste outlet
facilities either on a commerce-neutral basis or by allowing the
states to discriminate in commerce if the chosen method involves
commandeering.
335. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
336. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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b. West Lynn Creamery Revisited and Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison
3 7 the Court, per Justice
In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,"
Stevens, rejected a state regime that combined two facially neutral
measures-a tax scheme that applied equally to all milk sales and
a rebate scheme benefitting only Massachusetts milk producers-on
the ground that the combined scheme had the effect of removing
those who would stand in the shoes of the adversely affected out-ofstate milk producers and who would therefore be inclined to oppose
the tax and rebate scheme.33 8 In effect, the majority opinion
recognized that while the per se rule of invalidity applied only to
facially discriminatory measures, interest groups can cleverly
devise facially neutral schemes that have the same aggregate effect.
As with the facially discriminatory scheme, at least some facially
neutral measures are likely to promote a regime of mutual defection.
In his West Lynn Creamery dissent, Justice Rehnquist asserted
that "[alnalysis of interest group participation in the political
process may serve many useful purposes, but serving as a basis for
interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.3 3 9
In fact, while interest group analysis is not helpful in predicting
particular case results, it is helpful more generally in explaining the
evolution of legal doctrines. Certainly the more obvious method of
providing an advantage to in-state milk producers would be to
impose a differential tax on milk sales depending upon the state of
origin. But this would just as obviously have violated the per se
rule. The West Lynn Creamery Court recognized the subterfuge of
joining two separate schemes that have the same effect and thus
prevented the challenged regime from inviting the very retaliatory
response that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is designed
to prevent. So viewed, the challenged law, like the facially discriminatory statute that is financially motivated, falls within the
first core prohibition of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.

337. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
338. Id. at 201.
339. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The West Lynn Creamery ruling, applying strict scrutiny and
striking down the challenged law, had the effect of discouraging
other states from retaliating against the enacting state and thus of
discouraging mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma game. Before
leaving West Lynn Creamery, let us consider the case discussion
involving the strong presumption in favor of sustaining state
subsidy schemes. Although it is true that such schemes are facially
discriminatory-only in-state constituents receive the benefit-and
are financially motivated, the Court suggested that such programs
withstand dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 40 Thus, the West
Lynn Creamery Court reasoned that the problem was in joining the
two halves of its tax-and-rebate scheme together with the
knowledge that the tax revenues went into a segregated fund used
for the rebate scheme. Had the subsidy come from general taxpayer
revenues, however, the Court strongly suggested that the case
would have come out otherwise. 4 1
In contrast, in the subsequent decision, Camps Newfound/
3 42 the Court struck down a real
Owatonna,Inc. v. Town ofHarrison,
estate tax provision in a Maine statute that provided a general tax
exemption for charitable organizations, but that excepted from the
rule those institutions primarily serving nonresidents of Maine. A
camp serving members of the Christian Science faith, who were
primarily from out-of-state,3" challenged the exemption on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds. Justice Stevens, writing for a majority,
stated that the case presented an issue that the Court had not
previously addressed, namely "the disparate real estate tax
treatment of a non-profit service provider based on the residence of
the consumers that it serves."3 " The Court quoted West Lynn
Creamery for the proposition that "[tihe paradigmatic ... law
discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective
[import] tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported
from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in
340. See id. at 200.
341. Id. at 201-02.
342. 520 U.S. 564 (1997). For an informative analysis discussing the relationship between
these two cases in a manner that is largely consistent with the analysis presented here, see
Coenen, supra note 252.
343. The Court noted that ninety-five percent of the campers came from out-of-state.
Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 573.
344. Id. at 572.
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patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt
by a State to enact one.' 346 The Court went on to explain, however,
that if the state tax were allowed to stand, states could enact the
functional equivalent of prohibited tariffs by providing "special real
estate tax[es] on property" and then "gearing the increased tax to
the value of the imported goods at issue. " ""
As explained in Part II, the Court's differential treatment of the
state as market participant and state-law subsidies on the one
hand, and differential taxation on the other, can be reconciled as a
function of the ease with which adversely affected interests in other
states can secure reciprocal legislative protections. The more
transparent the special interest benefit, the more costly it is to
procure. Conversely, the more well hidden the special interest
benefit, the less costly it is to procure. Despite the economic equivalence of these two sorts of legislative preferences to the affected
businesses or nonprofit organizations,34 ' the game theoretical
analysis reveals a difference that is worthy of respect in the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Specifically, to the extent that
the doctrine is motivated by the desire to inhibit a regime of mutual
defection in a standard prisoners' dilemma, we might imagine the
Court's results to be graded according to the transparent nature
of the differential protectionist measure. So viewed, the market
participant doctrine, rather than serving as an anomaly, falls
squarely in the category of cases least likely to invite reciprocal
defection. Moreover, the analysis is consistent with the intuition
that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not targeted against
rent seeking as such. Instead, it is targeted against those forms of
rent-seeking activity that undermine a beneficial regime of mutual
cooperation among states.

345. Id. at 575 (quoting West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193).
346. Id. (quoting West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193).
347. Id. The Court further held that the rule prohibiting differential taxation on private
businesses applied to nonprofits. Id. at 583.
348. See Levmore, supra note 202.
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c. Summary
Table 7 summarizes the preceding discussion.
Table 7: The Prisoners' Dilemma Cases
Category

Market
Participant
Doctrine;
Export
Taxation

Subsidy
Cases

Differential
Taxation

Tarriffs,
Exclusions

Cases

Reeves;
Alexander
Scrap; White.
But see
Wunnicke

West Lynn
Creamery

Camps
Newfound/
Owatonna

City of
Philadelphia;
C&A
Carbone

Comments

Challenged
provisions
take form of
visible wealth
transfers from
diffuse to
organized
groups, which
are politically
costly to
procure and
thus less
likely to
invite
retaliation,

Suggests
that Court
generally
presumes in
favor of
subsidy for
same reason
as prior
category
unless
interest
group
analysis
reveals
dynamic that
masks
functional
equivalent of
differential
taxation.

Because
differential
taxes are
hidden, and
thus less
costly to
pass, Court
is less
likely to
sustain
them as
they are
more likely
to invite
retaliation,

Because these
cases present
the most
obvious
geographical
barriers to
trade, Court
presumes that
they threaten
to invite
mutual
defection.
Problem is
that in waste
context, states
retain option
to decline
permits, thus
re-inviting
defection.

Challenged Statute
Not Likely to Promote
Regime of Mutual
Defection

Challenged Statute
Likely to Promote
Regime of
Mutual Defection
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2. The Second Core Value: Restoring a Benign Multiple Nash
EquilibriumGame
a. The ParadigmCases
In Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp., 49 the Court struck
down Iowa's prohibition against sixty-five foot twin trailers even
though the state had some evidence to support its claim that such
vehicles were unsafe, 50 highway safety was traditionally an area in
which the Court had stated that deference applied, and along the
East Coast and in the District of Columbia, the Iowa rule was
5 ' And
dominant."
in Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines, Inc.,352 the Court
struck down an Iowa statute that required curved mudflaps when
forty-five other states allowed them and one other state prohibited
them.353 These cases present the clearest examples of laws that if
sustained would disrupt a multiple Nash equilibrium game among
those states that had adopted a common, pro-commerce regime. The
effort to secure appropriable quasi-rents is seen most easily in
Kassel, where the governor made plain that the benefit to the state
from disallowing a kind of truck that was allowed in surrounding
3 54
states was to reduce the wear and tear on state highways.
Assuming that the two dominant trucks for the relevant interstate
transit were sixty-five foot twins or fifty-five foot singles, then had
the surrounding states prohibited sixty-five foot twin trailers, but
allowed as a substitute fifty-five foot singles, Iowa would have been
able to secure the quasi-rent by disallowing the fifty-five foot
singles in favor of the sixty-five foot twins. Further, notice that
Iowa only truly benefitted provided that the remaining states
retained their common, contrary regime. Otherwise, Iowa, like the
states whose scheme it thwarted, would no longer have benefitted
from the reduced cost of commerce to Iowa, facilitated by that
common regime, which was furthered by the three exceptions to the
349. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
350. Id. at 685-86.

351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 688 & n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Id. at 523.
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 677.
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sixty-five foot trailer ban, including, most notably, the border cities
exception.
The critical point is that the rent does not arise from the
substance of the non-uniform law. Rather, it arises from the fact
that the law is non-uniform. As in the Manhattan hypothetical,
Iowa secures the quasi-rent only by disrupting whichever pure
Nash equilibrium result the surrounding states adopted. A similar
analysis applies in Bibb. Whether in fact there was a benefit to
straight versus curved mudflaps, when a scheme disrupts one of
two pure Nash equilibrium strategies pursued in numerous states,
the Court presumes a likely intent to disrupt a multiple Nash
equilibrium game, rather than a genuine effort to further interests
of highway safety. In effect, had the Court sustained these statutes
by applying low-level scrutiny, it would have invited clever state
legislators to turn what is essentially a coordination game between
and among states into a game in which a defiant state introduces
a third mixed-strategy equilibrium option that solely benefits
itself at the direct expense of interstate commerce. Whether
characterized as disrupting a multiple Nash equilibrium game or as
appropriating quasi-rents produced through the other states' benign
pro-commerce strategies, the result is the same. These cases reveal
why the Court attempts to facilitate among the states a simple
multiple Nash equilibrium game by taking the option to the
defecting state of procuring quasi-rents and thus introducing a
mixed-strategy equilibrium off the table.
Even though the states in these cases cannot formally coordinate,
in the absence of a defecting strategy, the probability of a benign
pure Nash equilibrium outcome among cooperative states is
improved because the decisions of the various state legislatures are
not simultaneous. Instead, one state or a group of states sets out a
lead policy, and as a consequence of path dependence, this policy
results in increasing marginal returns from more of the same
activity, and the surrounding states follow the lead of the early
mover or movers. And notice that this need not result from formally
enacted rules. Simply declining to prohibit that which other states
allow facilitates the desired pro-commerce regime.
Of course the effect of forcing a mixed-strategy equilibrium by
adopting a contrary option is potentially enormous. The Court
has captured this intuition by labeling such efforts as imposing
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unacceptable burdens on commerce. It is perhaps not surprising
then that in Bibb, Justice Douglas noted that "[tihis is one of those
cases-few in number-where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce."3 5 5 When there are two dominant regimes, for example
curved or straight mudflaps, each of which constitutes a Nash
equilibrium, and one has become dominant over time, defying the
path-induced equilibrium by introducing a nonconforming rule
will produce a quasi-rent that no participating state would have
reasonably intended a defecting state to appropriate had they
thought about the choice of regime ex ante. While some might have
preferred one regime or the other, none would have preferred a
mixed regime. Aside from the specific benefit of appropriating a
quasi-rent, this is even true for the defecting state.
While we should not expect to see cycling of the sort hypothesized
in Part II between potential pure Nash equilibria and a mixedstrategy equilibrium, 3" defecting states produce an outcome that
undermines the positive network externalities of the surrounding
states. It is for that reason that some scholars have characterized
these cases as involving holdouts in the production of a public
good. 5 7 But unlike the holdout game, there is no realistic possibility
of a payoff by adversely affected states to purchase the defecting
state's cooperation. Instead, the benefit comes from the act of
defection itself. So viewed, we can appreciate the Kassel and Bibb
holdings as the Supreme Court's decision to remove from the table
the option of one state to introduce a mixed-strategy equilibrium
when doing so allows the defecting state to appropriate a quasirent, but when it appears improbable that the motivation for the
nonconforming law is to secure the benefits of a superior legal
regime. Just as preventing a regime of mutual defection-the most
common economic explanation for the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine-represents a core value of the Court's doctrine, so too does
facilitating a benign multiple Nash equilibrium game by removing
the mixed-strategy equilibrium option. If we accept the proposition
that the Commerce Clause, operating in its dormant capacity, has
the power to invalidate state laws that undermine political union,
355. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529.
356. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
357. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 242.
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then certainly the clause must come into play when a challenged
law's only purpose is to secure a benefit at the expense of the other
states' benign pure Nash equilibrium outcomes. And that is just the
effect of the challenged laws in Kassel and Bibb.
b. A Comment on the Default Nature of the Dormant
Commerce Clause Rules
Before moving to the next group of cases, it is important to
consider the justification for treating the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause holdings as default rules. In Kassel and Bibb, the
effect of removing the disrupting mixed regime option was to
facilitate the dominant pure Nash equilibrium outcome. Notice,
however, that in Kassel, the enacting state was not unique and that
there were at least some policy arguments to support the rejected
regime."' To the extent that these cases suggest that the Supreme
Court applies the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to restore a
multiple Nash equilibrium game and to prevent state efforts to
secure appropriable quasi-rents, path dependence suggests that the
doctrine also has the effect of supporting the first mover. The first
mover might not, however, have selected the optimal regime or the
regime that will prove optimal over time. The choice to allow or
disallow sixty-five foot twins or to demand curved or straight
mudflaps might well be different from the choice of right or left
hand driving in one critical respect. The latter choice is pure
coordination. The former choices combine competing policy judgments with a coordination or path dependence game. The Court's
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine reflects the intuition that the
benefits of even a superior highway safety regulation can outweigh
the burdens of disrupting even a somewhat inferior outcome of
a coordination game. 59 This intuition is reflected in the Kassel
plurality's use of a balancing test.

358. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 677-78 & nn. 23-24.
359. The Bibb Court appeared to recognize this point:
Such a new safety device-out of line with the requirements of the other
States-may be so compelling that the innovating State need not be the one to
give way. But the present showing-balanced against the clear burden on
commerce--is far too inconclusive to make this mudguard meet that test.
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 530.
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The analysis further helps to explain the default nature of
these rules. The Court is institutionally incapable of using the
Kassel case as a means of imposing on other states the Iowa regime
prohibiting sixty-five foot twins. If the Court had that power and if
the Iowa regime were in fact superior, such a ruling would
simultaneously solve the coordination problem and avoid codifying
an inferior regime based upon the high probability that the first
mover had a systemic influence in establishing the dominant
regime. A similar analysis can be applied in Hunt.360 While it might
seem improbable, it is at least possible to imagine that there are
benefits to the simpler USDA grading system that outweighed the
informational benefits of the alternative Washington grading
system or even of a combined regime. Again, however, the Court
lacked the consti-tutional authority to use Hunt as a vehicle for
imposing the challenged North Carolina regime on the nation as a
whole.
The well known problem of Congressional inertia renders the
Court's entry into this area problematic because even selecting a
default constitutional rule might, as a practical matter, entrench
that outcome indefinitely. That said, if the chosen regime does
prevent private producers from securing Ricardian rents, or
economic rents associated with unique conditions that allow it to
produce a product in commerce for which there are limited
substitutes, there is at least an incentive to employ the political
process in Congress to bring about a change in that rule. I would
not be so naive as to suggest that Congress routinely ensures
that potential efficiency gains are facilitated through legislation
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. But the analysis of the multiple
Nash equilibrium cases provides a strong normative justification for
the shift from treating the commerce power as one in which state
and federal powers are hermetically sealed (as was the case in an
earlier era) to a regime in which Congress can change Supreme
Court rulings through ordinary legislation. Although this argument
might appear more compelling in the multiple Nash equilibrium
cases than in the prisoners' dilemma cases, the waste cases reveal
that it is sometimes applicable in both core areas of the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court's decision to
360. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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strike down state laws that restrict the flow of waste based upon
point of origin might have a greater normative foundation because
of the Court's willingness to allow Congress to choose an opposite
regime. As suggested previously, however, to the extent that the
anticommandeering doctrine developed on the affirmative side of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence prevents Congress
from enacting alternative solutions-including coercing the states
to create even state-specific solutions to their own waste storage
problems 3 61-the analysis further highlights the need for the Court
to be more attentive to the relationship between both sides of its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
This intuition is reinforced by the fact that it would appear most
implausible to imagine that absent some justification other than
facilitating appropriable quasi-rents that Congress would ever
select a mixed-strategy equilibrium regime in a competing Nash
equilibrium context.3 62 Congress would either leave the Court's
selected dominant regime in place, thus prohibiting the outlier
statute, or substitute a contrary, but uniform, regime. Similarly in
Hunt, although it seems unlikely that the informational benefits of
the Washington grading system were outweighed by the benefits of
simplicity in the USDA system, the Court's ruling at least left
Congress the option to declare otherwise.
This point can be generalized. To the extent that the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause rules are the product of efforts to
361. This was essentially the Congressional solution in the Low Level Radioactive Waste

Policy Amendments of 1986, through which Congress required states to either provide instate waste storage or to join a regional pact. The Court struck down this regime inNew York
v. UnitedStates, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), holding that Congress lacked the power to commandeer

the states by coercing them to become self-sufficient or to suffer draconian sanctions.
362. In fact, Congress has demonstrated its ability to adopt rules that limit the power of

states to inhibit the flow of commerce in this area. In The Surface Transportation Act of
1982, apparently in exchange for other provisions that imposed detrimental taxes on

truckers, Congress eliminated state restrictions on doubles traveling interstate highways.
See 49 U.S.C. § 2316, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1393 (1994). In subsequent
amendments enacted in 1984, Congress cut back on some of these gains by authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation, on the basis of highway safety or on petition of state governors,
to prohibit doubles on interstate highways. This suggests that Congress can facilitate a pure
Nash strategy equilibrium, or allow exceptions to a uniform regime in the event that a

nationwide Nash equilibrium outcome proves inferior in particular states or regions. But the
critical point is that while the federal judiciary can only sustain or strike down a challenged
state law, Congress has the wherewithal to enact as a uniform rule either the majority or

minority rule among the states.
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limit states in their attempts to disrupt benign multiple Nash
equilibrium games and to appropriate quasi-rents at the expense
of commerce, that suggests that particular Supreme Court rulings
cannot be cast in terms of whether the clause anticipates the
Court's ruling. Nothing in the Commerce Clause informs the selection of straight verus curved mudflaps, allowing or prohibiting
sixty-five foot twins, or allowing or prohibiting grading systems for
produce with finer top gradations. But this does not undermine the
Court's rulings in this area. Although the Commerce Clause does
not inform these specific choices, it does inform the Court's scrutiny
in assessing state laws the most logical construction of which is an
effort to secure a rent that would not have come into being but for
commerce, and that has the effect of undermining the pure Nash
equilibrium, pro-commerce regimes of other states.
c. The Proxy Cases: The ExtraterritorialEffects and
Antitakeover Cases
Another body of dormant Commerce Clause cases that fits this
paradigm, which I have not previously introduced, involves state
laws with extraterritorial effect.36 In a series of cases, the Court
has addressed a group of state laws, primarily involving liquor
pricing, that required those selling liquor from out-of-state to post
retail prices in the regulating state and to affirm that the posted
prices were lower than other identified states for a specified
period of time. In the most prominent recent decision, Healy v.
Beer Institute (Healy 11),364 the Supreme Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that required out-of-state liquor shippers to
affirm that their posted prices for products sold in-state were no
higher than those in the bordering states of Massachusetts, New
York, and Rhode Island. The challenged statute was an amended
363. For an essay (or more precisely the second of a pair of essays) that argues that the
constitutional notion of extraterritoriality is not grounded in any single clause, including the
Commerce Clause, see Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (7) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America and DormantCommerce ClauseDoctrine;(I) ExtraterritorialState Legislation,
85 MICH. L. REv. 1865 (1987). Whether or not extraterritoriality resides in a single clause,
it is important here to consider its implications for interstate commerce. The Court's rulings
in this area, not surprisingly, have rested upon a construction of the Commerce Clause
operating in its dormant capacity.
364. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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version of one that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit struck down and that the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed in Healy .65 The earlier version required the shipper to
affirm that their prices would remain no higher than the lowest
prices they would charge for beer in the bordering states for the
effective period of the posting. The version at issue in Healy II
limited the lowest price affirmation to the time of the posting. In
between the two cases, the Supreme Court issued Brown-Forman
DistillersCorp. v. New York State LiquorAuthority."' In that case,
a New York law required liquor distillers and wholesalers in the
state to affirm that bottles or cases of liquor were sold in New York
at a price no higher than the lowest price in any other state during
the month of the price affirmation. Twenty years earlier in Seagram
36 7 the Court upheld a New York price of
& Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,
liquor affirmation statute that required sellers to affirm that the
price sold in New York was no higher than that in any state in the
United States for the preceding month. In that case, the Court
grounded its holding in part upon the Twenty-First Amendment's
broad grant of regulatory power concerning liquor to states. 368 Thus,
the Court has issued decisions involving affirmation statutes with
prospective (Healy I), retrospective (Seagram& Sons), and present
(Healy II) effect.
The Healy II Court also discussed one other case that involved a
statute with extraterritorial effect. In Edgar v. MITE Corp. 369 the
Court struck down an Illinois antitakeover statute that required a
tender offer for a target company in which ten percent of shareholders or more resided in Illinois to register with the Secretary of
State and that prevented the takeover from having effect for twenty
days pending administrative evaluation to rule out inequity or
fraud. In a subsequent decision, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,3 7 °
the Court sustained against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge
an Indiana statute that permitted control shares in an Indiana
corporation to be voted only if other shareholders passed an
365. See United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), affd mer.,
464 U.S. 909 (1983) (Healy I).
366. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
367. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
368. See id. at 42.
369. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
370. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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approving resolution. In Edgar,in contrast, a plurality invalidated
the Illinois antitakeover law, finding that it "directly regulate[d]
transactions which take place across state lines, even if wholly
outside the State of Illinois."371
Before considering the Healy II Court's analysis, it is worth
noting an analytical similarity between that case, which struck
down the challenged state law, and Exxon, which achieved an
opposite result. As the Healy II Court noted, Connecticut had no
breweries or brewers, 2 and thus all brewers and importers were
located out-of-state. 7 3 While the Exxon Court rejected the dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the restriction on vertically
integrated retail service stations in part on the ground that the
challenged statute did not draw a line between in-state and out-ofstate firms,37 4 in Healy II, the Court declined to apply the same
reasoning. Even though all liquor came into Connecticut from outof-state, the Court struck down the law based upon its extraterritorial effect.3 7 5 In doing so, the Healy II Court overruled
Seagram & Sons.3 76
As stated above, the Healy II Court relied both on the earlier
liquor affirmation cases and on Edgarv. MITE to reject the revised
Connecticut statute. After explaining why it no longer construed the
Twenty-First Amendment as a barrier to dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny in this area, 7 the Healy II Court noted that
the law in question was narrower than those it had previously
reviewed: "ITihe statute requires only that out-of-state shippers
affirm that their prices are no higher than the prices being charged
in the border States as of the moment of affirmation." 378 Despite

371. 457 U.S. at 641.
372. Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 326-27 n.2 (1989).
373. Recall that in Exxon, Maryland had no refiners or processors of gasoline, so all
gasoline products were imported. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 123
(1978).
374. Id. at 125-26.
375. Healy 11, 491 U.S. at 340-41.
376. Id. at 342-43.
377. The Court relied upon Brown-Forman for the proposition that "[a]lthough the ...
(Twenty-First] Amendment vested in New York considerable authority to regulate the
domestic sale of alcohol, the Amendment did not immunize the State from the Commerce
Clause's proscription of state statutes that regulate the sale of alcohol in other States." Id.
at 334-35.
378. Id. at 335.
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the statute's narrower reach, the Court held that it violated the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Court distilled the prior
cases as follows:
Taken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial effects
of state economic regulation stand at a minimum for the
following propositions: First, the Commerce Clause ... precludes

the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State ... and, specifically, a

State may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of
establishing a scale of prices for use in other states.... Second, a
statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside
the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether
the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the
legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of
the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State.... Third, the practical effect of the statute must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the
statute itself,but also by considering how the challenged statute
may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other
States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every,
State adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the
Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation
arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State.... And, specifically, the
Commerce Clause dictates that no State may force an out-ofstate merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before
undertaking a transaction in another.379
The Court went on to explain that the Connecticut statute operated
in a manner that was inconsistent with the actual, or potential, procommerce regimes of those states in which the law had an
extraterritorial effect by "preventing brewers from undertaking
competitive pricing [in those states] ... based on prevailing market
conditions.'80
These cases suggest that the Court has identified as a significant
proxy for state efforts to disrupt benign multiple Nash equilibrium
379. Id. at 336-37 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
380. Id. at 338.
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games, and to secure appropriable quasi-rents, those statutory
provisions that directly implicate the laws of other states. While
Exxon itself reveals that the Court has not consistently applied
the second finding in the Healy II doctrinal summary, namely
presuming against the constitutionality of laws that affect private
business conduct beyond the regulating state's borders, the Court
has done substantially better at applying the third finding, namely
evaluating state regulations in light of their actual or potential
impact on the regulatory regimes of other states. This approach is
consistent with both core values of the dormant Commerce Clause
identified in this Article. After all, sustaining a law that would
result in a regime of mutual defection with other states has a strong
negative impact on the regulatory regimes of other states, which
without provocation would be more likely to favor commerce. By
inhibiting states in their efforts to disrupt benign multiple Nash
equilibrium games among other states, the Court further prevents
one state from undermining the pro-commerce regimes of another.
In addition, this group of cases reveals that the Court is
particularly concerned if the cumulative effect of a statute, if the
statute were also adopted by other states, would undermine the
ability of private entities to function in commerce. In effect, the
prohibited Illinois antitakeover statute at issue in Edgar could
altogether block a tender offer that would be allowed in other
states, just as the Kassel and Bibb regimes undermined the procommerce driving regimes that were common to the surrounding
states. This helps to distinguish Edgar and CTS. These two cases
establish that although states have free reign to regulate their own
corporations, however inefficient the state's corporations law might
be, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine will prevent a single
state from undermining the acquisition of corporations through
tender offer procedures that are antithetical to the laws of other
states in which the corporation is principally located or doing
business. This is particularly appropriate in the corporations
context given the ability of shareholders to sell off shares in1
corporations based in states with inefficient regulatory policies.8
381. Indeed, it is for that reason that the Tiebout model holds the greatest promise in
assessing the relative efficiency of the stock market, given that shareholders are better able
to vote with their feet in this context than in the context of choosing states or nations. For
a more detailed discussion on this point, see Stearns, supra note 194.

2003]

A BEAUTIFUL MEND

This suggests that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not
concerned with the efficiency of state corporations law per se,
except to the extent that such laws appear to disrupt the procommerce strategies of other states and to the extent that such
laws provide in-state constituents with the functional equivalent
of appropriable quasi-rents that become available only as a result
of the pro-commerce laws or practices of other states. The same
analysis explains the extraterritoriality cases more generally. In
each of these cases, 82 the Court expressed the concern that the
state with the affirmation statute threatened to undermine the
operation of competitive forces in other states that did not employ
similar schemes. The Court found fatal the mere possibility that the
challenged statute could have had the effect of undermining the
pro-commerce regime of these other states. In Healy II it did so
even though, as in Exxon," 3 the statute did not discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state firms (given that all brewers and
importers were out-of-state).
The analysis suggests that whereas Exxon was treated as an
example of inefficient in-state rent seeking, the extraterritorial
reach of the affirmation statute at issue in Healy II placed it
instead closer to the multiple Nash equilibrium game cases. The
cases are distinguishable because they present different dimensions
of the underlying game theoretical problem. When the challenged
statute primarily harms those in-state, as in Exxon, the Court is
more willing to allow the state's own political processes to operate
as the final check. This analysis does not hold, however, when
the rent-seeking statute confers a benefit, as in Healy II, that
threatens to undermine pro-commerce strategies of other states
that do not have a like regulatory regime. The risk here is not one
of retaliation. Rather it is in undermining pricing structures that
emerge as a result of the cooperative, pro-commerce strategies of
other states.

382. See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1981); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1982), affd mem, 464
U.S. 909 (1983).
383. For a fuller treatment of Exxon, see discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
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3. The Hard Cases: Those ContainingElements of Prisoners'
Dilemma and Multiple Nash EquilibriumGames
a. Hunt Revisited
3 84

In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
the Supreme Court struck down a North Carolina statute that
contained features consistent with an effort to secure appropriable
quasi-rents. The North Carolina statute prohibiting the import of
apples in cartons bearing other than USDA labels prevented
Washington apple producers, using an alternative set of standards
created under Washington law, from signaling superior apple
quality relative to other apples marketed throughout the United
States as USDA Grade A, and thus from securing whatever
additional rents were associated with that superior quality.3 ' The
inability to secure the additional profit resulting from signaling
superior quality presumably undermined the incentives to market
the apples across the United States. In Hunt, the appropriable
quasi-rents did not result from North Carolina's disrupting a simple
coordination game that involved two competing Nash equilibria, as
in Kassel and Bibb. Instead, the rents arose from what looks, at a
surface level, like ordinary in-state legislative rent seeking. Here,
the North Carolina apple producers, a relatively concentrated
group, received a benefit at the expense of in-state apple consumers,
a relatively dispersed group. The critical difference between this
case and one that involves pure in-state rent seeking, however, is
that but for the Washington State legal regime (permitted in
other states), which promoted commerce by allowing producers
of superior quality produce to signal that superior quality in
marketing, the opportunity to secure this particular rent could not
have arisen.
The best means of appreciating the nature of this rent is to
identify the divergence between ex ante and ex post expectations.
From an ex ante perspective, it is inconceivable that two states
would agree to allow producers of an inferior product in one to
prevent their competitors from out-of-state to signal that their
384. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
385. See id. at 343-44.
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competing product is superior. This case might also present a
multiple Nash equilbrium-type game among more than two states.
If it is inefficient for the Washington producers to customize their
packaging on a per state basis,"8 6 then the effect of complying
with the North Carolina law would be to select either the North
Carolina regime, which presumably would not violate the laws in
any other state, or to limit its marketing to states other than
North Carolina." 7 The latter option would not affect interstate
coordination, although it would effectively strip Washington apple
producers of one significant state-wide market. The former option,
however, would undermine the dominant practices-if we assume,
as seems reasonable, that other states allowing the Washington
grading system do so by failing to prohibit it-which, again, are procommerce. In effect, Washington has coordinated with other states
for a common pro-trade regime in which it is permissible to
signal quality that is at least as valuable to consumers as USDA
grading. If the Court sustained the North Carolina statute, and
if Washington producers elected to make that their uniform
marketing rule, then the effect would be to secure a rent at the
expense not only of Washington apple producers and North
Carolina apple consumers, but of potential consumers of
Washington apples elsewhere throughout the United States.
b. Exxon Revisited
We now reconsider a case that at a surface level appears to
present a doctrinal conflict not only with the extraterritoriality
cases, as previously explained, but also with Hunt. In Exxon,"'
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority, upheld a Maryland statute
that prohibited producers or refiners of gasoline from owning
or operating service stations. As explained in Part I, from the
perspective of interest group analysis, the two cases appear
386. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
387. Professor Bittker has made a similar observation: "North Carolina's requirement
forced the Washington growers either to alter their long-established inspection and grading
practices at substantial cost or to abandon the North Carolina market." BITrKER, supra note
106, § 6.06[A], at 6-41. The critical implication is that abandoning its long-established
inspection and grading practices would force the Washington growers to alter their practices
in other states whose pro-commerce laws or practices permit Washington-based grading.
388. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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identical. In each case, an identifiable in-state interest group-the
North Carolina apple producers in Hunt and the independent
service stations in Exxon-procured a legislatively conferred rent
at the expense of a diffuse group, in-state consumers, with a private
out-of-state counterpart. In each case, the legislatively conferred
rent produced an inefficiency at the expense of actors in commerce.
The North Carolina statute in Hunt threatened to deprive in-state
apple consumers of a superior product that they would have been
willing to purchase at the required premium to make exporting
cost-effective to Washington apple producers. The Maryland statute
in Exxon threatened to deprive in-state drivers with the benefit of
a lower price and more regular supply at some service stations that
could only be secured through the additional profit that the owners
of vertically integrated stations would secure by not having to hedge
against future price increases through the economic equivalent of
an insurance premium on the present price of gasoline.
The question then is why these two cases were decided
differently. The Exxon Court's nominal justification for declining to
apply strict scrutiny-that all gas comes from out-of-state and thus
interstate commerce will remain unaffected 389 -is unpersuasive.
While the statute does not draw a line between in-state and out-ofstate firms, and might have operated to the benefit of some out-ofstate firms, the fact remains that among affected firms, an
identifiable subclass of out-of-state firms bore the full economic
burden of the statute. The better explanation is that unlike in Hunt,
the challenged statute in Exxon did not confer rents that only could
have become available as a result of the pro-commerce laws or
practices of other states.
The Exxon statute did not undermine a Nash coordination game,
as in Kassel, because there would be no benefit to other states in
seeking to change their laws as a consequence of the Maryland
legal regime. The challenged statute conferred rents on in-state
independents at the expense of in-state consumers. If other states
wished to allow the same type of inefficient rent seeking, they could
do so, but their decision would remain unaffected by the presence
or absence of the Maryland statute. Any incentive for other states
to follow Maryland's lead would be in response to the pressures of
389. Id. at 125.
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their own independent service stations rather than in response to
those business interests disadvantaged by the Maryland rule, a
very different group comprising vertically-integrated firms.
Moreover, unlike in Hunt, the Maryland statute did not undermine
any other state's pro-commerce practices or laws. Instead, it
primarily affected the business decisions of private firms. The
decisions of other states to allow or to prevent economically efficient
producer-owned or refiner-owned retail service stations were
entirely unaffected by a decision by the Maryland legislature either
to allow or to prohibit such firms.
This is not the case in Hunt. While the effect of sustaining the
North Carolina statute on the Washington apple producers'
ultimate marketing practices remained an empirical question, at a
minimum, sustaining the proscription against non-USDA grading
threatened to force those producers to adopt a uniform marketing
strategy that would retain the North Carolina market for its
growers, thus preventing whatever additional premium was
attached to the apples if graded on the Washington scale. The result
could have been a potentially significant reduction in sales
throughout the nation. Alternatively, if the Washington producers
elected to have more than one marketing scheme to accommodate
the North Carolina statute, then other states might have followed
suit, insisting on scaled-down USDA grading whenever another
state allowed its producers to signal superior quality with respect
to competitive produce that the USDA grading system could not
disclose.
The Exxon case is difficult because the rent could not have arisen
but for commerce, but the rent was not the product of-and thus did
not threaten to undermine-the pro-commerce laws or dominant
practices of other states. Exxon thus supports the intuition that the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is concerned more with the
undermining of pro-commerce regimes of other states than with
securing the efficient allocation of resources that can be compromised through in-state rent seeking. As such, the game
theoretical analysis of Exxon and Hunt, and of the dormant
Commerce Clause generally, bolsters the intuition that the doctrine
is designed to promote political rather than economic union. We are
now ready to revisit the final puzzle, namely, why the Court has
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disallowed reciprocity statutes that appear to impose barriers to
mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma.
c. The Reciprocity Cases Revisited
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,3 9 the Supreme Court
struck down a provision of a Nebraska statute that conditioned the
withdrawal of groundwater for export on a reciprocal right to have
such water imported from the intended state of destination. While
the Court upheld other provisions of the Nebraska statute that
were linked to conservation,"9 ' it applied strict scrutiny to strike
down the reciprocity provision. As suggested previously, applying
a simple tit-for-tat analysis suggests that the Nebraska statute
was indeed pro-commerce. After all, if affected states are choosing
whether to permit or prohibit water exports, they would presumably be favorably influenced, and thus more likely to permit
such experts, with the Nebraska statute in place.
In addition, different states have different degrees of market
power over particular commodities. A state that is a relatively
minor player in water exports might be subject to in-state pressures
by conservationists to retain water for in-state use. The conservation interests in another state that is a bigger player in the
water market might take the Nebraska statute as an opportunity
to justify a similar measure. The Nebraska statute at issue in
Sporhase, if sustained, threatened to confer a rent upon those who
favored conservation at the expense of commerce in a direct sense.
Other states might take the bait and use a decision to sustain the
reciprocity statute as an opportunity to enact anti-trade measures.
Whatever benefit Nebraskans would receive from their conservation
efforts would thus threaten to undermine interstate trade by having
a direct and deleterious effect on the otherwise pro-trade practices
or laws of neighboring states. The difficulty with this story, however, is that if Nebraska perceived itself to be a small player that
could be harmed by opening up such an option to other states, it
would presumably have a disincentive to provide other states that
option through the reciprocity statute. Moreover, such statutes can
be narrowly tailored to the market-here groundwater-in which
390. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
391. See supra note 134 (quoting relevant provision).
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even a peripheral player generally possesses substantial market
power.
The preceding analysis, however, suggests that the Court might
presume that whenever a state law directly implicates the laws
of another state, as in the extraterritoriality cases, the probable
explanation is to secure a rent that would not be available but for
the pro-commerce laws or practices of the other state. If so, then
one possible explanation for the counterintuitive holdings in the
reciprocity cases is that the Court has implicitly categorized these
cases on the wrong side of its dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
If the Court treated those cases for what they are-cases that
present laws intended to limit mutual defection in a prisoners'
dilemma-then the Court would have a strong normative foundation for presuming in their favor. But by instead focusing on the
proxy of extraterritorial effect, the Court has implicitly and
erroneously assumed that the law intends to confer a rent at the
expense of commerce. While this provides a potential positive
explanation for the case results, it does not provide a compelling
normative foundation. The fact remains that such laws are likely
welfare-enhancing. That said, the cost of the Court's rule is
probably relatively low since any protectionist laws that are more
likely to pass without a reciprocity law in another jurisdiction in
place are also likely to be an independent violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.
d. Summary
Table 8 summarizes the preceding discussion.
Table 8: Multiple Nash Equilibrium Cases
Category

Disrupting
Nash or Path

ExtraTerritorial

Facially
Neutral Law

Induced
Equilibrium
Game

Effects;
Antitakeover

that
Potentially
Limits
Market
Conditions

Out-of-State

Intrastate
Rent Seeking
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Case

Kassel; Bibb

Healy I and
II; Edgar v.
MITE

Hunt

Exxon; CTS

Comments

Challenged
laws intended
to divert
traffic around
state, rather
than to select
preferred
alternative
pure Nash
equilibrium,
with effect of
thwarting
positive gains
associated
with network
externalities
in neighboring
states. Cases
reveal
importance of
default status
of dormant
Commerce
Clause
doctrine, in
event that
Congress
determines
rejected Nash
outcome to be
superior.

Challenged
laws seek to
protect instate
consumers
by limiting
application
of market
forces in
other states,
and thus to
confer rents
that could
not have
arisen but
for the procommerce
regimes or
practices of
other states
(Healy I and
II), or seek to
protect local
shareholders
at the
expense of
efficient
tender offer
rules in other
jurisdictions
(Edgar).

Challenged
law seeks to
benefit instate apple
producers by
conferring a
rent that can
only be made
available by
limiting the
operation of
a widely
accepted
marketing
regime from
a competitor
state, with
the threat to
force a
common
marketing
regime that
would
prevent
consumers of
superior
apples from
identifying
and paying a
premium for
that superior
quality.

Challenged
laws confer
benefits to
in-state
interests, but
do so in a
manner that
transfers
wealth from
diffuse to
organized
interests.
The resulting
inefficiencies
are
presumed
beyond the
limits of the
dormant
Commerce
Clause
doctrine.

Presumption of Effort
to Disrupt Benign Multiple
Nash Equilibrium Game

Presumption of
Intrastate Rent
Seeking

4. A PreliminaryAssessment of Maine RX
In the October 2002 term, the Supreme Court issued two
decisions that implicate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
The decisions neither change the contours of the dormant
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Commerce Clause doctrine in any significant respect nor do they
present any substantial tension with the analysis set out in this
Article. Because one of these decisions, Hillside Dairy, Inc. v.
Lyons,3 92 focused solely on the question whether a federal statute
was intended to exempt a California milk marketing order from
dormant commerce clause scrutiny and does not address the merits
of the underlying dormant Commerce Clause challenge,3 9 it is not
necessary to review that decision here. While Pharmaceutical
ResearchandManufacturersofAmerica v. Walsh (MaineRX) 94 also
arose in a posture that prevented the Court from fully assessing the
dormant Commerce Clause issue, it is worth offering a brief
assessment of that decision, which represents the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement in this area.
Maine RX is more important for its preliminary resolution of an
important question of Medicaid preemption than it is for its
relatively cursory treatment of the dormant Commerce Clause
issue. That said, the relationship between the two issues, and the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis itself, provide the basis for a
significant additional datum supporting this Article's game theoretical analysis. To understand the dormant Commerce Clause
issue, it is first necessary to review the preemption issue.
In Maine RX, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit of a federal
district court order granting a preliminary injunction against
Maine RX, a program established in 2000, and similar to those in
several states, through which the State of Maine provides lowcost pharmaceuticals to needy residents who do not meet the
eligibility criteria for Medicaid. 95 The challenged program
required pharmaceuticals to enter into rebate agreements with
Maine RX, the proceeds of which were then distributed to
participating pharmacies in Maine to compensate for offering the
392. 123 S. Ct. 2142 (2003)
393. See id. (holding that federal regulation concerning the composition and labeling of
fluid milk does not exempt California scheme requiring purchasers of out-of-state fluid milk
to pay into a price equalization pool from dormant commerce clause scrutiny).
394. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003)
395. One factual ambiguity was whether the program, because it was broadly worded, was
open to all Maine residents without regard to financial need, Maine RX, 123 S. Ct. at 1866,
or whether the incentives were such that any residents with an employer provided
prescription drug program would neither have an incentive to use, or be covered if she
elected to use, Maine RX. Id. at 1862-63 n. 14.
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covered drugs at a reduced cost. Those pharmaceuticals declining
to provide rebates equal to those for Medicaid purchases were
subject to notification to the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and more significantly, to the costly prior
authorization process for the Medicaid program as a precondition
to dispensing the medication through the state's Medicaid
3 96
program.
Without resolving several factual disputes concerning the Maine
RX program, the district court entered a preliminary injunction on
the ground that the program threatened to limit access to drugs to
Medicaid patients to benefit non-Medicaid patients. As a result, the
district court concluded that the program did not further a
Medicaid-related purpose and was therefore preempted by federal
law. 397 The Court of Appeals reversed on three grounds: first,
because the federal Medicaid program authorized states to require
prior authorization, the court determined that there was no actual
conflict between Maine RX and the federal program; second, the
court concluded that absent an actual conflict, the mere fact that
the imposed restriction failed to advance a Medicaid purpose did
not warrant the "strong medicine" of preemption; and third, the
court determined that even assuming the relevance of Maine's
motivation to the question of preemption, the goal of providing
medical services to poor-but non-Medicaid eligible-residents
might be consistent with the federal Medicaid program's overall
objective of advancing health care for persons in need.39
Because the case involved the propriety of a preliminary
injunction, the Supreme Court did not conclusively resolve the
merits of the underlying preemption claim. Writing in part for a
396. In a part of his opinion commanding a majority, Justice Stevens asserted that
Congress effectively ratified the practice by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the
"Secretary") ofapproving prior authorization programs for drug manufacturers not providing
rebates in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA). Id. at 1861. In 1993,
Congress further amended OBRA to allow states to use formularies subject to strict
limitations provided they comply with provisions in the 1990 Act requiring return calls
within twenty-four hours and, except for certain excluded drugs, the dispensing of emergency
supplies covering a seventy-two hour period. Id. at 1862. The program exempts single source
medications that 'fulfil[] a unique therapeutic function," from the preauthorization
requirement, and establishes a "Drug Utilization Review Committee" to make such
determinations. Id. at 1863.
397. Id. at 1865.
398. Id. at 1865-66.
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majority and in part for a plurality of four, Justice Stevens issued
what appears to be the narrowest grounds opinion on the likely
success of the preemption question, as needed to determine that the
court of appeals properly vacated the preliminary injunction. 9 9
Justice Stevens determined that the district court had improperly
construed the objectives of Medicaid too narrowly by failing to
consider three possible Medicaid-related objectives: helping needy
non-Medicaid eligible state residents, reducing Medicaid expenses
by helping borderline aged and infirm residents to avoid eventual
reliance on Medicaid, and facilitating the benefits of prior authorization when used.4 While identifying any possible Medicaid
purpose would not be sufficient to uphold the Maine RX program
against a preemption challenge, Stevens concluded that the district
court erred in assuming that in light of the discretion that the
program affords states in implementation, any impediment to
Medicaid drug choice, even if intended to further the interests of
non-Medicaid residents, was sufficient to preliminarily enjoin
Maine RX.

40

In the part of his opinion rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge as the basis for the preliminary injunction, Stevens

399. Justice Thomas determined that the competing policy considerations within the
federal medicaid program belied the claim that the overriding objective was to provide
pharmaceuticals to Medicaid patients, and also included considerations of cost. Id. at 1859,
1874-75 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). As a result, he would have found a
Medicaid purpose, or at least would have deferred to an agency finding locating such a
purpose, applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837(1984).
Justice Scalia determined that OBRA contained its own remedy, authorizing the Secretary
to cut off funding for noncompliant state programs, without intending federal statutory
preemption. Id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor, writing
for three, concluded that the program furthered no Medicaid purpose and was therefore
preempted. Id. at 1879, 1880 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that "[a] State may not... impose prior authorization to generate revenue for
purposes wholly unrelated to its Medicaid program" and "that the court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that petitioner demonstrated a likelihood of success on its preemption claim"). Justice Breyer, who joined the relevant parts of Stevens' opinion, also
produced a separate opinion that does not alter the line up of the Court.
400. Id. at 1867-68.
401. Id. at 1868-69. Stevens also rejected the argument that because Maine offered no
Medicaid related purpose it had effected a waiver, asserting instead that Maine simply
maintained it had no obligation to offer a Medicaid purpose. Id. at 1867. Stevens did not rule
on whether the Secretary's approval was required before the challenged program could go
into effect and did not speculate on the propriety of any potential responses to the program
by the Secretary. Id. 1869-70.
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commanded a majority. °2 First, Justice Stevens rejected the claim
that Maine had undertaken an extraterritorial regulation in
violation of Healy v. Beer Institute,4°3 observing that the scheme
does not regulate any transactions arising out-of-state.40 ' More
significantly, Stevens rejected an argument based upon West Lynn
Creamery that the program effected a seemingly neutral tax only to
then distribute the proceeds to in-state interests that would
otherwise oppose the scheme. Unlike in West Lynn Creamery,
Stevens noted that Maine RX did not tax members of the same
industry in- and out-of-state and pay off the in-state members of
the taxed industry. Instead, all pharmaceutical companies were
subject to the required rebate negotiations (on threat of prior
authorization), and the proceeds of all obtained rebates were
distributed to a different group altogether, namely participating instate pharmacies, as compensation for offering the covered drugs at
a discounted price. Because the regulation operated neutrally but
effectively burdened out-of-state businesses, Stevens' analysis
appears at first blush to place Maine RX closer to Exxon than to
West Lynn Creamery.0 5
On this reading, this case does not appear surprising. When
viewed from a game theoretical perspective, the challenged law
appears most obviously to represent an in-state wealth transfer. It
imposes costs on Medicaid participants who will experience delays
in obtaining medications for which the pharmaceutical is subject
to prior authorization, and who will possibly be required to obtain
alternative approved drugs. So viewed, the program appears to be
the product of a political conflict between two sets of constituents,
Maine's Medicaid patients and Maine's borderline non-Medicaid
eligible residents. The apparent political victory of Maine's uninsured might appear in tension with interest group theory, given
that this constituency is poor and not well organized, in contrast
402. Id. at 1870-71. Justices Thomas and Scalia would have rejected any dormant
commerce clause challenge that does not involve a facially discriminatory state statute. See
id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
403. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
404. Maine RX, 123 S. Ct. at 1871.
405. Thus Stevens noted that "[a] manufacturer could not avoid its rebate obligation by
opening production facilities in Maine and would receive no benefit from the rebates even if
it did so...." Id.. For an analysis that places this case closer to Hunt, see infra at 153-54.
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with Medicaid recipients, who although poor might have superior
means of political identification as a recognized constituency. A
more seasoned reading of public choice, however, recognizes that
the complex processes through which successful political coalitions
sometimes form can result in payoffs to groups of varying wealth,
size, and organization.
Regardless of whether the scheme challenges intuitions about
interest group participation, on its most obvious reading, the case
does not present a substantial challenge to this Article's game
theoretical model. The burdens of the law fall primarily on an
identifiable in-state constituency-Medicaid recipients-to benefit
another identifiable in-state constituency-those who are not
insured and who are not Medicaid eligible. If viewed as an intrastate transfer of wealth between these two groups, and thus as a
form of rent seeking, Maine RX is unlikely to cause other states to
follow suit. Individual states can, through their own political
processes, determine the appropriate payoffs to non-Medicaid
eligible infirm and elderly constituents for implementing the
Medicaid program. As a result, sustaining this law does not appear
likely to promote mutual defection in a prisoners' dilemma. And
because the case appears to constitute an in-state wealth transfer,
sustaining Maine RX also appears unlikely to undermine any
identifiable pure Nash equilibrium, pro-commerce Atrategy among
other states. 4 6
An alternative reading, however, suggests a possible threat to
something resembling a benign pure Nash equilibrium game. If we
assume that pharmaceuticals depend upon a certain market share
to support the needed research and development costs of issuing
new medications, even if that market share is subject to Medicaid
rebates, then the Maine RX program might have the effect of
diminishing that market share and thus burdening beneficiaries of
newly produced drugs not only in Maine, but in other states.
Additionally, the pharmaceuticals likely depend upon the nondiscounted sales within each state to offset the discounted Medicaid

406. For an article published prior to the Supreme Court decision which advocates an
opposite outcome, see Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx PrescriptionDrug Programand
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Linkage, 29 AM. J. L. &
MED. 7 (2003) (arguing that challenged program is facially discriminatory and burdens outof-state drug sellers).
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sales. In either case, by attempting to leverage Medicaid rebates to
benefit the non-Medicaid eligible residents on threat of removing
Medicaid market share (or at least delaying sales through prior
authorization), the Maine RX program threatens to compromise the
complex pricing scheme-one presumably facilitated by the
practices of those other states not seeking to leverage their
Medicaid rebates to benefit non-Medicaid eligible residents
-through which high volume discount (Medicaid) sales plus nondiscount sales (through employer health plans and to uninsured
residents) combine to ensure the required profitability to encourage
the research and development of emerging pharmaceuticals. On
this reading, along the relevant margin, residents in other states
will at least potentially be forced to bear some of the costs
associated with Maine's attempt to benefit its non-Medicaid eligible
uninsured residents. In that respect the case might move closer to
Hunt than to Exxon.
As stated above, the procedural posture of Maine RX prevented
the Court from finally assessing the dormant commerce clause
challenge. It will be interesting to watch, perhaps with the benefit
of an administrative determination and one subject to Chevron
deference, 7 how this case will eventually unfold.
CONCLUSION
A common critique of game theory-and of rational choice
generally-is that those who employ these methodologies tend to
rely upon the very efficiency-based premises that they are seeking
to further in their construction of analytical models. A careful game
theoretical analysis, however, has the potential to refute as well as
to verify the importance of rules or institutional practices the
principal purpose of which is to promote efficiency. The game
theoretical model of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
does not show that the Court has generated outcomes the best
explanation of which is to ensure that resources flow to their
most highly valued uses, unobstructed by state laws that have the
capacity to undermine a unified national market. Instead, the
model reveals a set of competing concerns that prove more
407. Maine RX, 123 S. Ct. at 1866-67 (noting that following a hearing, the Secretary's
determination would be presumptively valid).
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consistent with a political rather than economic vision of national
union. The Court routinely countenances laws that appear inconsistent with efficiency concerns and that impose potentially
significant costs upon the national economy. At the same time, the
Court sometimes strikes down state laws that appear welgrounded in concerns for economic efficiency. And yet, I have
argued, the game theoretical model provides a basis for understanding and for reconciling many of the most criticized results.
I do not contend that the Court's rulings in this area are
uniformly correct, or even that they are better than available
alternatives in all cases. Rather, I suggest that the Court's rulings
reflect a concern that states not enact laws affecting commerce that
undermine political union either by encouraging other states to
pursue like strategies, or by feeding off the pro-commerce cooperative strategies already in place in other states. I have no doubt
that the Court could have resolved certain cases and devised certain
doctrines in a manner that would produce more pleasing (dare I say
efficient!) results. But constructing a set of doctrines and case
results that encourage mutual respect between and among states
regarding their commerce-related laws or practices is certainly a
compelling-maybe even beautiful-project.

